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1. 
ABSTRACT 
The Role of a Minor Party 
A Comparative Study of the British Liberal Party 
and the Australian Country Party since 1918. 
2. 
The thesis examines the proposition that the role of a minor 
party is determined, not by its total strength expressed as a percentage 
of the national vote, but by how its strength is concentrated. 
Australia and Britain were chosen for the comparison because 
of the many similarities in political culture and in the extent of class 
voting. Each country has a party - the Country Party in Australia and 
the Liberal Party in Britain - which has had a distinct impact on the 
political scene in their respective countries. In the period from 1918 
to the present day neither party, at the national level, has ever held the 
largest number of seats in parliament let alone a majority of seats, and 
it is in this sense that they are herein defined as minor parties. 
In the thesis the constitutional background of and differences 
between Australia and Britain are reviewed, followed by a brief historical 
picture of each of the two parties being studied. The sources of supporc 
of the two parties are analysed and it is here that real differences emerge. 
The Country Party in Australia is a deliberately sectional party with a 
narrow rural base, whereas the British Liberal Party is more broadly based 
than either the Labour or Conservative Parties in Britain. 
3. 
Party leadership and organisation are then discussed. Both 
parties have had outstanding leaders, Earle Page and McEwen for the 
Country Party; Asquith, Lloyd George and Grimond for the Liberal Party. 
Both parties have had relatively fewer leaders than their major party 
opponents. However, whereas the Country Party has been free of serious 
splits the Liberal Party was shattered on the leadership struggles of 
Asquith and Lloyd George. 
Both parties have been identified with decentralisation of state 
power, the Country Party through its support, albeit sometimes lukewarm 
of the New States Movement; the Liberal Party through its espousal of a 
federal system for Britain with separate Welsh, Scottish and regional assem-
blies. Unfortunately for the British Liberal Party the beneficiaries of their 
policies in this area have been relatively new nationalist parties in both 
Wales arid Scotland. 
The major part of the thesis is devoted to a study of how the 
electoral systems in the two countries have, in practice, worked to the 
advantage or disadvantage of the Country Party and the British Liberal 
Party. The Country Party has been as consistently over-represented in the 
House of Representatives as the Liberal Party has been under-represented in 
the British House of Commons. With the even distribution of its support 
the introduction of the single transferable vote, in itself, would bring 
little benefit to the British Liberal Party in terms of seats. Multi-
member urban constituencies combined with some type of list system are the 
only way the Liberals are likely to obtain House of Commons seats in propor-
tion to their votes. 
4. 
Finally, the relations of the two minor parties with their 
respective major parties are considered. In the conclusion the future of 
the two parties is reviewed. In general terms it appears that the Country 
Party is faced with a slow decline. Although the British Liberal Party 
made a major breakthrough, in terms of votes, in the February 1974 elec-
tion, they were unable to maintain this momentum in the October election, 
even though they lost very little ground. In the long term they must 
make an inroad into Labour held seats if they are to progress further. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 1918, the British Liberal Party and the Australian 
Country Party have enjoyed comparable shares of the total national vote 
in their respective countries. Neither party, in over half a century, 
has ever had a clear majority at any time and, in this sense, both can 
be defined as minor parties. The Liberal Party in Britain excluding 
the Lloyd George Coalition government (1918-1922), the National Liberals 
(1931-1935) and the 1940-1945 wartime coalition, has never achieved any 
share in governmental power, whereas the Country Party has had a signifi-
cant share of power, primarily at the Commonwealth level but also in a 
number of the Australian States. 
The thesis examines the proposition that the role of a minor 
party is determined, not by its total strength expressed as a percentage 
of the national vote, but by how its strength is concentrated. The con-
centration of its strength is mainly determined by the relative narrowness 
of its policies and goals and the electoral environment, as represent ed 
by constitutional constraints and the electoral system. 
The topic is approached by first considering the constitutional 
framework in Australia and Britain and the historical development of the 
two parties since 1918. Their sources of support, party leadership and 
11. 
organisation, are analysed. The only major policy similarity is in their 
espousal of regionalism or new states, and the respective reasons for this 
policy are reviewed. Because of its impact on their respective fortunes 
the influence of the electoral system in Australia and Britain is examined 
in some detail. Finally the relations of the two parties with the other 
parties, and particularly the two major parties, is discussed since these 
relations reflect on their ability to achieve electoral success. In the 
concluding chapter, the validity of the thesis is examined in the light 
of the data presented and, from the basis of the thesis, a prediction 
made regarding the relative future role of the two parties considered. 
In order to provide a perspective for the whole thesis, an 
analysis has been made of the degree of "success", measured in years of 
government power, achieved by the Country Party and the British Liberal 
Party. This introduction also reviews the reasons for choosing these two 
particular parties, in these two countries, for the examination of the role 
of a minor party, with special reference to the type of governmental system, 
cultural and constitutional similarities and the influence of class cons-
ciousness. 
The relative success of the Australian Country Party and the 
British Liberal Party can most readily be measured in terms of the propor-
tion of time spent in government since 1918, expressed simply as years 
in government divided by the total years in the period 1918 to 1974. This 
is shown for Australia in Table 1 and for Britain in Table 2. The total 
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sum of these proportions is a measure of the extent to which coalition 
or composite governments have been in power and this sum is called the 
"coalition coefficient". 
Table 1 
Australia - Proportion of Years in Government by Party 
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Australian Labor Party .23 .63 .26 .25 .51 .54 .74 
Country Party .65 .37 .33 .07 .39 .35 .05 
Liberals and predecessors* .77 .37 .70 .75 .49 .46 .26 
Coalition Coefficient 1. 65 1.37 1.30 1.07 1.39 1.35 1.05 
* United Australia Party and National Party. 
Table 2 
Britain - Proportion of Years in Government by Party 
Conservatives 0.73 
Labour 0.36 
Lloyd George Liberals (1918-1922) 0.08 
National Liberals (1931-1935) 0.07 
Liberals 0.09 
Coalition Coefficient 1.33 
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The Lloyd George and National Liberals have been included 
in Table 2 be caus e of the difficulty in determining, in absolute terms, 
who were the true succesSors of the Liberal Party at the time. However, 
Ramsay MacDonald's National Labour Party (1931-35) has been excluded 
since it was totally divorced from the Labour Party. 
All data, for both countries, are for the lower Houses. All 
Country Party time in government has been as members of coalition or com-
posite governments, with the exception of two and a half years (1950-52) 
in Victoria when they formed a minority government, with ALP support, even 
though they held only one fifth of the seats in the legislature. This would 
be similar to the Liberal Party in Britain winning 125 seats, the Conserva-
tives 260 seats and Labour 240 seats and the Liberals forming a minority 
government - this particular seat distribution would have been very closely 
in line with the actual votes received by the parties in the February 1974 
general election. The average coalition coefficient for the seven Austra-
lian lower houses is 1.31, very similar to that for Britain despite the 
differences in the electoral systems. In this respect, it is also of 
interest to note that Tasmania, which is the only State to have proportional 
representation for election to the House of Assembly, has the lowest coali-
tion coefficient. 
The British Liberal Party is often viewed as a Centre Party 
though, as discussed in Chapter 4, this may not be the way in which the 
Liberal Party regards itself. In some respects, the Country Party 
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is more 'conservative' on for example such matters as the retention of 
capital punishment, than the Liberal Party of Australia. It would like 
to see itself as 'the true middle of the road party' or the 'small man's 
1 party'. As a point of similarity on the political spectrum, this compa-
rison is questionable. 
One basic difference between Australia and Britain is in the 
form of governmental system. Lipson ranks the United Kingdom and older 
Commonwealth countries on a Unitary ---Federal Scale in the following 
order:- New Zealand, United Kingdom, South Africa, Canada and Australia 
with the latter as the most strongly federal. He then makes the comment 
that "the countries in which the two-party system is most firmly established 
(New Zealand and the United Kingdom) are the very two whose institutions are 
most definitely centralised and unitary" 2 A comparison on the role of 
minor parties could be made between Australia and Canada, two British origin 
federal systems. However, as Mayer defines federalism,3 Canada is a 
'congruent' federal system because the legal institutions of federalism are 
congruent with a cultural or economic environment reflecting geographically 
defined diversities, whereas Australia is a 'formalistic' federal system 
ID.W. Rawson, Australia Votes: The 1958 Federal Election. 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1961), p.53. 
2L• Lipson. "Party Systems in the United Kingdom and the 
Older Commonwealth: Causes, Resemblances, and Variations". Political 
Studies, VII (1959), p.20. 
3Lawrence Mayer. "Federalism and Party Behavior in Australia and 
Canada." The Western Political Quarterly. 23(4) December 1970, p.795. 
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with a relatively homogeneous society. In support of this he refers to 
1961 census data which shows the range of percentage Roman Catholics in 
the population as 17 to 23 per cent among the six Australian States and 
from 17.5 to 88.1 per cent among the ten Canadian Provinces. In addition 
in Canada the linguistic range is even greater with a minimum of 3.7 per 
cent of the population, in Newfoundland, showing French as their first 
language, to a maximum of 80.6 per cent in Quebec. It was not desired to 
introduce differences such as these into the comparison though there is 
obviously no reason why the hypothesis on the role of minor parties could 
not be tested against Canadian conditions. 
The similarities between Australian and United Kingdom political 
culture are illustrated by some of the areas where the two countries are 
r~nked together in the Banks and Textor data,las follows: 
Interest Articulation by Institutional Groups is Limited. 
Interest Articulation by Associational Groups is Significant. 
Interest Articulation by Anomie Groups is Very Infrequent. 
Interest Articulation by Political Parties is Moderate. 
Interest Aggregation by Political Parties is Significant. 
Interest Aggregation by the Executive is Moderate. 
Interest Aggregation by the Legislature is Moderate. 
Party System is Qualitatively Class-Oriented or Multi-Ideological. 
lArthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor. A Cross-Polity Survey 
(Cambridge (Mass.): M.I.T. Press, 1963), from data printouts. 
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Political Leadership is Moderately Elitist (U.K.) or 
Non-Elitist (Australia). 
Bureaucracy is Modern. 
Character of Legal System is Cornman Law. 
Although there are numerous European countries where minor 
parties playa significant role, none is as closely comparable as 
Australia and Britain. One final point of similarity is in the extent 
of class voting. Alford definedl an index of class voting as the per-
centage of manual workers voting for Left parties minus the percentage 
of non-manual workers voting for Left parties and found, over the ten 
year period 1952 to 1962, that the mean index for Britain was 40, 
Australia 33, U.S.A. 16 and Canada 8. He also found 2 that the mean 
class voting index when two class characteristics (education, income, 
subjective social class and trade union membership each with occupation) 
were considered together, showed an index for Britain 10 to 20 percent 
higher than Australia, but nearly double that for the U.S.A. and three to 
nearly six times as high as for Canada. Alford advanced several reasons 
for this, particularly between Britain and Australia on the one hand and 
the U.S.A. and Canada on the other, namely - lower per capita national 
income; the explicit links of the trade unions with the Labour parties 
lRobert R. Alford, Party and Society. (Chicago: Rand McNally 
& Co., 1963), p.102. 
2Ibid., p.106. 
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in Australia and Britain; significantly lower number of students per 
1,000 population in higher education, as an indicator of lower social 
mobility; and also the significantly lower ratio of salaried workers 
to wage-earners in manufacturing establishments, as an indicator of 
greater stratification in the work force l • As will be seen later, and 
particularly in chapter 5, class voting is a significant factor in 
British and Australian politics. The domination of class politics 
2 
pulls the major parties to the Left, compared with the U.S.A. and Canada . 
Because of its significance, in terms of voting behaviour, it was desirable 
to eliminate it as a variable and whether education, income or occupation 
were used, singly or in combination, as the measure of social position the 
level of class voting in Canada was lower in all r egions and in either 
m~jor religious grouping (Protestant or Catholic) than it is in Australia 
or Britain3 • 
With the elimination of class voting as a significant variable 
the major difference remaining, between Australia and Britain, lay in the 
electoral systems. In Britain the simple 'first past the post' system is 
now universal whereas in Australia the single transferable vot e is the 
most common with various forms of proportional r e pr esentation also used. 
lRob ert R. Alford, Pa rty and So c i e ty. (Chicago: Rand McNally 
& Co., 1963), pp. 117-130. 
2Ibid ., p. 300. 
3Ibid ., p. 250. 
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Finally, are the r6le and importance of a minor party worth 
considering or are they merely a nuisance on the larger national politi-
cal scene? Although they may well be a 'nuisance' to the major parties 
both the Country Party and the British Liberal Party espouse ideals that 
contain some sort of universal appeal. The Liberals appeal is more gene-
ral and states that "The Liberal Party exists to build a Liberal Society 
in which every citizen shall possess liberty, property and security, and 
none shall be enslaved by poverty, ignorance or conformity. Its chief care 
is for the rights and opportunities of the individual, and in all spheres 
it sets freedom first".l John McEwen described the Country Party as "a 
specialist par·ty. In the nature of things, we know more, as a political 
organisation, about life and industry outside the metropolitan cities than 
any 'other political party does. We have a more concentrated interest in it, 
because .we do not have representation from the metropolitan cities nor domi-
nation from the metropolitan cities".2 Although their political opponents 
may dispute the uniqueness of these claims, there are enough similarities 
and contrasts between the two parties being studied to make valid compa-
risons. 
lJohn D. Lees and Richard Kimber, eds. Political Parties in 
Modern Britain. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), p.lS. 
2 John McEwen, "The R6le of the Country Party" in Australian Politics: 
A Second Reader, ed. by Henry Mayer, 2nd.ed. (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, 1969), 
p.338. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND GREAT BRITAIN 
The principal constitutional differences between Australia 
and Great Britain are in the form of the Constitution and in the basic 
type of system. Australia is a Federal system, whereas Britain to-date 
has exemplified the strongly unitary system. Britain has no formal 
written Constitution unlike Australia which does. 
Under the Australian Federal system the States tend in many 
respects to be more powerful than the Provinces of Canada. There is a 
simple reason for this. All the States had Constitutions of their own 
that antedate that of the Commonwealth. Like the United States and Swiss 
constitutions the Australian constitution gives specified powers to the 
Federal Government and leaves all the residual powers in the hands of the 
states, which is the opposite of the case in Canada under the British 
North America Act. One view of the merits of written constitutions is 
that they "are, in the main, expressions of the distrust which a people 
feels of its government or a government feels of its people".l The U.S. 
Constitution is a prime example of the former but the Australian Consti-
tution was more an outgrowth of economic and geographical factors. The 
1 A.F. Pollard. The Evolution of Parliament (2nd ed.; 
London: Longmans, 1926), p.233. 
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British approach to written constitutions is attacke d by some critics 
on the basis that the British are" a most illogical people who act upon 
instinct, who are too lazy to abandon their clumsy groping and stumbling 
along the political path, and who so far have by great good fortune -
perhaps by some form of divine protection - escaped disaster. This 
intriguing picture is, of course, a rhetorical exaggeration, because 
in fact the British Constitution has in essence existed for a thousand 
years".l 
The primary feature of the British constitutional system is that 
there is no set of laws endowed with a higher legal authority than any 
other laws. The British constitutional system is composed of four main 
sources: 
1) Statutes 
2) Case or common law 
3) Conventions 
4) Views of constitutional authorities. 
There are over three hundred statutes and documents of some 
constitutional significance but the outstanding ones are as follows: 
p.2l0. 
1215 
1534 
1628 
Magna Carta 
Marches in Wales Act 
Petition of Right 
1 F.W.G. Benemy. The Elected Monarch (London: Harrap, 1965), 
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1641 The Grand Remonstrance 
1689 Bill of Rights 
1707 Act of Union with Scotland 
1832 Representation of the People Acts (The Reform Act). 
Further Acts followed in 1867, 1884, 1918, 1928, 1948, 
1949 and 1969 • 
1911 Parliament Act 
1931 Statute of Westminster 
1972 European Communities Act. 
The Acts through to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the 
ensuing Bill of Rights were primarily concerned with the struggle between 
King and Parliament. The nineteenth century saw the basic reforms that 
eventually led to universal suffrage at age of eighteen and the limiting 
of the powers of the House of Lords. The Statute of Westminster gave reco-
gnition to the sovereign powers of the Dominion governments and the Euro-
pean Communities Act in taking Britain into the European Common Market may 
bring about future political changes. Many of the major statutes were the 
products of constitutional crisis and contain the terms of settlement of 
h . 1 t ose crlses • The 1534 and 1706 Acts formally united Wales and Scotland 
with England and it was not until 1966 that Plaid Cymru first elected a mem-
ber to the House of Commons, followed a year later by the first Scottish 
1 Gwendolen M. Carter. The Government of the United Kingdom 
(2nd.ed.; New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967), p.28. 
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National Party member. Both these parties are more secessionist than 
even federalist and with the Liberal Party committed to some form of 
federalism there is the possibility in the future that Britain will 
ceas~ to be a unitary state. 
Case or common law has cumulatively developed over the centu-
ries as a result of court decisions. These decisions have been the basis 
of the rule of law, though it can be argued that respect for the rule of 
law can be weakened if the fundamental laws can be too readily changed 
at the dictate of the political party with the most seats in the House 
of Commons. This question is explored in more detail later since it is a 
risk that is underlined by the gross under-representation in the 1974 House 
of Commons of the large Liberal vote. In Australia, it tends to be under-
lined for the opposite reason - out-of-proportion Country Party influence due 
to major differences in the value of an urban and a country vote. In the 
end, the protection of the constitution is in the hearts and minds of the 
peoplel and common law is clearly perceived as protecting the fundamental 
liberties of the citizens and imposing restrictions on arbitrary govern-
mental power. This is a unique feature of British law and is not universal 
throughout . the so-called British Dominions. South Africa, in the pursuit 
of apartheid, has severely curtailed judicial independence. In the 
Province of Quebec a person may be acquitted by a jury and the Government 
1 Gwendolen M. Carter. The Government of the United Kingdom 
(2nd.ed.; New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967), p.29. 
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can appeal the acquitbal to a higher court, where the accused has no right 
to trial by jury, and secure a conviction. 
Conventions and customs are important in the British system. 
The method of selection and the powers of the Prime Minister are not laid 
down by statute but are a matter of convention, and conventions do change 
with time. The views of constitutional authorities carry great weight in 
times of constitutional crisis and range from Bracton, a mid-thirteenth 
century royal judge, through Fitzherbert (the early Tudors), Coke (Chief 
Justice under Elizabeth I and James I), Blackstone in the eighteenth cen-
tury to Jennings of more recent times. The strength of the British system 
has been its pragmatic approach to the problems of the day which has led 
to some debatable 'solutions'. Because Northern Ireland had its own Par-
liament it was deliberately under-represented, by about thirty percent, i n 
the House of Commons relative to its population, whereas Wales and Scotland , 
because they have no parliament of their own, as yet, are equally delibera-
tely over-represented - Wales by about nine percent and Scotland by 
fifteen percent. The danger of pragmatic solutions is that as circumstance s 
change the basis for the solution may disappear but vested interests may be 
opposed to further changes. If the secret of success in making the British 
system work is the willingness to seek reasonable compromise, then extr c-
mism and political polarisation are its greatest dangers. As Benemy points 
1 
out if the supreme merit of an unwritten constitution is its flexibility 
1 Benemy, p.248. 
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there is also the danger that the opportunity is provided for a dicta-
torship, if not of a single individual, then of an oligarchy which could 
lead eventually to a paternalistic authoritarian government. "Parliament 
could quite legally, extend its own term of office forever. turn England 
into a republic, make Buddhism the established religion, or restrict 
1 the right to vote to women of seventy and overll. The only reason any 
of the things in the quotation are absurd is if the actions of Parliament 
lie in responsible self-restraint. The use of Parliament to f urther conser-
vative anti-unionism or Labour pro-nationalization to extreme levels can 
only undermine the moral authority of Parliament to speak for the nation 
as a whole. Although similar policies occur in similar form in Australia 
the existence of a federal system with a written constitution and judicial 
review may tend to modify the pace of radical change. 
The Australian Constitution has another feature in common with 
the Swiss Constitution and that is the provision for holding a referen-
dum, but only on changes to the Constitution proposed by the Commonwealth 
Parliament. "Why could not the foolish Swiss realize, asked a prominent 
British legal writer, that it was Parliament which was sovereign, and not 
the people? This really is the reductio ad absurdum of the British concept 
2 
of Parliamentary government". This aspect is considered in detail later, 
1 Carter, p.3l. 
2 . 
Colin Clark. Australian Hopes and Fears. (London: Hollis 
& Carter, 1958), p.100. 
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when the electoral systems are reviewed, and which shows that virtually 
one out of every five British voters (for the Liberal Party) are effec-
tively disenfranchised. 
Australian history starts at the end of the eighteenth century 
with the arrival of Captain Arthur Phillip, R.N., as the first Governor 
of New South Wales with the First Fleet carrying 290 officials, marines, 
women and children, 520 male convicts and 197 female convicts. In 1823 
the British Parliament enacted the New South Wales Act, which created 
separate Supreme Courts for NSW and Van Diemen's Land (now Tasmania) and 
a small nominated Legislative Council. In 1841, New Zealand was proclaimed 
a separate colony and in 1842 the first Australian Constitution Act was 
enacted by the British Parliament setting up a Legislative Council for NSW 
with two-thirds of its members elected. 
It was in 1846 that the first officially recorded suggestion 
for a central authority over all the Australian Colonies was made - by 
Governor Fitzroy of NSW. In 1851 Victoria was separated from NSW and in 
1856 South Australian Constitution Act was passed and the first parliaments 
under responsible government met in NSW, Victoria, Tasmania and South 
Australia. Three years later the northernmost district of NSW was proclaimed 
the separate colony of Queensland and in 1870 partial responsible govern-
ment was introduced in \~estern Australia. 
In 90 years the Australian population had grown from one thousand 
to two and a quarter million people. The first Federal conference was held 
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in Sydney in 1883 and in 1885 the British Parliament enacted the Federal 
Council of Australasia Act which enabled Fiji, New Zealand, NSW, South 
Australia, Queensland, Victoria, Tasmania and Western Australia to parti-
cipate voluntarily in a confederate style constitutional arrangement. 
The first session of the Federal Council of Australasia met in 
Hobart the following year but little of note occurred until a second meeting 
was held in Melbourne in 1890. This called for the convening of a National 
Australasian Convention, which met in Sydney in 1891 and approved a draft 
federal constitution for submission to the Australasian colonies. Efforts 
to getPar1ia~entary approval failed and in 1895 the conference of Premiers 
of the six Australian colonies declared that Federation was needed, with 
a Convention of directly elected representatives from each Colony to carry 
out the drafting of a constitution. 
Two years later, in March 1897, the first meeting of the Austra-
lasian Federal Convention met in Adelaide with directly elected delegates 
from all the colonies except Queensland. A second meeting was held six 
months later in Sydney, and finally a third meeting the following March in 
Melbourne. The pace accelerated and in 1899 referenda in NSW, Queensland, 
South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria approved the proposed constitution. 
The electors of Western Australia followed suit in 1900 but the government 
of New Zealand advised the British Government that it did not wish, at that 
time, to join the proposed federation but wished to reserve its right to 
do so later. With the unanimity of the mainland colonies decided the British 
Parliament passed the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act and the 
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Commonwealth was formally proclaimed in Sydney on January 1, 1901. Origi~ 
nally the first Commonwealth Parliament opened in Melbourne. It was not 
until 1908 that Canberra was selected as the site of the capital and, 
nearly twenty years later, in 1927 that the seat of the Commonwealth was 
actually transferred from Melbourne to Canberra. 
In 1919 Australia was accorded separate representation at the 
Versailles Peace Conference, marking the first major step in the evolution 
of the development of an independent foreign policy for Australia. In 1930 
the first Australian Governor-General was appointed, but it was not until 
1952 that the first Canadian born Governor-General was appointed. It was 
not until 1942 that the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act was passed, 
retroactive to the date of the outbreak of the Second World War, September 
3, 1939, which made the Commonwealth Government no longer subject to control 
from Westminster. The States, it can be argued are still theoretically 
subject to the British Parliament but it is difficult to conceive of any 
situation where the British Parliament would be willing to intervene. 
The Australian Constitution, compared with those of some of the 
newer nations, is a reasonably concise document. Articles 9 and 31 lay 
down that the method of choosing senators shall be uniform for all the States 
but the methods for electing the House of Representatives shall be the same 
as for electing the State Lower Houses unless provided otherwise by Parlia-
ment. The final clause is most important since it means that Parliament, 
or the majority at any particular time, can alter the electoral laws. In 
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fact, this is the current Australian Labor Party policy. They wish to 
eliminate the proportional representation features of the present elec-
toral system in order to destroy the influence of the Democratic Labor 
Party and weaken the Country Party. From the ALP viewpoint this is cer-
tainly practical power politics but raises questions of the rights of 
minorities, which are not always too well respected even under supposedly 
democratic regimes. 
Article 53 restrains the Senate from originating any money 
bills or from making amendments to money bills. However, the Senate may 
return such bills to the House of Representatives . Since this represents 
an obvious source of conflict there is provision, in Article 57, for resol-
ving such conflicts by a double dissolution of both Houses and simultaneous 
elections, such as was experienced in May of this year. If there is st i ll 
a deadlock the Governor-General may convene a joint sitting, which then 
requires an absolute majority of the total number of members of the Senate 
and the House of Representatives, which the ALP now has. 
The powers of the High Court of Australia are defined in 
Articles 71-80. Apart from its judicial review power over all Parliamen-
tary legislation it is also the final court of appeal from the State 
Supreme Courts. 
The articles dealing with the establishment of New States are 
discussed in detail (see chapter 7). Article 128 lays down the amending 
procedure for the Constitution which requires a proposed amendment to 
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have the approval of the House of Representatives, the Senate, a majority 
of all electors voting and a majority of electors in a majority of States. 
It is this final provision that has proven the stumbling block for many 
proposed amendments, and Tasmania, the smallest State, has exercised a 
negative vote the most often. To date the Constitution has acted as a 
brake on the more extreme socialist measures of the ALP. This has vividly 
illustrated the fact that although voters faced with the choice of electing 
a government may, on balance, decide to vote for a particular party when 
they have to decide on an extreme aspect of that party's policy they vote 
against it. It is probably reasonable to surmise that there are a fair 
number of Labour Party voters in Britain who prefer the Labour Party policy 
on the Social services but who would vote against a specific question rela-
ting to further nationalisation of a large range of industry. This matter 
relates directly to the earlier comment on the Swiss Constitution and the 
use of the referendum. The British political establishment is firmly 
opposed to the referendum. I would surmise that one reason for this oppo-
sition lies in the aristocratic tradition that the people are best governed 
by their 'betters', as well as the common argument that the use of the 
referendum detracts from the responsibility of a Government to govern. 
Class attitudes bedevil British society and nowhere more so than in polit i c s . 
Edward Heath was the first grammar school student to become the Conserva-
tive leader. Some Labour leaders, whilst urging comprehensive schools fo r 
the masses, send their own children to public (which in Britain means private) 
schools. Class snobbery underlay the conflict between Herbert Asquith and 
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David Lloyd-George. There are ill-informed, ignorant and bigot ted elec-
tors at all class levels, in and out of Parliament. The objection to the 
referendum is that it poses a threat to the party establishments and many 
parties appear to feel that government is for the benefit of political 
parties not for the people. 
There are some significant features of the Australian system 
in practice that are different from that in Great Britain. The life of 
the Commonwealth House of Representatives, and many of the State Houses, is 
only three years not five as in Britain. Two-thirds of the members of the 
Federal House are elected from NSW and Victoria, and Tasmania has five seats, 
the minimum number for a State as laid down in the Constitution. All the 
States have Upper Houses except Queensland which abolished its in 1922. All 
the upper houses have a normal term of six years, except NSW which is twelve. 
The NSW Legislative Council, as the Upper House is known, is not elected 
directly but by a joint sitting of both Houses of the NSW legislature. 
The Federal Senate is elected under proportional representation and the 
State Legislative Councils with a preferential voting system. 
Ministers can be drawn from both Houses, both at the Federal 
and State level, with the Prime Minister or Premier and the majority of 
the ministers from the lower house. The number of ministers varies from 
State to State. Coalition and minority governments are common at both the 
Federal and State levels. The Country Party governed Victoria with first 
the support of one party and then the support of another, even when the 
Country Party itself was the smallest of the three parties in the Legislative 
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Assembly. As a minority Government can continue only so long as it can 
keep the support of the other party, changes of Government have been 
frequent in some States. Victoria had fifty-seven Governments and thirty-
eight Premiers in a century, its shortest Government (in 1943) having lasted 
only five days. New South Wales had the shortest Government on record in 
1 1921 - a Ministry that lasted only seven hours • 
The size of the various Australian Houses is small by British 
standards. The Australian House of Representatives has 127 members compa-
red to 630 in the British House of Commons. The Tasmanian Legislative 
Council is the smallest Upper House with only nineteen members, whilst 
the Tasmanian Lower House has only thirty-five members and the South Aus-
tralia Lower House forty- seven. Even the NSW Lower House, which is the 
l?rgest of the State Lower Houses, has only ninety-six members. The 
Federal Senate has sixty members and with proportional representation the 
two major parties are assured of complete safety for two-thirds of their 
teams. A consequence of these small numbers is that Government majorities 
of one or two are fairly common and the effects of major illness, death 
or defection are enormously magnified. This may account for some of the 
very bitter feuds that accompany party splits in Australia. In Britain, 
the effect of an individual member leaving his party is minimal, though 
this does not seem to lessen the vigour with which such heretics are pursued, 
1 C.R. Forell, How We Are Governed. (2nd.ed.; Melbourne: 
F.W. Cheshire, 1966), p.32. 
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particularly on the Labour side. Vacancies in the Australian Senate are 
filled by vote of the relevant State Parliament. In some, for example 
Western Australia, it is conventional to treat such seats as the property of 
the late incumbents party; others subsume them in state cabinet patronage 
1 
or by a joint sitting of the State Houses • 
Some of the financial features of the Australian Government are 
unique. Overborrowing by one state could have affected the credit of all 
the other states and of the Commonwealth. A financial agreement was appro-
ved by all the Governments and by referendum and came into force in 1928. 
This provided that all borrowing by the State or Commonwealth Governments 
(except for the latter in the case of purposes of defence) should be made 
only through a Loan Council. This Council consists of a representative of 
each State and of the Commonwealth, the latter with two votes and a cas t ing 
vote. It therefore requires only two States to vote with the Commonwealth 
to block the other states. Tasmania, Western Australia and to a lesser 
extent South Australia were often in financial trouble and since 1933 pay-· 
ments from the Commonwealth Treasury have been made through the CommomvealtL 
Grants Commission. These are a form of 'equalisation' payments but the 
effect has been to lower the level of fiscal responsibility of these smaller 
states and to encourage horse-trading between them and the Commonwealth for 
support to the latter on the Loan Council. As a specific example of the type 
lA.F. Davies, Australian Democracy: An Introduction to the Political 
System. (Melbourne: Longmans, Green, 1958), p.49. 
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of problem this raises, NSW and Victoria were interested in building nuclear 
power stations in the latter half of the sixties. However, such plants 
require large amounts of capital and the large states could not see the 
small states agreeing to this, since there was no direct benefit to them. 
Like most compromises the system is not perfect but on balance it has 
probably been a great deal fairer than leaving all the financial power to the 
big states. 
There has been only one major move to revise the Constitution as 
a whole. The first moves to call a new Constitutional Convention came from 
the Parliament of Victoria in 1970. These were the outcome of State discontent 
with the results of Premiers Conferences and the workings of the Commonwealth 
Loan Council. Victoria also was upset by several High Court decisions that they 
considered to be unfavorable to the State. For a variety of reasons all the 
Premiers wished to review certain sections, and not the same ones for each 
State and they agreed that the Convention delegates should be made up of 
sixteen from the Commonwealth parliament, twelve from each State, with two 
each from the Northern Territories and the Australian Commonwealth Territory 
and a local government delegation of three from each State. However, the 
delegations from the Territories and the Local Governments would have only 
one vote for each delegation. The Northern Territories were also allowed 
to send two non-voting representatives from its Legislative Council. The 
party composition of the parliamentary delegations are shown in table 3 
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Table 3 
Composition of Parliamentary Delegations 
to the 1973 Constitutional Convention at Sydneyl 
A.L.P. D.L.P. LIB. C.P. L.C.L. IND. TOTAL 
Commonwealth 8 1 4 3 16 
New South Wales 6 3 3 12 
Queensland 5 3 4 12 
South Australia 6 1 5 12 
Tasmania 5 3 4 12 
Victoria 4 5 3 12 
Western Australia 6 4 2 12 
Northern Territories 1 1 2 
Total 41 1 23 15 5 5 90 
In July 1973, the Steering Committee listed the following main 
2 
areas of concern • 
(a) Methods of amending the Constitution and varying the dis-
tribution of powers. 
(b) Additional powers that may be conferred to enable the Com-
momvealth to exercise adequate powers to manage the Austra-
lian economy. 
(c) The financial provisions of the Constitution; and 
. (d) The legislative powers and immunities with respect to trade 
and commerce. 
1 J.E. Richardson. "The Australian Constitutional Convention, 
Sydney, 1973". The Australian Quarterly, 45(4) (December 1973), 106-108 
2Ibid .,p.91. 
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The Convention opened on September 3, 1973 in Sydney. In 
the opening address, Sir Robert Askin (Premier of NSW) identified the 
main problem as financial, "although the bulk of legislative powers and, 
as a corollary, responsibility for the great range of community services 
rests with the States, the bulk of financial resources required to main-
tain proper standards in existing services and to initiate new ones is in 
1 Conunonwealth control". 
Prime Minister Whitlam proposed the following constitutional 
2 
changes for approval. 
(i) Synchronisation of elections to the Senate and House of 
Representatives; 
(ii) An amendment to secure the principle of substantial 
equality of electoral divisions for all Parliaments in 
Australia; and 
(iii) A provision to require State Houses of Parliament to be 
elected directly by the people. 
The proposals to alter the existing Constitutional amendment PCJ-
cedure (article 128) met with little support from non-Labor State delegates. 
The Conunonwealth delegates were opposed to the proposal to allow the States 
to submit proposed Constitutional amendments 3 • 
lRichardson, p.92 
2Ibid .,p.93 
3Ibid ., p.96 
-----.. .. . _-. . ... . . . 
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There were numerous references l to the Canadian income tax sys-
tem whereby all the Provinces (except Quebec) get the Federal Government 
to collect an additional percentage of income tax for the Provinces own use. 
Sir Charles Court, then the Western Australia Opposition Leader 
and now Premier, referred Western Australia secessionist sentiment 2 to . 
In July 1974, he 3 federal that ignored commented that any government seces-
sionist feeling in Western Australia did so at its own peril. While the 
possibility that Western Australia will become a separate, independent 
nation is regarded in most political quarters as remote, the growth of the 
secessionist movement is a measure of the opposition aroused, not only in 
the west but also in other states, towards moves by the government of Prime 
Minister Gough Whitlam to enlarge the power of the central government at 
the expense of the states. 
Although far from perfect, the Australian Constitution does 
appear to provide a better climate for the recognition of minority politi-
cal views. The supremacy of Parliament, as practised in Britain, may serve 
only as a cloak for the supremacy of the two major party machines. Although 
this is infinitely preferable to supremacy by a single party it offers far 
less than ideal representation of other viewpoints. Both the Labour and 
Conservative parties in Britain embrace a wide range of views, but the 
lRichardson,pp.97,9S. 
2Ibid .,p.99. 
3 The Montreal Star, July 31, 1974, p.2. 
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opportunities for dissident groups to directly alter legislative policy 
are much more limited than in say the United States Congress or as a 
separate party such as the Australian Country Party. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALIAN COUNTRY PARTY 
Rural political groups of various hues were starting to or-
ganise at the end of the nineteenth century and "while the emergence 
of the Australian Country Party was undoubtedly aided by the marketing 
and price controls used during World War I, their appearance on the 
political stage makes sense only if it is seen as the product of factors 
which were operating well before 1914. At one level, the country party 
movement can be explained as an outcome of three broad factors - the 
feeling of political separatism which the insecurity of their industry 
gave the wheat farmers, especially those in the newly developed regions; 
the strength of the agrarian tradition in rural Australia; and the pro-
gressive development of organisational and political techniques by farm 
groups from about 1870 onwards. At another level, the movement within 
1 
each state was advanced or retarded by local factors." 
At a lower level, but obviously illustrative of the emotional 
appeal of the Country Party is strong anti-city s en t iment, as cited by 
2 Gruen in the following quotation from an editorial in a country pap er: 
lB.D. Graham, The Formation of the Australian Country Parties 
(Canberra:Australian National University Press, 1966), p. 94. 
2 F.R. Gruen, "Rural Australia",in Australian Society:A Soc i o_l.?..-&.-
ical Introduction, ed. by A.F. Davies and S. Encel (New York: Ather t on 
Press, 1965), p. 256. 
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lilt is a shameful thing that a predominantly agricultural country such 
as ours should have overcrowded cities while rural areas are being denu-
ded of population •.• Wars are bred in overcrowded cities, the enfeeble-
ment and extinction of nations begins there". 
In considering rural Australian political development it is 
important to realise that the small farming communities of Australia and 
North America have little in common with the traditional peasant commu-
1 
nities of Western Europe. The peasant societies were a product of earlier 
feudal societies, whereas the farmers of the new lands felt beholden to 
no one. However, there are also significant differences between the poli-
tical evolution of the Australian farmers and their North American counter-
parts. The North American crusades against proprietary railway companies, 
grain elevator firms, and the great grain exchanges had only f a int echoe s 
in Australia where the state built railways, the grain trade was disorga-
nised, and most agricultural production was for home consumption2 because 
of the distance from foreign markets. The Australian farmer's frontier 
was economic rather than geographic. His life, and that of his family, was 
a hard one and he had to grow wheat on land where the squatter and the pas-
toral worker were the masters. 
The basic support for the formation of a distinctively Country 
Party came from four groups: 
1 Graham, p.291. 
2Ibid ., p.291. 
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graziers worried about rising tariffs 
dairy farmers unhappy about price-fixing methods 
conservatives fearful of Labor influence in the Hughes Natio-
nal Government 
returning soldiers (in 1919) contemptuous of exi sting 
parties. 
Apart from some "rural mystique" there is no Country Party 
political philosophy and Country Party conferences are poor places to go 
for discussions on foreign affairs, education, defence, industrial rela-
. h· 1 . 1 tlons or t e SOCla serVlces. The Country Party, pa rticularly at the 
Commonwealth level and in all the States except Victoria, has been strongly 
anti-labor for fear that a Labor Government would include agr i cultural 
workers in the arhltration system, would increase land taxes and would 
2 favour a leasehold rather than a freehold land system. There is irony in 
this anti-labor stance since the Country Party is far from being an unabashed 
'free-enterprise' party that their allies, whether Nationalist, United Aus-
tralia Party or Liberals, often claim to be. The Country Party believes 
in subsidies, guaranteed-prices, producer-controlled marketing schemes, 
soldier settlement and the maintenance of uneconomic ra i lways, all cont r ary 
to the inclinations of the tax-paying business community3 In fact, the 
IDon Aitkin. "The Australian Country Party", in Australian Poli-
tics: A Second Reader, ed. by Henry Mayer (Melbourne: F.W.Cheshire,1969),p.332 . 
2Louise Overacker. Australian Part i es in a Changing Society : 
1945-67. (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, 1969), p.243. 
3James Jupp, Australian Party Politics. (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1964), p.171. 
41. 
principal difference between Country and Australian Labor Pa rty policy, 
in agricultural affairs, is that the latter are less keen on incentives 
h h · . 1 t roug taxatlon conceSSlons Marketing and regulatory boards are as 
much a feature of A.L.P. governed states as those states where the Country 
Party is a part of government. Country Party advocacy of rura l road cons-
truction and insistence on the keeping open of uneconomic r a ilway lines 
has been a source of tension with its government partners in Queensland and 
Western Australia2• 
Subsidies and regulation in general do not lead to consistency 
in policy. Maxwell Newton3 describes the Australian pattern of regulation 
of primary industry as perhaps the most erratic form of regulation in exis-
tence. Some products qualify for outright subsidy; others do not. Some 
qualify for "home consumption price" schemes; others do not. Some qua l i f y 
for "price stabilisation schemes" based on publicly available "formulae" 
(wheat); others qualify for "price stabilisation"schemes but the methods 
used for determining the "cost of production" are shrouded in mystery -
this is particularly the case with sugar. The success of the farmer in 
obtaining this type of government support has encouraged the mineral produce r 
lJames Jupp, Australian Party Politics. (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1964), p.173 
2Ibid • ,P.176 
3 Maxwell Newton. "The Economy", in Australian Socie ty: A 
Sociological Introduction, ed. by A.F. Davies and S. Encel (New York : 
Atherton Press, 1965). p . 244. 
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and the manufacturer to seek similar benefits. This then l eads to the 
classic producer/consumer confrontation, which we also have in Canada, 
where it is difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle the interests of 
consumer as producer and producer as consumer. 
The Country Parties in the States and the Commonwealth "sur-
vived because of their solid regional and sectional support, the practi-
cality of their strategy, and the shrewdness of their leadership. As mem-
bers of composite State governments, and by hard bargaining, they won con-
cessions: bounties, special grants, better transport r electric power, 
telephone and other services for rural communities".l 2 Coleman makes the 
point that it is a characteristic of economic pressure groups, such as the 
Country Party, that they are politically naive outside their immediate range 
of economic interests. He cites as an example of this the conflict between 
the strong anti-communism stand of the party with its enthusiasm for trade 
with communist China. This may well not be naivete but rather a separation 
of internal and external policy, which is practised by many parties and 
governments throughout the world. There is no good reason why trade policy 
and ideology have to lead to the same goals. It is, however, true to say 
that the narrowness of Country Party overall policy in securing economic 
benefits for its supporters is a source of great strength. Not unnaturally 
1 Overacker, p.264. 
2 Peter Coleman. "The Liberal and Country Parties: Platforms, 
Policies and Performance", in Forces in Australian Politics, Australian 
Institute of Political Science--o?roceedings 29th Summer School), (Sydney : 
ANgus & Robertson, 1963), p.13. 
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the supporters are grateful and perhaps more importantly are much less 
inclined to switch support to either of the other two major parties, where 
their interests might be submerged under those of business and the trade 
unions. This is a basic difference from the British Liberal Party, which 
does claim a distinctive political philosophy and which does not serve par-
ticular interest groups except in terms of general policy. 
Colemads point was rebutted in the discussion of his paper by 
C.K. Reid l who stated that "the Country Party is undoubtedly a minority party 
and does not aspire to govern in its own right but i~ serves a vital purpose in 
Australian politics. It exists to represent the country electorates which 
in spite of their sparse populations produce at this stage of our develop-
ment the exports which enable us to grow, even to exist. In the last finan-
cial year the entire realisations of our wool and wheat exports only just 
met import requirements in raw and semi-finished materials for our secondary 
industries. City dwellers by the very nature of their surroundings and occu-
pations tend to be insulated from the problems of the more remote areas and 
in their way are probably just as prone as their country cousins to sectional 
bias. The Country Party has evolved naturally as a result of a steady demand 
from the electorate. It satisfies this demand and, although its greatest 
successes have undeniably been the implementation of its particular policies, 
it has general policies which are also continuously evolving so G,dt the 
Country Party will be around for a long time yet". 
1 Coleman, p.23. 
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Let us consider now first the history of the Fed eral Country 
Party and then the histo~y of the various States Country Parties with 
particular reference to how they became established and have maintained 
their existence. 
The history of the Federal Country Party is remarkably calm 
and stable. From Page's assumption of leadership in 1921 there have been 
only five leaders, himself, Cameron, Fadden, McEwen and Anthony. This com-
pares with nine for the other non-Labor party, including two with separate 
terms and eight for the A.L.P. In the same period th~ British Liberal 
Party has had seven leaders, Labour eight and the Conservatives nine. 
Th P h ff d 1 1 · 1 e arty as su ere on y one sp lt between Fadden and Page in 1939, 
and has had only one quarrel with its outside machine when the Victorians 
expelled John McEwen in 1937. 
On the outbreak of the First World War the first outlines of 
a country party were standing out clearly in New South Wales and Western 
Australia, were visible in Victoria and indistinct in the other states. 
The signs then indicated a small party with limited and scattered electoral 
resources. The 1919 General Election marked the turning point. In the 
2 
new Parliament a Federal Country Party was formed by eleven old and new 
members returned by the efforts or under the sponsorship (or at least 
1 Jupp, p.154. 
2L•F . Crisp. Australian National Government (Croydon: 
Longmans, 1963). p.219. 
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endorsement) of primary producers' organisations such as the Farmers' and 
Settlers' Associations and the Graziers' Associations. The Country Parties, 
when first formed,were highly vulnerable;l they were regionally based, they 
often suffered from a shortage of money, and they lacked leaders with par-
liamentary, as distinct from electoral experience. They were most fortunate, 
therefore, that their electoral bid was made at a time when the Australian 
party system was unstable. After 1916, the ALP, except in Queensland, was 
faced with making good the loss of strength it had suffered during the split 
over the conscription issue, and the National Party, formed in 1917 under 
Hughes the ex-Labor leader, was a precarious sectional alliance of free 
traders and protectionists, liberals, conservatives and ex-Labor men. Earle 
Page regarded Hughes as a disguised Socialist and spendthrift 2 and was 
waiting for a suitable time to topple him. Hughes went into the Gener a l 
Election of December 16, 1922 with a majority of one over all other parties 
combined. He emerged with thirty seats, ALP with twenty-nine, Liberals 
two and the Country Party fourteen. Page was in a strong position and played 
his cards well. He refused to serve under Hughes and negotiated with Bruce 
the terms of a coalition3 after Bruce was invited to form an administr3t:~on 
1 Graham, p.294. 
2 B.D. Graham. "The Country Party and the Formation of the Bruce -
Page Ministry". Historical Studies, Australia and New Zealand. 10(37) 
(November 1961), p.73. 
3Strictly speaking the Government so formed was a "composite 
ministry" rather than a "coalition" since each party retained its party iden-
tify and independence. In Britain the 1931 National Government was not a 
composite ministry since National Labour and National Liberal soon became 
indistinguishable from their conservative partners. The wartime coalition 
government under Winston Churchill, on the other hand, was really a composite 
ministry with party warfare merely suspended for the duration of hostilities 
overseas. 
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on February 3, 1923. The Country Party received five out of the eleven 
portfolios and agreement that Cabinet division on party lines constituted 
a negative vote. The Country Party could not repudiate Page's arrangements 
since this would have precipitated a crisis and possible dissolution. 
Hughes broke away from the Nationalists in 1929 and the ALP had an 
unhappy two years in office followed once again by the Labor leader, this 
time Lyons, breaking away and forming the conservative United Australia 
Party. In the 1931 General Election the U.A.P. secured an absolute majority 
of three, in a House of 75 members, and ruled without the Country Party. 
In 1934 they lost their absolute majority and once again had to share power 
with P~ge, but" this time the Country Party obtained only four portfolios to 
ten for theU.A.P. Page's rSle in the collapse of the U.A.P. in 1941 is consi-
dered in chapter 9 but from 1941 to 1949 the A.L.P. governed. 
In 1949, the A.L.P. was defeated and a Liberal/Country Party 
government ruled for the next twenty-three years. Country Party represen-
tation in the Cabinet and in the total number of Ministers remained steady 
at around twenty-five percent of the total. This figure was roughly in line with 
the relative distribution of seats between the Liberals and the Country Party 
but was out of line with its popular vote since the number of seats obtained 
by the Country Party was regularly in excess of the number proportional to 
its popular vote. The percent vote of the main federal parties is shown 
in figure 1. 
Western Australia has the oldest Country Party. In the October 
21, 1914 election eight farmers representatives were returned to the fifty 
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seat Legislative Assembly and subsequently joined together to form the 
state Country Party. The ALP had a majority of two, but during the 
1915/16 recess Labor lost two seats and the Country Party were left 
holding the balance of power and supported the Liberals in forming a govern-
ment on 25 July 1916. Monger was the local Country Party leader at this time 
and in September 1922 he proposed the following principles that a Country 
Party should follow regarding coalitions, or composite ministries, and the 
problem of retaining party independence. The six principles can be summa-
rised as follows: 
(1) Country Party has right to decide on its relationship with 
the other parties. 
(2) Country Party representation in the Cabinet shall be in 
proportion to its membership in the Assembly. 
(3) A Country Party member should be Deputy Premier if the Pre-
mier was from another party. 
(4) Where possible, the portfolios directly affecting the primary 
industries should be held by the Country Party. 
(5) The Leader of the Country Party shall have the right to 
recommend members of his party for the ministerial positions 
to be filled by Country Party members. 
(6) The Country Party should be consulted about all policy 
matters before legislation was brought before Parliament. 
The final point might appear obvious if the principle of Cabinet 
solidarity is being observed. However, its importance to the Country Party 
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lay in the possibilities for dealing and horse-trading with their govern-
ment partners in order to get Country Party proposed legislation adopted. 
The history of Western Australian government has been alterna-
ting periods of ALP and Liberal/Nationalist/Country Party composite 
government rule. The February 1971 General Election gave the ALP a majority 
of one in a 51 seat assembly, ending twelve years of Liberal/Country Party 
domination. In January 1974 the National Alliance was formed as a result 
of a merge between the Western Australian Country Party and the W.A. Demo-
cratic Labor Party. At the March 30,1974 General Election the Labor Govern-
ment was defeated and the Liberal/National Alliance secured a majority of 
seven. 
The history of the Country Party in Victoria is much more 
varied and has involved several splits in the Party. In over fifty-five years 
of separate exist ence, it has served in coalition for only brief periods. 
Otherwise it has preferred to give its support to governments formed from 
either of the other parties, or to rule with their supportl. 
In 1917 five members of the Victorian Farmers' Union were retur-
ned to the State Parliament, increased to thirteen in the 1920 election 
out of an Assembly of sixty-five. The Nationalists did not secure a clear 
majority at this election nor at another General Election a year later when 
they captured 31 seats to 21 for the A.L.P., twelve for the now Country Party 
(formerly V.F.U.) and one independent Labor. This led, Septemb e r 7, 1923 
1 Jupp, p.149. 
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to the formation of a coalition government under Lawson, the Nationalist leader 
and John Allan, the Country Party leader. The cabinet that was formed 
contained seven Nationalists and five Country Party members. However, 
support within the V.F.U. for the Nationalists was lukewarm and the Natio-
nalists lost eleven seats in the 1924 election. On 16 July, 1924 Michael 
Prendergast formed a minority Labor government. The Nationalists were alar-
med at the prospects of increased taxation to such an extent that they 
agreed four months later to the Country Party terms which led to Allan becoming 
Premier, with six other Country Party members in the Cabinet. This meant 
that just over half the entire Country Party caucus was in the Cabinet. 
Remarkably this Government survived until the next general election, but not 
before both the Country Party was split by Albert Dunstan and the V.F.U. 
also split. 
At the 1927 election the Country Party retained ten seats and 
Dunstan's Country Progressive Party four. The Government coalition had 27 
seats to the A.L.P.'s 28 and there were in addition two Liberals and four 
independents. The opportunities for Dunstan were enormous and he used them. 
First, he supported Hogan to permit him to form a Labor Government but 
switched his support a year later in opposition to an electoral redistribu-
tion bill that would have reduced rural representation. The 1929 election 
left the picture more or less the same and Dunstan switched his support back 
to Hogan. In 1930 Allan and the official Country Party rnerged with Dunstan's 
group to form the Victorian Country Party and to complete the confusion Hogan 
himself left the A.L.P. and joined Dunstan's refurbished Victoria n Country 
Party. 
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In the early years of the depression the Victorian Country 
Party joined with the U.A.P. in a State coalition but finally, in 1935, Dunstan 
formed a Country Party Government of his own, with Labor support and main-
tained this until 1943 - a record term for a Victorian Premier at that time. 
Under Dunstan's influence the Victorian Country Party was hostile 
to the U.A.P. and it carried this to the extreme in attempting to f orce its 
Federal parliamentarians out of supporting the Lyons-Page government. It 
was this that led to John McEwen leaving in 1937 to form a Liberal Country 
Party on the basis of support for the Federal coalitionl • This faction did 
not rejoin the State organisation until 1943, and then only after acrimo-
nious debates. 
From 1943 to 1945 Dunstan headed a Country Party/U.A.P. coalition 
and again in 1950 the Country Party was once more in office with Labor sup-
port. 1955 saw the start of the long Liberal party rule of Henry Bolte. 
The Country Party in New South Wales evolved from the Progressive 
Party which was an attempted amalgamation of rural and metropolitan interests, 
and which secured fifteen seats (out of ninety) in the 1920 general electi0n. 
This election was held under proportional representation. After the election 
the party split over the issue of coalition with the Nationalists. Seven 
Progressive M.L.A. IS, all from the country, led by Bruxner broke away. They 
had the support of the Farmers' and Settlers' Association. The other half, 
including the metropolitan representatives, had the support of the Graziers 
1 Jupp, p.149. 
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Association and in 1922 joined a Nationalist led coalition. In 1925 
Bruxner's group formally adopted the name 'Country Party'. Its geographic 
base was firmly established in New England and the Riverina. The Country 
Party entered a coalition with the Nationalists in 1927 and received four 
Cabinet posts compared to ten for Bavin's Nationalists. Lang returned 
to power briefly from 1930 to 1932 but then a U.A.P./Country Party coalition 
governed until 1941, which saw the start of a twenty-four year long period 
of Labor rule. Since 1965, however, there has been a Liberal/Country Party 
coalition government with narrow majorities, Country Party having six 
Cabinet posts compared to thirteen for the Liberals. In New South Wales, 
the Country Party has been very conservative, so much so that many farmers 
1 transferred their support to the A.L.P .. 
The only other State where the Country Party is strong is 
Queensland. The Country Party elected five members to the Legislature in 
1915 and achieved little in the following ten years. In November 1925 
the party merged with the United Party to form the Country and Progressive 
National Party which enjoyed one term in power after the 1929 election 
before the A.L.P. started a quarter of a century rule. The A.L.P. in Queens-
land broke up in the mid-fifties into a A.L.P., a Queensland Labor Party and 
a North Queensland Labor Party. A Country Party/Liberal Party coalition t ook 
office in 1957 and has remained in power since with the Country PaLty as the 
dominant partner providing the Premier. The extent to which the coalition 
1 Graham, p.240. 
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and in particular the Country Party, owe their success to gerry-mandering 
is considered in chapter 8. Suffice it to say that in the 1969 election 
(in a 78 seat legislature) the Country Party won 26 seats with 21 percent 
1 
of the vote but the Liberals won only 19 seats with 23.7 percent of the vote; 
2 the A.L.P. got 40 percent of the vote and 31 seats, which was an accurate 
reflection of their vote. 
In 1919, the Country Party in South Australia had e leven seats 
in a 75 seat legislature. Their strength slowly declined in the twenties 
and they were under constant pressure to merge with the Liberals. This 
pressure was reinforced in 1929 by changes to the electoral act. Two 
member constituencies were retained but the \vhole of an elected candidate':s 
preference votes were distributed at their full value, thereby ensuring 
that the party whose candidates polled the highest number of primary votes 
would secure all the seats in a given electorate and not a share proport i o-
nate with their vote. In June 1932 the Country and Liberal Parties merged 
to form the Liberal and Country League which then proceeded to dominate state 
politics, including the quarter century reign of Sir Thomas Playford. The 
ALP finally achieved office in 1965, lost in 1968, but won comfortably in 
1970. 
Finally, Tasmania where the Country Party has been of little signi-
ficance. Some Country Party members were elect ed in t he early twenties. 
lJames Kelly. "Vote Weightage and Quota Gerrymanders in Queens-
land, 1931-1971". The Austral ian Quarterly. 43(2), (June 1971), pp.39-54. 
2Albinski, p.28l. 
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There has been a slight revival in recent years with the formation of 
the Centre Party, which elected two members in 1959. However, the 
thirty-five years of Labor rule did not come to an end until 1969 when 
the A.L.P . and Liberals each elected seventeen members and Kevin Lyons, 
the son of a former State Labor Premier, was elected for the Centre Party. 
Bethune, the Liberal leader, became Premier with Lyons support. However, 
the government did not survive a full term (five years in Tasmania) and 
Labor returned to power in 1972 and Lyons lost his seat. It has been 
1 
argued that the reason for Country Party weakness in Tasmania is that the 
State is the least industrialised, and that the capital city, Hobart, is 
not a major commercial centre. Hence both the Liberals and the A.L.P. cater 
closely to rural interests. 
In summary therefore what has the Country Party achieved in 
terms of electoral success and government power? The original adoption 
of the coalition strategy involved both an alliance with the National Party 
and a declaration of war on the A.L.P.; in other words an admission that 
the Country Party did not aspire to major party status 2• At the Federal 
level the Country Party has been successful in seeing many of its policjso 
for the benefit of rural interests, implemented. Although polling around 
'nine percent of the national vote (in a relatively limited number of contests) 
it managed in the mid-sixties to elect 20 members to the House of Repre-
sentatives, six to eight Senators and hold a quarter of the Cabinet posts. 
lAlbinski, p.206 
2 Graham, p.196. 
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It is the dominant partner in the Queensland govern,.t,: " t and a junior 
member of the governments of N.S.W. and Western Australia. 
It has achieved this by concentrating on a narrow range of eco-
nomic goals. The limited objectives of the party and its narrow range of 
policies make it unlikely that factionalism and internal party strife will 
1 develop. The only state where factionalism has occurred is Victoria, where 
the party has split twice. However, in Victoria the party tended to be 
more radical and local politics, in general, more volatile. The V.A.P./ 
Liberals in Victoria have also split twice, the A.L.P .• once and the Commu-
nists once2• The appearance of the Democratic Labor Party in 1955 has made 
matters worse for the A.L.P., who have achieved less relativel y at elections, 
3 both Federal and State, in Victoria than any other State , . 
One can criticise the Country Party for its narrowness. If the 
purpose of politics is to see who gets what, how and when then the Country 
Party has been outstandingly successful in ensuring good representation of 
the views of its supporters and in meeting their needs over the past half-
century. It will be interesting to compare the extent to which the British 
Liberal Party has been able to do the same. 
The Country Party has many positive achievments to its credit 
lA' k' l.t l.n, p.333. 
2 D.W. Rawson. "Victoria 1910-1966: Out of Step, or Merely 
Shuffling?". Historical Studies. 13 (49) (October 1967), p. 6l. 
3Ibid.,p.62. 
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includ i ng improved road, rail and air services particularly in rural 
areas and in broadca sting; the growth of the central banking system and 
the launching of the Development Bank; the initiation of the Australian 
Loan Council on a voluntary basis; the creation of the Commonwealth 
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation and the introduction of 
a National Health Plan. Because it has often held the balance of power 
it has also been able to block legislation it regarded as hos tile to its 
interests, particularly in the area of tariffs and currency r evaluation. 
It certainly appears doubtful if the interests of rural Austra lia would 
have been as well served by either the A.L.P. or the Liberal Party and 
its predecessors if the Country Party had never existed. 
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CHAPTER 4 
HISTORY OF THE BRITISH LIBERAL PARTY 
A commonly held view is to regard the British Liberal Party 
as a Centre Party with policies midway between those of the Labour and 
Conservative Parties. This can be misleading and if true would have 
eliminated Liberal support long ago. Because of the closeness of the 
vote between Labour and Conservative - even in the 1945 Labour landslide 
they received only eight percent more of the total vote than the Conser-· 
vatives - both the major parties woo the centre. Liberal activists do not 
see themselves as a centre party but see the Liberal Party at one end of a 
spectrum (the individualist end) with both the Conservatives and Labour 
grouped together at the other (collectivist) endl • Butler and Stokes found 
that, in the summer of 1963, fully a third of Labour supporters preferred 
the Conservatives to Liberals as a second choice and among Conservatives 
more than a quarter preferred Labour to the Liberals2 • Given the extent 
of the class and basic policy differences between Labour and Conservatives 
this supports the view that a significant number of Labour and Conservative 
supporters prefer the collectivist authoritarian aspect of their parties 
to the more radical individualism of the Liberal Party. Radical is used 
lArthur Cyr, "Class in Britain through Liberal Eyes". Comparative 
Politics. 5(1972-1973), p.79. 
2David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain 
(London: Macmillan, 1969), p.203. 
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here... in its literal sense of "getting to the roots" and is, and always 
has been, of the greatest value to the Liberal movement l • The question 
of whether the future of the Liberal Party lies in being a Radical Party 
or a Centre reform party is at the root of most Liberal policy discussions. 
J.M. Keynes summed up the latter position very aptly as Liberals deciding 
whether they consider themselves to be the 'best type' of Conservative Free 
Traders (on the left of the Conservative Party), or 'the best type' of 
Socialistic Reformers (on the right of the Labour Party)2. In the twenties 
and thirties there were many defections from the Liberal Party to both Labour 
and Conservatives. In more recent times Labour politicians such as Desmond 
Donnelly, Woodrow Wyatt and Christopher Mayhew give more signs of being at 
home in the Liberal Party as do Conservatives such as Sir Edward Boyle. 
There is still a very definite need for a radical party in Bri-
tain and the Labour Party certainly is not radical. It has been estimated 
that in 1911, 5 percent of the population owned 87 percent of private wealth • 
. Fifty years later 5 percent still owned 75 percent while the trend towards 
3 
redistribution of wealth was actually greater before the thirties than after • 
The Labour record on law reform in such areas as divorce, treatment of 
1 Lord Wade. Our Aim and Purpose-Liberalism. (London: Liberal 
Central As~ociation, 1968), p.4. 
2 "?" b J.M.Keynes. Am I a Liberal. • An address to the Li eral 
Summer School at Cambridge, 1925, in The Liberal Tradition: From Fox to 
Keynes, ed. by Alan Bullock & Maurice Shock (London: Adam and Charles 
Block, 1956), p.284. 
3J . C . 1m ouslns. The Left and the Liberals. (London: New Orbits 
Group, 1969), p.27. 
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homosexuals, abortion and equal rights is, if anything, even poorer than 
the Conservatives. Labour educational policy is a levelling down process, 
whilst the Liberals, with similar ultimate goals, propose steps that are a 
levelling up process. There is an old adage about Socialists that they 
can be divided into two groups, those who are motivated by ideals of 
social reform and those who are motivated by envy. One of the many trage-
dies of British politics is that the Labour Party, under Harold Wilson, 
mainly seems to follow the latter path. To read the "New Statesman" and 
the "Sunday Telegraph" is to follow replays of the class war and denunciations 
of all unions that are the curse of present day British politics. The 
British have a millstone round their neck labelled "class consciousness" 
to such an extent that the fact that the Liberal Party does not evoke any 
class images in the minds of the electors can be seen as one of the "diffi-
1 
culties" of the Liberal Party by Blondel. Liberal supporters are very "anti" 
the class concept, which is widely accepted by both Labour and Conservative 
2 
supporters. In fact there is a strong impression that the Liberal Party 
is a haven for "people who are highly individualistic and correspondingly 
hostile to the political and sociological communalism of the major parties,,3 
This could partially explain the difficulties of efficiently operating the 
Liberal Party, conversely the Conservative and Labour Party managers may 
feel they are more fortunate in having a higher proportion of politically 
1 J. Blondel. Voters, Parties, and Leaders: The Social Fabric of 
British Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963), p.S3. 
2 Cyr, pp. 80-Sl. 
3Ibid • ,po n. 
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doc~e sheep. Liberals are much more likely than major-party supporters 
to say that both business and the trade unions alike have too much powerl. 
The growth of the power of the State is a real concern to the 
Liberal Party. Grimond wrote that he believed that the concentration of 
economic power in the hands of the State is a threat to Freedom and Libera-
lism and that property is a bulwark against tyranny if spread sufficiently 
widely2. He continues: "for Liberals, therefore, the Free Enterprise system 
associated with private property seems the best instrument to hand and they 
intend to make it work in a liberal fashion,,3. It is because of these 
basic Liberal policies of free enterprise and the merits of private property 
that any union between the Liberal and Labour Parties is out of the question. 
Given the basic concern of Liberals that the Conservative Party 
is basically a reactionary party, that occasionally and for its own convenience 
wears reformist sheep's clothing, there could be no long term union between 
Liberals and Conservatives. Sir William Beveridge, in his summary of Full 
Employment in a Free Society (1944) wrote that "the policy of full employment 
proposed here is a policy of socialising demand rather than production •••• 
it makes possible the retention of private enterprise to discover and develop 
the best technical methods of production, so long as private enterprise 
1 Butler and Stokes, p.323. 
2Joseph Grimond, The Liberal Future. (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1959), p.60. 
3Ibid , p. 60. 
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appears to be the most efficient agency for that purpose. At the same 
time, it does not block the way to socialisation of production in general 
or in any particular industry"l This is a far sounder approach to the 
question of nationalisation than the "on again/off again" see-saw on steel 
nationalisation by successive Labour and Conservative Governments or the 
present proposals, so fervently espoused by Wedgwood Benn, to nationalise 
anything big whether it be a chemical company or a brewery. 
In the face of over fifty years wandering in the political wil-
derness why does the Liberal Party still exist in Britain and at any rate 
thrive in many people's minds even if not in terms of parliamentary seats. 
Francis Boyd sums up the basic reason as follows: "the central position of 
the party is that the Liberal witness is needed now more than ever because 
the forces of illiberalism are gaining strength everywhere; that the 
existence of an independent, autonomous Liberal party is essential if the 
Liberal witness is to be declared faithfully; that strong representation in 
Parliament must be sought because only in such a forum can the priorities 
between competing social causes be fairly settled; and that community act·ion 
is to be developed provided that Liberals take part as members of an indepen-
2 
. dent party" • 
lSir William Beveridge. "Full Employment in a Free Society", 
in The Liberal Tradition: From Fox to Keynes. ed. by Alan Bullock & Maurice 
Shock (London: Adam and Charles Block, 1956), p.266. 
2Francis Boyd, "Eastbourne - and Afterwards". Contemporary Review, 
217 (1258), (November 1970), pp.260-261. 
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What then are the distinctive Liberal policies that give vali-
dity to its claim to be an independent party. The Liberal Party General 
Election Manifesto was published on February 13, 1974. Its policy on 
federalism is discussed more fully in chapter 7, and on electoral reform 
in chapter 8. The Liberal Party would scrap Maplin (the proposed new London 
Airport), severely curtail the Concorde and make the Channel Tunnel rail 
only. The Liberals would introduce a national minimum wage - in Britain, 
this is too radical for the Labour Party to espouse. They would introduce 
a negative income taxl • However, the most distinctive other policy relates 
to Liberal industrial policy, which has three objectives: 
(1) Employees must become members of their companies just as 
shareholders are with the same clearly defined rights. 
(2) It must be accepted that directors in public companies are 
equally responsible to shareholders and employees. Employees 
should be entitled to share in the election of the directors 
on equal terms with shareholders, and works councils repre-
senting all employees must be set up at plant level with 
wide powers to negotiate pay and conditions of work. 
(3) Employees should share in the profits of the company and 
the growth of its assets. 
In the long term, the implementation of Liberal co-partnership 
policies will contribute to the solution of wage inflation by ensuring that 
lLiberal Research Department. The Way Ahead. (London: Liberal 
Publication Department, 1970), p.98. 
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all ~mp1oyees benefit from wage increases and by including a measure of 
responsibility into wage bargaining. 
The basic purpose of the Liberal co-partnership proposals is that 
they stress the community of interests among those taking part in produc-
tion and emphasise joint responsibi1ity1. 
Various co-partnership schemes have been tried though some are 
little more than share-offering schemes without any real invo1vment of the 
work force. Cyr cites2 as examples of the failure of co-partnership ICI 
and Rolls Royce experience. Imperial Chemical Industries started a scheme 
in 1954 but by 1970 only 40 percent of the stock distributed as a bonus to 
the workers had been retained. For Rolls Royce the percentage of workers 
holding workers' shares dropped in half between 1964 and 1968. The Liberals 
claim beneficial results at Glacier Metal, Avimo,Conder International, 
Norwich Union Insurance Group, Texas Instruments and Phillips and cite West 
3 German and Yugoslav experience, in a somewhat different setting, in support • 
Given the disasters of Conservative industrial relations policy 
and Labour's surrender to the big unions (but not necessarily to the small 
ones), Liberal policy does offer a genuine radical solution, which is not the 
same thing as offering an easy or an opportunistic answer. Liberal policy 
1Grimond, p.80. 
2 Cyr, pp.69-70. 
3 Peter McGregor and Gordon Lishman. "Participation in a Compe-
titive Economy". Liberal Focus. No.3 (London: Liberal Publication Depart-
ment, 1969), pp.1-24. 
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towards the unions is a delicate issue. By and large Liberals recognise 
the benefits that trade unionism has brought to the working man. However, 
this positive recognition is tempered by concern at the effect on indivi-
dual rights and liberties of the closed shop, union 'disciplinary' actions 
and picket line violence. Watkins refers disparagingly to the trickle of 
Liberals in the "direction of the extreme laissez-faire Right, as repre-
sented by Mr. Edward Martell's union-busting People's League for the 
I Defence of Freedom". Watkins himself seems to have fallen for union pro-
paganda on this topic. The League's concern was that all individuals were 
entitled to the protection of the law and that the fact of being a member 
of a strong un·ion did not grant you immunity to assault and injure someone 
else who disagreed with you. Such a view is not symptomatic of the extreme 
Right but of basic liberal values. The fact that these values are widely 
flouted wherever there are powerful trade unions does not make the values 
wrong;it is merely a recognition that most non-liberal political parties 
recognise "might is right" when their own direct interests are threatened. 
Liberal policy on Rhodesia has been the perfectly straightforward 
one that Ian Smith is a rebel and that British Governments who refuse to 
treat him as such, because he is white, when black revolts were crushed with 
force, are hypocritical at best and cowardly at worst. This attitude is 
labelled extreme Left when in actuality it is the only policy that truly 
recognises the plight of the black majority in Rhodesia. Although it has 
I Blondel, p.86. 
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of tan been Labour policy to try to identify the Liberals with the Conser-
vatives, Rhodesia is certainly one area where Liberals and Conservatives 
are poles apart. The Liberals should have no need to. apologise for their 
defence of individual freedom. 1 Blondel quotes Dr. Eysenck's hypothesis 
on the relationship between conservative/radical attitudes and 'tender 
minded'/'tough minded' attitudes particularly towards the use of force in 
politics. This indicated that Liberals were the most 'tender-minded' of 
all - compared to Labour, Conservatives and Communists. This is nothing 
the Liberals need be ashamed of, but it would be a mistake for their oppo-
nents to equate "tender-mindedness" with a willingness to tolerate injustice. 
Labour and Conservative alike are far more willing to tolerate injustice, as 
exampled above, in the name of political expediency which, given the nature 
of politics, is maybe one reason they achieve power and the Liberals do not. 
Finally, in the consideration of Liberal policy, it must be reco-
gnised that the party does not cater to any particular sectional interest 
and, conversely, that no economically powerful pressure group is willing to 
2 
act as the patron of the party • 
It is not intended to give a detailed history of the Liberal party, 
its leaders and its fortunes since a relatively large number qf books have 
been publi~hed on these topics compared to the history of the Australian 
1 Blondel, p.86. 
2Lowell G. Norman. "The Decline of the Liberal Party in British 
Politics". Journal of Politics, 16(1) (February 1954), p.37. 
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Country Party. In his history of the Liberal Party Douglas attributed1 
the decline of the party not to "the inescapable logic of history, or the 
inapplicability of Liberal remedies to the issues of the day, but to avoi-
dab1e mistakes made by Liberals themselves. What failed was not Liberalism 
but Liberals". 2 This thesis was expanded by Taylor who summarised the four 
principal Liberal mistakes as follows: 
(1) Liberal/Labour electoral pact of 1903 which gave Labour 
significant parliamentary representation but was of little 
benefit to the Liberals. 
(2) The split in the Liberal Party dating from Asquith's resi-
gnation in 1916 and leading to the electoral pact between 
the Lloyd George Liberals and the Conservatives. 
(3) The fa~lure of the Liberals to form the Government in 1923. 
(4) The despair of the Liberal leaders after the 1929 election 
and their resulting failure to act as an independent party. 
The Liberal/Labour electoral pact of 1903 may well have benefitted 
Labour more than the Liberals but in itself would not have been fatal to 
the Liberal Party. The Asquith/Lloyd George split was far more serious. 
Innumerable books have been written from every conceivable angle on this 
1Roy Douglas. History of the Liberal Party, 1895-1970. 
(London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1971), p.3. 
2Alan H. Taylor. "The Effect of Electoral Pacts on the 
Decline of the Liberal Party". British Journal of Political Science . 
3(2) (April 1973), p.243. 
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topic with the extremes in viewpoint ranging from it being a dastardly 
piece of treachery on the part of Lloyd George all the way through to it 
being Lloyd George saving the nation from a disastrous negotiated peace on 
the lines of the Lansdowne memorandum. Like most significant events that 
involve people there is probably a little bit of truth at both ends and a 
great deal more somewhere in the middle. The Maurice affair cast great 
shadows of suspicion on Lloyd George's integrity. On the other hand Lloyd 
George is rightly remembered as one of Britain's three greatest war 
Ministers - with the elder Pitt and Winston Churchill. Asquith in his own 
way was a great prime minister, but unsuited to war. Unfortunately for the 
Liberai Party "it was the Conservative Party that reaped the recognition of 
concluding a victorious war even if few people at the time realised how much 
the'world would soon change for the worse under the twin evils of Communism 
and Fascism and particularly Stalinism and Hitlerisrn. 
However, it is very debatable whether it was either necessary or 
wise for Lloyd George to support the 'coupon' election. Douglas argues that 
the arrangements for the election were being considered as early as January 
19181 , when the real issue in the election would have been whether to fight 
on or to attempt a negotiated peace with Germany, and that after the armis-
tice Lloyd George could and should have fought the election as a Liberal 
without Conservative support and resolved his problems with Asquith afterwards. 
1 Roy Douglas. "The Background to the 'Coupon' Election Arrange-
ments", The English Historical Review. LXXVI (339), (April 1971) , p. 324. 
68. 
Trevor Wilsonl , on the other hand, felt that Lloyd George considered the 
Liberal Party to be finished and that his best chance of continued power 
lay in receiving the support of the Conservatives. It must be remembered 
that in those days party "switching" was not necessarily political suicide 
as evidenced by the examples of Joseph Chamberlain and Winston Churchill. 
The old adage about the dangers of riding a tiger - if you should happen 
to falloff - also applies. Lloyd George had the support of only one third 
of the Liberals, the remainder supported Asquith or were ambivalent. 364 
Conservatives and 159 Liberals received the coupon. It could be asked why 
Lloyd George did not try to get the coupon for more Liberals but it is pro-
bable that he got as many as he could expect. 
In the jingo atmosphere immediately after the war the Conservatives 
would probably have won anyway. The Asquith Liberals were blamed for the 
early defeats in the war and Asquith himself was defeated by an undistinguished 
and uncouponed Conservative2• It can be argued that Lloyd George's purpose 
was to safeguard a certain number of Liberal seats, but if he had thrown his 
mantle over all the Liberals they would have probably won as many seats as 
they did divided, but with immeasurably better prospects of reuniting and 
rapidly reviving. 
The actual result was very different. The forming of electoral 
lTrevor Wilson. "The Coupon and the British General Election 
of 1918". The Journal of Modern History, XXXVI(l) (March 1964), pp.28-42. 
2Ibid • ,p.40. 
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1 pact.,$ was the main cause of the Liberals losing "major status", that is 
finishing first or second, which in turn led to loss of credibility as a 
party and hence accelerated the loss of major status elsewhere. The real 
2 
weakness of the Lloyd George coalition was of the very nature of all truly 
coalition arrangements. Before the coalition fell Conservatives were almost 
as ready to damn it for being too Liberal as the Liberals were to damn it 
for being too Conservative. In any political party, the mainspring of acti-
vity comes from the enthusiasts and these are the very people most easily 
disgruntled by those compromises with the traditional "enemy" that a coali-
tion necessarily entails. 
Asquith's leadership of the Independent Liberals in the early 
twenties was uninspiring and he gave little evidence of having any new 
policies to cope with the problems of reconstruction3 The Liberals could 
have formed a minority government in 1923 and demonstrated that they still 
had the capacity and ability to govern and, as Canadian experience has 
demonstrated, minority government by a "middle" party is not necessarily bad 
government. 
Splits tend to breed splits and the demoralisation of the Liberals 
in 1929 was compounded by the defection of Simon in 19314. 
It was to be more than thirty years before the Liberals polled more 
1 Taylor, p.245. 
2 Douglas. "History of the Liberal Party", p.296. 
3 Trevor Wilson. The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914-1935. 
(London: Collins, The Fontana Library, 1968), pp.225 and 253. 
4Douglas. "History of the Liberal Party"., pp.2ll-223 fully 
describe ' this episode. 
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tha~ ten percent of the national vote. Samuel, Sinclair and Davies were 
decent men but uninspiring. It was not until Joseph Grimond became Liberal 
leader in 1956 that Liberals could start to lift their heads. Liberal by-
election successes at Torrington in 1958 and Orpington in 1962 breathed 
life into the party. Jeremy Thorpe took over the leadership in 1967 and 
brought the Liberal General Election vote in 1974 to past the six million 
mark for the first time since before the first World War. The principal 
Liberal Party problem in these more recent years has been to define policy 
and parliamentary tactics. The general public can well become confused when 
in a typical Commons session (1964/65) out of 170 divisions the Liberals 
voted with the Labour Government, which had an overall majority of only 
four, on 41 occasions; against it on 95; abstained 3 times and permitted 
a free vote of Liberal M.P. 's 31 times. However, if Liberals are to be true 
to their own policy such differences are natural and inevitable. 
Rasmussen considered that an index to Liberal strength is its 
success in recruiting parliamentary candidates and whether the party is kept 
going by faithful old members or whether new members are coming into the 
party to give it vitality. 1950 was a low point for the Liberals but since 
then the Party has been able to attract new candidates and to retain a 
good portion of those who had stood before. For example, of those who stood 
for the first time in 1955, 46 percent (N = 26) stood again, but of expe-
rienced Liberal candidates, who stood in 1955, 64 percent (N = 34) stood 
again~. One major problem in the early fifties in both recruiting candidates 
lJ. Rasmussen. "The Implications of the Potential Strength of the 
Liberal Party for the Future of British Politics". Parliamentary Affairs. 
XIV (3) (Summer 1961), pp.368-392. 
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and conducting election campaigns was finance. One of Grimond's major 
~ 
successes in revitalising the Party was to restore its finances to a rea-
sonable level, though obviously far short in total of ,the amounts avai1a-
b1e to Labour from levies on trade union members and to the Conservatives 
from business. In the five years before the 1964 General E1~ction the 
Liberal Associations, at the constituency level, probably raised and spent 
an average of 225,000 pounds annually in the five years prior to 1964 rising 
to 300,000 pounds in 1964. In that election the average expenditure per 
Liberal candidate was just over six hundred pounds1 compared to 930 pounds 
per Labour candidate2• However, it was the financing of Liberal Headquar,ters 
that posed the most serious problem. Although headquarters income rose from 
23,500 pounds in i959 to 83,000 pounds in 19643 this wa~ far below Transport 
House (Labour) at 325,000 pounds and the Conservative Central Office at over 
one million pounds4 • 
What have the Liberals achieved e1ectora11y and what effect have 
they had on British political life? Roberts sums up the latter point well 
in his comments that "the Liberal Party, in the post-war years, has been 
more of a source of critical challenge to the orthodoxies of the two main 
parties, and an originator of exciting policy ideas (entry into Europe, 
p.269. 
lRichard Rose. Influencing Voters. London: Faber & Faber, 1967), 
2Ibid .,p.259. 
3Ibid .,p.270 
4Ibid .,p.261. 
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co-~rtnership schemes in industry, elected regional authorities, and so 
forth) than a challenge to the power of Labour or the Conservatives"l. 
Lord Wade lays emphasis on the fact that "Liberals reject the whole concept 
of politics based on class war. This concept they regard as out-of-date and 
illiberal. Libera1s .reject the idea of a privileged class or race claiming 
to possess a special right or aptitude to govern and enjoying favoured treat-
ment as its reward. Liberals are opposed to a party structure whereby one 
party relies primarily on the support of employers and the other primarily 
2 
on the support of employees" . 
For people who believe strongly that there is that much difference 
between Liberals and both Labour and Conservatives then a major by-election 
upset victory can be the cause of ecstatic rejoicing. Lady Violet Bonham 
Carter's reaction after her son's victory for the Liberals at Torrington in 
1958 is highly exaggerated but indicative of Liberal feelings. She is quoted 
as saying "I had the strange sense of being a member of an army of liberation 
entering occupied country which for years had been ruled by Quislings and 
collaborators and that their day was over once and for all. There are in 
England thousands of Liberals living in occupied territory whom we have got 
to 1iberate,,3. 
Figure 2 shows the fluctuations in party strengths since 1918 in 
terms of voter percentage at general elections. Of greater significance for 
1 Geoffrey K. Roberts. Political Parties and Pressure-Groups in 
Britain. (London: Weidenfe1d & Nicolson, 1970), p.185. 
2 Wade, p.5 
3Watkins, p.89 quoting from the 'Daily Express' 23 February 1958. 
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the~iberal Party is how these votes were reflected in seats in the House 
of Commons compared to the number of seats proportional directly to their 
vote. This is shown in table 4 together with an "Index of Underrepresen-
tat ion" which is the number of seats directly proportional to the vote 
divided by the number of seats actually won. 
Table 4 
Seats Won by Liberal Party at General Elections 1918-1974 
Year Seats Won Seats Propor- Index of Under-
tional to Vote representation 
1918 1651 171 1. 04 
1922 1161 179 1. 54 
1923 158 182 1.15 
1924 40 108 2.70 
1929 59 2 144 2.44 
1931 35 38 1.09 
1935 21 39 1.86 
1945 12 58 4.83 
1950 9 57 6.33 
1951 6 16 2.67 
1955 6 17 2.83 
1959 6 37 6.17 
1964 9 71 7.89 
1966 12 54 4.50 
1970 6 47 7.83 
1974 (February) 14 122 8.73 
1974 (October) 13 116 8.95 
Liberals have recently done relatively better in local elections 
than in parliamentary elections. In the May 1973 metropolitan district 
1 1918 and 1922 Results are for the Independent Liberals and 
Coalition Liberals Combined. 
2 1935 Results are for the Samuel and Lloyd George Liberals Combined 
but excluding the Simon (National) Liberals. 
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e1e~ions they became the largest party in Liverpool with 48 seats to 
Labour's 42 and the nine Conservatives. In Leeds they hold the balance 
of power with Labour holding 44, the Conservatives 38 and the Liberals 
14. In the non-metropolitan District Council elections in June 1973 the 
relative party strengths were: 
Labour 
Conservative 
Liberal 
Independent 
Others 
4,327 
4,286 
919 
3,534 
449 
Most of the Independents, if they had a party label, would be 
Conservative or Liberal with very few Labour. The Liberals won control of 
Eastbourne and hold the balance at Bath, Exeter and York. An interesting 
result was at Lincoln where Dick Taverne's Democratic Labour supporters won 
control of the local council returning 20 members compared to only one for 
the official Labour Party. 
Not surprisingly it has been found that potential Liberal suppor-
ters are increasingly likely not to vote Liberal the less likely they think 
L'b 1 'h ' , 1 a 1 era mlg t come to wlnnlng • If this is the case then a change in the 
electoral system might well benefit the Liberals who suffer from the "wasted 
vote" propaganda of the two major parties at present. 
Some other observations on Liberal election results are not quite 
so obvious. 
. 2 
Watkins claims that the Liberals make the most progress under 
1 Butler and Stokes, p.327. 
2Watkins, p.148 
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an unpopular Conservative Government and that Conservative supporters 
.. 
who are dissatisfied with their government vote Liberal but that Labour 
supporters in like case tend to abstain. Taylor on the other hand claimsl 
that "like the major parties, the Liberals declined most where they were 
strongest. The size of their advances was unrelated to their previous 
strength. They advanced most where they were already strongest, presumably 
due to their serious hopes of victory but least where their strength was 
intermediate". This is probably more a reflection of their lack of unique 
class identity which is then not reflected in a class divided system. 
The Liberals have often been accused of being the archtype'floating 
voters'. Cyr strongly disputes this and claims that the voter flow to and 
from the Liberals, in the period 1963-1966, was found to be Labour-Liberal-
Labour and Conservative-Liberal-Conservative, not Labour-Liberal-Conservative 
2 
or the reverse. This supports the theory of the uniqueness of the Liberal 
Party and that it is not just a centre party. Finally, even the strongest 
Liberal supporters are overcome by views of impending doom as exampled by 
Lord Ogmore, who was President of the Liberal Party in 1963-1964, writing after 
the 1970 General Election "never again is it likely that we shall see 333 
Liberal candidates taking the field in a general election with scores of 
lost deposits to follow,,3. Four years later the Liberal Party fielded 
1 A.H. Taylor. "The Proportional Decline Hypothesis in English 
Elections". Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (General), 
135(3), (1972), p.368. 
Review. 
2 Cyr, p. 66. 
3Lord Ogmore. "The Liberal Party - What Now?". 
217 (1256) (September 1970), p.122. 
, 
Contemporary 
517 ~andidates in February 1974 and over six hundred in October, the 
largest numbers for over sixty years, and lost fewer deposits in the 
February 1974 General Election than did the Labour Party. 
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The Liberal Party today is heir to an honoured past and offers 
the prospect of radical new policies. Its future electoral success is 
still questionable. 
78. 
CHAPTER 5 
SOURCES OF SUPPORT 
The electoral success, or otherwise, of a "party depends on many 
factors - its policies, leaders, organisation; the rival parties; inter-
nal and external economic, social and political factors; the e lectoral 
system and the sources of its support. A IIpressure groupll or "interest ll 
groupll type of party will tend to maintain its stability, other factors 
remaining unchanged, as long as the reason for exerting pressure or pursuing 
a special interest remains. The danger signa ls in this case may well be its 
own success in achieving its supporters' goals, unle ss it can e ither find 
further similar goals or convince its supporters that their continued s upport 
is vital in order to hold what they have gained. Another basic type of pa rty 
is the lIideologicalll party which is primarily concerned in promoting its 
ideas or political philosophy. A third group, and possibly the most common, 
is a mixture, in varying proportions of the first two. On this scale we could 
construct a rank order from 'strongly' pressure group to strongl y 'ideological ' 
which would look something like this for the pr i ncipa l Australian and Briti sh 
Parties. 
Strongly 'Pressure' 
or 'Interest Group' 
Country Party 
Scottish National Party (S. N.P .) 
Plaid Cymru 
Australian Labor Party (A.L.P.) 
Labour Party 
Demo cratic Labour Party (D.L.P.) 
Australian Li beral Party 
Conservative Party 
Strongly 'Ideological' British Liberal Party 
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The gap is deliberate since it is suggested that the British 
Liberal Party is the most clearly neither a pressure group nor an interest 
group but is strongly 'ideological' compared to the other parties and that 
the Country Party in Australia is the most strongly 'pressure group' 
oriented. The Scottish National Party is obviously a strong 'interest 
group' based on a particular region. The two main labour parties, because 
of their dependence on and close links with the trade union movement in the 
two countries, are more 'pressure' group motivated than ideological whatever 
their own propaganda may claim. The Australian Liberal Party and the Con-
servative Party in Britain make much of the mystique of 'free enterprise' 
but obviously also serve certain 'interest' groups. 
Regardless of the relative rank order in the middle of the range 
t~e important point is the totally different nature of the Country Party and 
the British Liberal Party in terms of pressure group/ideological party iden-
tity. This difference is explored in this chapter and an attempt made to dis-
cern a pattern, or lack of it, in the bases of support. Statistical data on 
both parties are relatively scarce compared to the major parties. In Britain 
this has been compounded by the smallness of the Liberal vote in the 1950's 
which, on any mass general sampling, hardly gave a large enough Liberal 
portion to have much statistical validity. In Australia the problem is 
compounded because so seldom is the Country Party base separated from the 
Liberal Party, they are usually lumped together as 'Non-Labor' or 'Anti-
Labor'. However, it is felt that what data there are, presented in this 
chapter, certainly provides a clear outline of the essential differences 
between Australian Country Party and British Liberal Party support. 
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1 Rawson carried out an extensive study on the results of the 
1958 Australian Federal election for the House of Representatives and he 
observed that "most country people in Australia, including most of the 
farmers, vote for the parties other than the Country Party. It is a party 
held together by regional, industrial, and personal interests and loyalties, 
in all kinds of combinations, but with the regional factors usually predomi-
nating,,2 Different country towns, apparently with very similar class dis-
tributions can be either strongly Liberal, give an A.L.P. majority, or be 
3 
overwhelmingly Country Party What is true is that if the A.L.P. is to win 
a clear majority it has to do well in the country. 1958 was a bad year for 
the A.L.P. with the Country Party/Liberal government holding on to its large 
majority of around thirty seats. Even in this year the A.L.P.won fourteen 
seats outside the State capitals, compared to seventeen for the Liberal Party 
and twenty-one for the Country Party. Within the State capitals the Country 
Party won none, the A.L.P. won thirty-three and the Liberals thirty-nine. 
The A.L.P. puts considerable effort in trying to win rural areas 
as do the Liberals to win the larger country towns. The most dependable 
support for the Country Party is among the wheat and dairy farmers, the 
smaller graziers, and those engaged in mixed farming. Geographically this 
sets close limits on Country Party strength which is pretty much restricted 
1 D.W.R. Rawson. Australia Votes: The 1958 "Federa1 Election 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1961). 
2Ibid • ,p.49. 
3Ibid • ,po 231. 
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to New England and the Riverina in N.S.W.; the Murray Valley and Gippsland 
in Victoria; parts of the Darling Downs and the south-eastern coastal zone 
in Queensland; and the coastal plains around Perth in Western Australial • 
One very significant difference in looking at the rural vote in 
Australia is the very different relative position of agricultural earnings 
compared to wage rates in manufacturing. Compared to New Zealand, Norway, 
West Germany, Sweden and Britain, Australia was the only country where agri-
cultural wage rates were higher than in manufacturing and the difference was 
increasing between 1950 and 1958 2 Admittedly the sheep shearers are the 
financial aristocracy of agricultural workers, but the average gap between 
Australian agricultural rates and those of the other countries named above 
is too large to explain by this factor alone. However, it was traditionally 
true that the grazing country, with its high proportion of employees to land-
owners and with a powerful trade union organisation, had been favourable to 
3 Labor. More intensive land use has reduced the number of electorates of this 
type and in 1958 this only provided three of the A.L.P. 's country seat wins. 
As mentioned earlier the voting in country towns is extremely 
erratic4 ; in some of the larger country towns the A.L.P. vote ranges f ! 
lLouise Overacker. Australian Parties in a Changing Socjpty: 
1945-67. (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, 1968), p.267. 
2J . B. Condliffe. The Development of Australia (Galt: The Free 
Press of Glencoe, 1964), p.51. 
3 Rawson, p.231. 
4Ibid .,p.232 
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one-third to two-thirds of the total whereas in some of the smaller towns 
it ranged from as little as fifteen percent to over fifty percent. There 
was no evidencel that the Country Party lacked appeal for townsmen in 
general. Where Country Party candidates were especially strong they were 
strong both in and out of towns, where it was weak in the towns the vote was weak 
in the surrounding rural areas. Exactly the same pattern was also shown 
for the Liberals. It does not seem; therefore, that the growth of the 
country towns in itself is going to benefit either the A.L.P. or the Liberals 
to any great extent. As Rawson observes "the ordinary country town as such, 
has no political colour of its own,,2. 
As was noticed in the history of the development of the various 
state Country Parties they were the product of different factors and there-
f~re it is not too surprising that there is no consistent pattern of support 
across Australia as a whole. The Country Party has tried to establish a 
claim to being a "non-class" party in a working/middle/upper classification 
3 but instead to be representative of the interests of all countryman , whether 
farmer, grazier, employee, country businessman and so on. If this is the 
case then it would be expected that the second preference votes of Country 
Party candidates would be relatively evenly divided between the A.L.P. and 
the Liberals where they were the remaining choice, and certainly more evenly 
1 Rawson, p.233. 
2Ibid .,p.234 
3Ibid . ,p.52 
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divided than the division between the A.L.P. and the Country Party where 
they were the remaining choice. 
1 Gruen made a study of N.S.W. elections from 1930 to 1941 and all 
State and Federal Elections from 1940 to 1962 in a variety of country elec-
torates. He found that the average percentage of second preference Country 
Party votes going to Liberal (UAP/Nationalist) candidates was 85.37. In 
the minds of most Country Party voters, therefore, there is a very definite 
preference for the Liberals over the A.L.P. if their own man cannot win. 
2 Australian Public Opinion Polls show not only farmers but farm workers 
to be more 'conservative' than all other classifications of 'worker'. One 
of the few clear facts seems to be that Liberal/Country Party voting strength 
3 
rises with age. If this trend continues then the declining birth rate 
spells long term problems for the A.L.P. 
Overall there appears to be some justification to Jupp's opinion 
of the Australian parties as"machines for providing access to power, rather 
then movements striving after ideals,,4. However, as was seen in the discussion 
IF.H. Gruen. "Rural Australia", in Australian Society: A Socio-
logical Introduction, ed. by A.F. Davies and S. Encel (New York: Atherton 
Press, 1965), pp.257-259. 
2 Gruen, p.258 
3 A. F. Davies and S. Encel. "Politics" in Australian Society: 
A Sociological Introduction, ed. by A.F. Davies and S. Encel (New York: 
Atherton Press, 1965), p.113. 
4Jarnes Jupp, Australian Party Politics. (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1964), p.181. 
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at the beginning of this chapter the only party labelled as strongly 
'ideological' in the sense of being 'non-pressure group' was the British 
Liberal Party and the 'striving after ideals' is not an altogether common 
trait of political parties. 
In summary therefore, it can be said that the Country Party 
is primarily a small conservative party with historically defined and limited 
areas of support and satisfies certain specifically articulated economic 
needs of some country dwellers. It is perhaps only in its actual member-
ship that it has a more clearly defined base with some"three graziers, far-
mers or members of their family for every middle or lower middle class 
citizen of Country towns and villages. l 
The situation of the British Liberal Party is very different . 
Alford considers that the Liberal Party in Britain functions as an 'ideolo-
2 gical outlet' for the strains of a highly class-divided political system. 
Certainly the results of the February 1974 general election would tend to 
bear out this view. Richard Rose, who has been responsible for many 
British political studies, feels that class is more important for British 
3 parties than it is in any other European party system In addition, there 
is a strong disposition in the minds of the public to associate the main 
lCrisp, p.2l8. 
2 Robert R. Alford, Party and Society. 
& Co., 1963), p.158. 
(Chicago: Rand McNally 
3Richard Rose. Class and Party Divisions: Britain as a Test_ Case 
(Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Survey Research Centre, Occasiona l. Paper 
No.1, n.d. (c.1968), p.3l. 
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parties with the interests of classesl • Butler and Stokes published data2 
on party self image by occupational status in 1963, as shown below in 
table 5. 
Table 5 
Party Self-Image by Occupational Status, 1963 (U.K.) 
Occupational Higher Lower Super- Lower Skilled Unskilled 
Status Hanage- Manage- vising Non- Manual Manual 
Classification rial rial Non-Ma- Hanual 
nual 
I II III IV V 
-
VI 
Party Self Image 
Conservative 86 81 77 61 29 25 
Labour 14 19 23 39 71 75 ~ 
They then extended this data to show the proportion who voted 
Conservative, Labour and Liberal. The tables for Labour and Liberal are 
3 4 
repeated here as tables 6 and 7 respectively. 
Table 6 
Proportion (%) Labour Among Major Party Supporters by 
Occupational Level and Class Self Image, 1963 (U.K.) 
Class 
Self Image I II III IV V VI 
Middle 10 11 9 17 46 55 
Working 43 42 43 48 79 79 
~ 
I 
I 
1 John Bonham. The Middle Class Vote. (London: Faber & Faber, 1954),p.17 9 . 
2David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain 
(London: Macmillan,1969), p.77 
3Ibid ., p.78 
4Ibid., p.79. 
Table 7 
Proportion (%) Liberal Among Major Party Supporters by 
Occupational Level and Class Self Imag e , 1963 (U.K.) 
-Class 
Self Image I II III IV V VI 
- -.-
Hiddle 12 20 16 24 12 10 
Working 22 14 13 14 10 5 
86. 
The Conservative figures make up the balance in each case 
and show the reverse class self-image of Labour. The significant point 
is of course the much more even distribution among all occupational levels 
by class self-image for the Liberals . . If the actual percentage vot e by 
Party is considered, the same 'cla ss' picture emerges, as shown in table 8. 
Class 
Upper Middle 
Middle 
Working 
Very Poor 
Total Vote 
Table 8 
Parliamentary Voting by Social Class l 
(1959, 1964, 1966 U.K. General Elections) 
-
Conservative Labou r 
1959 1964 1966 1959 1964 1966 1959 
9 10 10 - 2 2 5 
34 34 31 8 11 14 28 
52 50 52 76 75 70 56 
5 6 7 16 12 14 11 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
~ _____ .. ___ .. _ . L... ___ ________ • __ ' _ _ _ ____ ' ______ '_"_'_'----.--. 
Liberal 
--
1964 1966 
5 6 
27 20 
61 65 
7 9 
100 100 
IS.E. Finer, Comparat i ve Gove rnment. (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1970), p.145, based on British Institute of Public Opinion 'quota' 
samples. 
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In every class category from 'upper middle' to the 'very poor' 
the Liberal vote is between the Conservative and Labour and is striking 
evidence of the "non-class" basis of Liberal support. The table also 
brings out the interesting fact of how dependent the Cons ervatives are on 
the working class vote. With this dependence, Heath's industrial policies 
are difficult to rationalise from a purely political standpoint. The 
figures for the percentage of the total vote by class in the 1966 election 
arel - Upper Middle 6%; Middle 22%; Working 61%; Very Poor 11%. The 
maximum deviation of the actual Liberal vote was only 4%, in the case of 
working class. 2 National Opinion Poll data, quoted by Pulzer for the 1964 
General Election, shows exactly the same picture with somewhat different 
figures because of a different class classification. Figures for the break-
down of the vote by class are even more conclusive, as is shown in table 9 
3 from Gallup Poll data . 
Table 9 
Percentage Vote of Parties by Class (U.K. General Elections 1945-1964). 
---.---.--- -.... ----.---.--- . ------ _._ .. _----
1945 
C Lab. L C 
1------ -- ------.- - - - _. --
76 Upper Middle 14 
Middle 61 24 
Working 32 57 
Very Poor 32 57 
10 79 
11 24 
1~5 69 11 36 
~------~~-------
lIbid., p.143 
1950 
Lab. L C 
--- --
_., -
9 12 90 
17 14 73 
53 11 44 
64 12 31 
1951 1955 
Lab. L C Lab. L 
. - _._-----_. --.-
6 4 89 9 2 
22 5 77 21 2 
52 4 41 57 11 
67 2 44 54 2 
- ------_._-- --
1959 
C Lab. L 
---
87 6 7 
76 16 8 
40 54 6 
25 68 7 
2peter G.J. Pulzer, Political Representation and Elections 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p.105. 
C 
77 
65 
33 
32 
1964 
Lab. 
9 
22 
53 
59 
L 
14 
13 
14 
9 
3Henry Durant. "Voting Behaviour in Britain, 1945-64; The Gallup 
Poll", in Studies in British Politics, ed. by Richard Rose (London: Macmillan, 
1966), p.123 constructed from data shown in table 1. 
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The even nature of the distribution of the Liberal vote is re-
markable compared with both Conservative and Labour. Considering the two 
class extremes of the 'upper middle' and 'very poor' the maximum variation 
for the Liberals was +5 percentage points (in 1964) compared to -62 (in 
1959) for Labour and ~62 (also in 1959) for the Conservatives . The mini-
mum variation for the Liberals was zero (in 1950, 1955 and 1959) compared 
to -43 (in 1945) for Labour and +44 (also in 1945) for the Conservatives. 
If occupation type is used as the criterion instead of class, 
the same picture emerges, as shown in table 10. 1 
Table 10 
Liberal Party (U.K.) Preference by Occupation Type (1943-1959) 
.-----r-----------... -------.. - .. --. 
% with Liberal Preference 
Date of Survey Manual Non-Manual 
-----------,-------
December, 1943 12 (1060)* 10 (378) 
February, 1957 8 (743) 12 (558) 
January, 1958 8 (415) 7 (344) 
August, 1958 12 (874) 21 (692) 
February, 1959 10 (397) 9 (309) 
I MaY/Ju.ne, 1959 13 (871) 12 (606) 
--------
----- ------------
*Total Number of respondents in parentheses. 
The average difference, over the six surveys, is less than l! 
percent more for the non-manual over the manual. The difference is too 
small to be of any great significance but it certainly does not show a 
1 Alford, p.153. 
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strong bias of support and is in line with Alford's own conclusionl that 
there is no striking evidence of differences between Liberals on any 
class basis. 
The only indication of any class 'bias' is shown in the results 2 
of a survey of supporters, members and officers, in the period 1951-54 
of a single constituency, Glossop in Derbyshire. Compared with the class 
distribution of all the voters in the constituency Liberal support among 
business proprietors and workers was exactly the same and in both catego-
ries almost exactly half-way between Labour and Conservative. The Liberals 
had the highest support of all three parties among professional and manage-
rial arid the l ·owest among white collar workers. All the parties showed 
a decreasing involvment of those classified as workers among party members 
and 'even more so among party officers. 
The largest single group among Liberal party officers in this same 
constituency was the white collar and more also, from this group, than for 
either Labour or Conservative. There may, therefore, be some truth in the 
idea, attractive to the Liberals, that they appeal to the better-educated. 
3 In their study of electoral behaviour in Greenwich in 1950, 
. Benney, Gray and Pear found that the Liberal distribution of support, across 
1 Alford, p.152 
2 Pulzer, p.74 
3 Mark Benney, A.P. Gray and R.H. Pear. How People Vot e : A 
Study of Electoral Behaviour in Greenwich. (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1956), p.103. 
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the full range of class, was mor-e even than either Labour or Conservative. 
There was a marked difference in Liberal support from the manua l c lass le-
vels the higher the educational level (15 percent of those with secondary 
level education or higher compared with one percent from those with only 
. d .)1 prlmary e ucatlon Rose also found some evidence of this and noted that workers 
with above-average education are less likely to vote Labour than workers with 
2 
minimum education, especially if female. He attributed this partly to aspi-
ration and partly to frustnation. It is in general true that, in Britain, 
women tend to vote Conservative more than men as is shown in table 11. 3 
Table 11 
Sex Differences in Voting Behaviour (U.K.) 
(Difference in % Vote Homen Minus Men by Party, 1945-1964) 
Party 1945 1950 1951 1955 1959 1964 
Conservative + 8 t 4 + 8 + 8 + 6 + 5 
Labour - 9 - 3 - 9 - 9 - 5 -10 
Liberal T 1 - 1 + 1 T 1 - 1 + 5 
Apart from 1964, there is virtually no sex difference in the 
Liberal vote. Increasing age is also generally associated with more con-
servative voting and table 124 shows the effect of age difference in two 
voting groups, 'Young' (21-29 years old) and 'Middle Aged' (30-49 years 
old), on voting behaviour. 
lMark Benney, A.P. Gray and R.H. Pear. How People Vote: A Study · 
of Electoral Behaviour in Greenwich. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956),p.l03. 
2 Rose, p.23 
3Durant, p.125, derived from data shown in table 2 therein. 
4Durant, p.126, derived from data shown in table 3 therein. 
Table 12 
Age Differences in Voting Behaviour (U.K.) 
(Difference in % Vote Middle Aged minus Young Voters by Party, 
1945-1964) 
Party 1945 1950 1951 1955 1959 1964 
Conservative + 7 + 7 + 4 + 6 + 2 + 3 
Labour - 5 - 7 - 5 - 6 0 - 2 
Liberal 2 0 + 1 0 2 1 
------ ---"----------
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Again, age seems to have comparatively little influence on the 
Liberal vote. Of perhaps greater significance is that age seems to be 
declining as a differential factor between Labour and Conservative. 
The effect of religion is debatable since the influence of the 
churches has declined considerably in Britain since the end of the nine-
teenth century. Alford considers that the only social bases for Liberal 
support ·which appear at all significant are "Nonconformity, Welsh and Greater 
London residence, and middle class self-identification"l. Rose, however, 
considered that the most significant spread in 'religious' voting by the 
working class was among Roman Catholics. In the 1964 general election only 
17 percent of working class Catholics voted Conservative compared to 73 per- . 
2 
cent for Labour. He relates this to Northern Ireland where the Catholics are anti-
unionist, i.e. anti-conservative. 
Geographically there are some differences in voting patterns in 
Britain though nowhere near to the extent of say the West and Quebec in Canada. 
1 Alford, pp.152-l53 
2 Rose, Appendix (table 6) 
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The rank order of class voting in the British regions, 1957-1962, is 
highest in Wales, followed by the North of England, Scotland, Midlands, 
1 London and the South. This rank order is the same as for the unemployment 
2 
rate and Alford suggests that where unemployment is high class grievances 
are the most obvious and class cleavage the most pronounced. Class voting 
is also apparently higher in heavily Labour urban constituencies3 , again 
because class differences are more noticeable. 
As far as Liberal strength is concerned, at any rate in the 1964 
General Election, they are strongest in rural and seaside areas and weakest 
in industrial constituencies4 • This also is very similar to the areas of 
Conservative strength. Liberal strength was relatively greatest in Scotland, 
Wales, Yorkshire, Northwest and Southwest England, which includes the so-
called 'Celtic fringe' and poorest in East Anglia, the Midlands and inner 
5 London . 
Although the background of supporters is important so also is the 
background of parliamentary candidates and members of parliament since this 
reflects, in many ways, the leaders view of the party base. The Labour Parry 
has its share of old Etonians and ex-public schoolboys at the M.P. level, in 
1 Alford, p.148. 
2Ibid ., p.149. 
\bid., p.133. 
4H. B. Berrington. "The General Election of 1964". Journal o f 
the Royal Statistical Society, (Series A), 128(1965), p.35 
5Ibid ., p.34. 
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1 
the region of 15 to 20 percent of their total. The Liberal Party lies 
between Labour and Conservatives in the number of its candidates with public 
school backgrounds, with something like half of its candidates with grammar 
school backgrounds. 
As far as the class background of the candidates is concerned 
the Liberal party is still faced with its traditional dilemma of aiming to 
be a 'non-class conscious' party coupled with a 'class' bias in its leader-
ship. Keir Hardie, Ramsay Macdonald and Arthur Henderson were all rejected 
as Liberal candidates 2 nearly a century ago with incalculable consequences 
for the image and future of both the Liberal Party and the Labour Party. The 
different 'class' backgrounds of Asquith and Lloyd George was an underlying 
factor in their feud. The proportions of working class candidates, for each 
o~ the major parties, is shown in table 133. 
Table 13 
Percentage of Working Class Candidates in Recent U.K. General Elections 
---_. 
Conservative Labour Liberal 
----
1950 1.1 14.9 2.7 
1951 2.4 26.9 0.9 
1955 3.0 28.2 3.6 
1959 2.2 27.6 2.3 
1964 1.8 23.8 3.0 
1966 1.3 21.4 1.6 
1970 1.3 16.2 0.3 
.----------~-----.--
1 Blondel, p.137 
2Leon D. Epstein. Political Parties in Western Democracies, 
(New York: Praeger, 1967), p.174 
3Cyr , derived from data on p.76. 
94. 
The chances of a Liberal candidate being elected are low and a 
politically active working class person is more likely to achieve politi-
cal influence in the Labour Party. However, even in the Laho :l:: Party the 
percentage of Labour M.P.'s with working class backgrounds has been steadily 
falling from 86 percent in 1906 to 71 percent in 1923, 38 percent in 1945 
and 30 percent in 19661 • Many of the remaining working class Labour M.P.'s 
are from the trade-union spons ored group in safe Labour mining and steel 
industry seats. The background of the Labour Cabinet and Shadow Cabinet has 
became even less working class as shown in table 14 2. 
Table 14 
Percentage of U.K. Labour Cabinet with Working Class Background 
Date 
1924 
1929 
1935 
1945 
1950 
1951 
1955 
1959 
1964 
1966 
1967 
Cabinet 
Cabinet 
Shadow Cabinet 
Cabinet 
Cabinet 
Shadow Cabinet 
Shadmv Cabinet 
Shadow Cabinet 
Cabinet 
Cabinet I Cabinet 
Percentage workin~1 
Class Background . 
55 I 
42 
50 
50 
50 
21 
28 
28 
22 
17 
9 
Note: Working Class Background defined as working-class tather 
with career begun as a worker with no secondary education. 
Shadow Cabinet limited to elected E~ecutive COTh~ittee of 
the Parliamentary Labour Party. 
1 Rose, p. 3. 
2Epstein, p.177 and Rose, Appendix (table 2) 
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This trend is partly a reflection of the increased availabi-
lity of secondary education but also because many of the politically active 
middle class, who might otherwise have entered the Liberal Party, have 
entered the Labour Party as a more probable route to political power. 
A review of the background of sixty-three Liberal candidates, interviewed 
in 1960-61, showed overwhelming middle-class background and particularly the 
newer middle class - the clerical, communications, professional middle class -
rather than of the traditional middle class of small commercial interestsl • 
One factor that makes it very difficult to pinpoint the sources 
comes from a constantly changing group2. In Alford's studies each of the 
four surveys available showed that less than one-third of the Liberal vote 
3 
was constant. Hith the low level of Liberal support in the 1950's "even 
modest changes in the rates at which the Liberals attracted and lost suppor-
ters could yield net changes of support that must be regarded, proportiona-
tely, as very large indeed,,4. The 1974 election results certainly bears this out. 
A major factor in Liberal election fortunes is related to can-
vassing. Canvassing in Britain is important because of the strict limits on 
campaign spending at the constituency levelS 6 Butler and Stokes reported 
the effect on Liberal support, in seats the Liberals fought in 1964, by 1963 
lJorgen Scott Rasmussen, Retrenchment and Revival. (Tucscn: 
University of Arizona Press, 1964), pp.2l6-2l7. 
2Butler and Stokes, p.3l5. 
3Alford, p.158 
4Butler and Stokes, p.317 
5Epstein, p.114 
6Butler and Stokes, p. 
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preference and Liberal canvassing in 1964, as shown in table 15. 
Table 15 
Effect of Canvassing on Liberal Support (U.K.) 
1963 Preference 
For Liberals For Other than Liberals 
Canvassed Not Canvas- Canvassed Not Canvas-
by Liberals sed by by Liberals sed by 
Liberals Liberals 
Voted Liberals, 1964 72% 45% 12% 9% 
Voted other than 28 88 -Liberal, 1964 55 91 
(N) = 32 99 85 488 
Canvassing is thus especially needed in order to hold on to those 
leaning towards the Liberals and the Liberal Party success, or otherwise, 
in holding onto or improving its February 1974 vote will largely depend on 
grassroots work at the constituency level. 
One final aspect in considering Liberal support lies in the 
Liberal Party attitude towards the trade unions, which are so powerful 
politically and economically in Britain. The Labour Party is basically 
'pro' union and, in recent years, the Conservative Party has appe ared as 
strongly 'anti' union. The Liberals are somewhat more likely than the Con-
servatives to consider the trade unions to be a 'good thing,l. The Liberals 
are much more likely to answer 'don't know' to that type of question, which 
1 Alford, p.156. 
may be an even better indication that they are torn between wanting to 
recognise the legitimacy of trade unions and wanting to preserve the 
freedom of the individual worker l . 
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The picture that emerges of the bases of support for the British 
Liberal Party is mainly an attractive one. Support is not based on class, 
as with the two major parties, or on appeals to envy or specific economic 
interests. It is essentially an appeal to moderates which becomes attr6c-
tive to greater numbers of people the more extreme the two major parties 
become or appear to become. In this respect it is, therefore, very diffe-
rent from the Australian Country Party which has a narrow base and primarily 
seeks to hang on to this base at all costs and is not concerned with any 
general appeal throughout all segments of Australian society. 
IAlford, p.156. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PARTY LEADERSHIP AND ORGANISATION 
In the early chapters the constitutional background and the 
historical development of the Australian Country Party and the British 
Liberal Party were examined. Crucial to the development and success of 
any political party is the calibre of its leadership and the way in which 
its organisation assists in developing and promoting the party's aims. As 
will be discussed in chapter 8 electoral success, in terms of seats won, is 
much more related to the electoral system than to the excellence or other-
wise of the party's leaders and organisation. 
Both the Country Party and the Liberal Party have had fewer 
leaders, since 1918, than either of their two major party opponents. In 
its fifty-three years of existence to-date the Country Party has had three 
leaders - Earle Page, Arthur Fadden and John McEwen - for 49 of these years. 
Douglas Anthony has been leader since 1971 and the only other leader, 
A.G. Cameron, served for only two years in 1939 to 1941 between the long 
, leadership periods of Earle Page and Arthur Fadden. Cameron later served 
as Speaker of the House of Representatives, .having had the dubious distinc-
tion in his earlier career of once being named by the Speaker of the day and 
1 
suspended from the service of the House • 
1 L.F. Crisp, Australian National Government. 
1965), p.245. 
(Croydon: Longmans, 
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Page, Fadden and McEwen were all strong, aggressive persona1i-
ties, the only comparable British Liberal Party leader in this period 
being David Lloyd George. The Country Party leadership at the Federal 
level has certainly been an important factor in their political success. 
As Ellis described him '~age had a genius for constructive ideas. 
The path from the problem was rarely a procession of well-ordered steps. 
He applied to political problems his surgeon's facility for quick diagnosis 
and was apt to bridge the gap in one inspired leap, arguing backwards from 
the solution to the problem to justify his conc1usion,,1. Whether Doug 
Anthony can cope with the A.L.P.'s attempts, now that they have a majority, 
to emasculate the Country Party e1ectora11y, remains to be seen. 
As might be expected from the different backgrounds of the two 
parties the backgrounds of their leaders are very different. Most of the 
Libera11eaders have been lawyers and even in recent years, Grimond and 
Thorpe are both products of Eton and Oxford. The Country Party leaders are 
much closer in background to their followers. Both McEwen and Anthony are 
farmers, Page was a country doctor and Fadden started his working life as a 
clerk in the local mill, became Assistant Town Clerk in the small country 
town in which he was born and then Town Clerk. McEwen and Fadden both 
came from Queensland, Page and Anthony from New South Wales and Cameron 
from South Australia. Liberal Party leaders have also come from a relatively 
narrow geographic base - Sinclair and Grimond from Scotland, Lloyd 
1U1rich Ellis. A History of the Australian Country Party. 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1963), p.100. 
George and Davies from Wales, Asquith and Samuel from northern England. 
Thorpe was born in London but represents a Devonshire constituency. 
The educational background of the Country Party leaders is 
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much closer to that of their supporters. Apart from Page, the only leader 
with any post-secondary education is Anthony who went to an Agricultural 
College after attending the local primary and secondary schools. McEwen 
was a soldier settler after the First World War as were many of the original 
Country Party members. Of the seven British Liberal Party leaders since 
the First World War only one, Lloyd George, did not go to Oxbridge -
Asquith, Samuel and Grimond all went to Balliol College, Oxford. Even the 
Liberal Party suffers from the class aspects of the educational system in 
England and underlines the difficulty of any non-socialist party there 
achieving any radical break from the traditional past. The Liberal Party 
is certainly better equipped to do this than the Conservative Party but 
will not find it easy. 
Party organisation is very different. The Country Pa~ty has 
a simple structure (figure 2) compared with the Liberal Party. However, 
the Liberal Party is attempting to practise as well as preach participatory 
democracy and has made commendable efforts to ensure policy input from all 
areas of the party and has a cumbersome structure. As a Federal organisa-
tion the Country Party has a loose, even rather informal organisation, 
almost all the organisational strength is at the State level l • 
lCrisp, p.224. 
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Figure 2 
Organisation of the Australian Federal Country Party 
Federal 
Federal 7<.- Joint Meeting ..... Parliamentary Council on Policy " ..... Country 
Party 
r 
Federal 
Council 
Executive 
The Federal Parliamentary Country Partylas its name implies, 
consists of the Federal Members of the House of Representatives and the 
Senate. The Federal Council is the main link with the Country Pa rty State 
Organisations. It was establishedl in March 1926 and consists of the Fede-
ral Leader and Deputy Leader, the State Leaders, the immediate past President, 
one Federal parliamentarian from each State and four non-parliamentary repr e-
sentatives (one of whom must be a woman) from each State. The maximum possi-
ble size of the Council is therefore only thirty-nine compared to a maximum 
membership for the Liberal Party Council approaching three hundred. 
The Federal Council Executive, composed of t he Federal Officers 
and State leaders, meets relatively infrequently. The Federal policy of t he 
party is determined at a joint meeting of the Federal Parliamentary Party and 
the Federal Council. Such meetings must be held at least triennially and in 
2 
voting on policy resolutions only the Federal Councillors present may vot e . 
ICriV, p.224. 
2Crisp, p.224. 
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The costs of the Federal Council and its activities are largely 
1 
met from affiliation fees paid by the State Branches. In relation to its 
total vote at General Elections the Country Party has a large membership. 
In the late 1960's Albinski2 put A.L.P. individual membership at just over 
40,000, Country Party membership at over 80,000 and the Liberal Party at 
around 120,000. (Jupp 3 gives a somewhat higher figure for the A.L.P. of 
55,000 in the early sixties). The Country Party often succeeds in recrui-
ting a quarter or more of its vote into Party branch membership. There are 
apocryphal stories that in parts of the Victoria Mallee wheat-belt there are 
small townships where the paid-up party membership even exceeds the vote4 • 
Although much of its revenue is based on individual dues and donations, 
McEwen House, the Country Party's Headquarters in Canberra, was largely 
financed through contributions from industrialists. 5 
At the Federal level the parliamentary party has considerable 
freedom of manoeuvre, particularly compared to the A.L.P. This is virtually 
essential for a minority party which needs flexibility in order to give it 
greater bargaining power. Given the strong leadership mentioned earlier 
lCrisp, p.224. 
2 Henry S. Albinski. Canadian and Australian Politics in Compara-
tive Perspective. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p.18S. 
3James Jupp. Australian Party Politics. (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1964), p.197. 
4Ibid ., p.198. 
5Albinski, p.164. 
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this has given the Country Party influence out of proportion to its num-
bers. On the reverse side, apart from its leaders, the Federal Country 
1 Party has produced anything but striking or conspicuously able men • 
At the State level the New South Wales organisation2 is typical 
and is shown in figure 3. 
Figure 3 
Organisation of the N.S.W. Country Party 
Federal 
Electorate 
Councils 
State 
Conference 
State H.Q. 
and General Secretary 
State 
parliamentary/ 
Country 
Party 
Electorate 
Council 
The State Conference meets annually and its members consist of 
all members of the various Electorate (constituency) Councils, both Feder~~ 
and State, the Central Council, Central Executive and delegates from all 
branches. The Central Council consists of the Chairmen of the Federal 
and State Electorate Councils, Federal and State Leaders, two Federal and 
two State Parliamentarians plus certain ex-officio and co-opted members. 
lcrisp, p. 223. 
2 . 
Ibid., p.222. 
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The Central Executive is made up of some sixteen members elected by the 
Central Council plus Federal and State Leaders. 
The principal restriction in the Federal Country Party Constitu-
tion on the potential actions of its Leader is a prohibition of any form 
of alliance with another political party that would threaten the separate 
entity of the Country Party. Although the Federal Council is given a veto 
on the acceptance of portfolios in a composite government this is not a 
serious restraint since the parliamentarians ordinarily dominate the Council l • 
The British Liberal Party has been out of power, in any real 
sense, for over half-a-century. The Parliamentary Party in the Hous e of 
Commons could, in recent years, have been transported in a minibus. The 
Leader of the Parliamentary Liberal Party has therefore neither had, nor 
potentially had, the powers of a Prime Minister. His main function has been 
to project a good 'image' of the Liberal Party and in this respect the Lib eral 
Party has been well served by Grimond and Thorpe. Since it is far from the 
levers of power and places great store on individual freedom it has developed 
a party structure that gives far greater opportunity to the ordinary members 
than do either the Labour or Conservative Parties. 
The Labour Party Annual Conference is dominated by the block vot e s 
of the large unions and the Conservative Party Annual Conference often 
appears to serve only as a rubber stamp for pious platitudes. The main inte-
rest, for the outside observer, of either conference is to see what support 
the extremists of the Left or Right are able to muster for such items as 
lCrisp, p.223. 
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"total nationalisation" or a "restoration of flogging and capital punish-
ment" • 
The Liberal Party of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland 
is a federated party with independent constituent parties in Northern Ire-
land, Scotland and Wales. The climate for any true form of liberalism is 
none too kindly in Northern Ireland at present and, at the 1974 General 
Elections, the Liberals contested none of the Ulster seats in t he House of 
Commons. Within England the various Constituency Associations are organised 
into Regional Federations and party membership is through either the local 
constituency association, or in the absence of one, through direct rnember-
ship of a Regional Party. The Constituency Association is the financial 
base of the party and the National Executive Committee, subject to Assembly 
approval, determines the Affiliation Fees for Constituency Associations. As 
of 1st January 1973 the Affiliation Fee was thirty pounds (approximately 
1 
seventy dollars) • Liberal Party membership tends to fluctuate considera-
2 bly but in 1964 stood at around 300,000 compared to 2,150,000 for the 
3 4 Conservative Party and 830,000 in individual membership of the Labour Party. 
What the Liberals lack in numbers they tend to make up in enthusiasm, even 
though the disproportionate reward for the number of votes their candidates 
receive may then dampen their enthusiasm. 
lResolution 15, Liberal Assembly, Margate,September 1972. 
2Richard Rose. Influencing Voters (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), p.269 
3Ibid ., p.26l 
4Ibid ., p.25l 
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The Liberal Party organisation has changed very little over the 
years as a comparison of the 1948 structurel and the 1969 structure2 indi-
cates. The organization shown in figure 4 is based on Cruikshank and pur-
posely shows the greater importance given to the Constituency Associations, 
Regional Parties, the Assembly and the Council. 
p.47. 
Figure 4 
Organisation of the Liberal Party of the United Kingdom 
and Northern Ireland 
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lR.J. Cruikshank. The Liberal Party. (London: Collins, 1948), 
2 John D. Lees and Richard Kimber, eds. Political Part i es in 
Modern Britain (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), p.25. 
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The most significant thing about this structure is the absence 
of any over-riding authority by either the Party Leader or the Parliamen-
tary Party. It can obviously be suggested that this is because of the 
absence of power in either of these because of their own distance from 
governmental power. Although there is no doubt some truth in this, it is 
unlikely that a Liberal party leader would ever achieve, or even aspire to, 
the personal power of a Conservative or Labour Party leader. If there is one 
thing the Liberal Party in Britain should have learned it is the penalties of 
personal power and personal power conflicts between strong personalities. 
The Leader of the Liberal Party is elected by the Liberal members 
in the House of Commons. The President of the Liberal Party is elected by 
the Assembly and is "the guardian of the Party's Constitution". Up to 
fifteen Vice-Presidents can be elected, for life, by a two-thirds majority 
of the National Executive Committee, they can be removed by the President 
subject to ratification by the National Executive. 
Policy making is basically the role of the Council and the Standing 
Committee. The Council is a very large body and consists of: 
All members of the National Executive Co~nittee 
Vice-Presidents of the Liberal Party 
Six members of the House of Lords chosen annually by the Liberal 
members of the House of Lords 
Six members of the House of Commons - Chief Whip plus five chosen 
annually by the Liberal members (one must be from a Scottish 
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constituency, as must one of the elected peers be Scottish). 
There is no similar requirement for Welsh representation. 
All members of the Standing Committee 
Two representatives from each Regional Party plus one additional 
representative for every ten or part of ten affiliated Cons-
tituency Associations. 
Representatives of Scottish, Ulster and Helsh Liberal Parties as 
for the Regional Parties 
Thirty representatives of the party as a whole, elected by ballot 
at the Assembly. 
Not more than fifteen members each appointed by the Women's Libe-
ral Federation, Liberal Candidates Association, National 
League of Young Liberals, Union of Liberal Students, Asso-
ciation of Liberal Councillors. 
Two representatives appointed annually by each of the Li beral 
Agents Association, National Union of Liberal Clubs Limited 
and the Association of Liberal Trades Unionists. 
The Council has the power to appoint not more than fifteen mem-
bers in recognition of distinguished service to the Party. 
The Council has the responsibility of stimulating militant Lib e-
ralism and expressing the views of Liberals on current political questions. 
Under the Liberal Party Constitution the Council is required to meet at 
least four times per year. 
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The Standing Committee is responsible to Council for planning 
the long-term evolution of Liberal Policy; for expressing, between 
meetings of the Council, the views of the Liberal Party on urgent politi-
cal issues, and presents policy motions to Council. This Committee is of 
more manageable size with a maximum membership of twenty-four, made up as 
follows: 
Leader of Party 
Chief Whip in House of Commons 
Leader of Liberal Peers 
Chairman of National Executive Committee 
Chairman of Finance and Administration Board 
Standing Committee Chairman appointed annually by the Parlia-
mentary Party in the House of Commons 
Twelve members elected annually by an electorate consisting of 
all members of Council together with all M.P. 's and candi-
dates who are not members of Council. 
One representative from each of the Scottish, Ulster and Welsh 
Liberal Parties. 
Up to three co-opted members. 
The Standing Committee membership is much more under the control 
of the Parliamentary Party and the Liberal candidates and as the party 
representation in Parliament grows so would the influence of the Standing 
Committee. 
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The Leader of the Party is responsible for the compilation of 
the party's General Election Manifesto in consultation with the Standing 
Committee and the Liberal Candidates Association. 
The Assembly is a very large body with a potential delegate 
strength of several thousand. It is composed of: 
All members of either House of Parliament 
All Parliamentary Candidates 
All Councillors and Aldermen who are members of the Association 
of Liberal Councillors 
Honorary Officers of the Party 
All members of Council 
All members of Regional Federation Councils 
All persons entitled to vote at Annual Conferences of Scottish, 
Ulster and Welsh Liberal Parties. 
Representatives of Constituency Associations at the rate of one 
per fifty members up to a maximum of twenty per association. 
Representatives of each of the following bodies in proportion 
of one for every twenty-five members up to a maximum of 
200 representatives per body: 
Association of Liberal Trade Unionists 
National League of Young Liberals 
National Union of Liberal Clubs 
Union of Liberal Students 
Women's Liberal Federation 
Agents and Organisers of Constituency Associations who are 
members of the Liberal Agents Association. 
The functions of the Assembly are to: 
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(1) Elect Party Officers and those members of Council chosen 
by the Assembly 
(2) Receive from Council and consider reviews of progress and 
work of the Party, financial statements, etc, 
(3) Consider resolutions on public policy. 
As will be noted there is provision at the Assembly for the 
attendance of large numbers of Young Liberals, some of whose loudly expres-
sed views are little different from Maoist, Marxist, Trotskyist and all the 
other variants of the extreme political Left. Although this has given the 
Liberals a bad 'press' it can definitely be argued that the Liberals are in 
fact practising what they preach, namely freedom of speech, and that surely 
it is better to have these young activists exposed to more moderate opinions 
than operating in the streets with only their ownrhaoric for intellectual 
nourishment. 
Finally, there is the National Executive Committee, which is 
roughly double numerically than the Standing Committee and which directs 
the day-to-day work of the Party and, through the Finance and AdmiD~stration 
Board, oversees the employment of staff and the running of headquarters. 
The National Executive consists of the: 
President 
President Elect 
Immediate Past President 
Leader of Party in Commons 
Leader of the Liberal Peers 
Chief Whips in both Houses 
Treasurer 
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Representatives from Regional Parties, Scottish, Ulster and 
Welsh Parties and the other affiliated Liberal organisa-
tions. 
Eight members elected by ballot of Council. 
The National Executive Committee may co-opt up to five addi-
tional members. 
Provision is made for the amendment of the Liberal Party Cons-
titution. Amendments require a two-thirds majority of delegates voting at 
an Assembly and they can be proposed by any five Constituency Associations. 
The Constituency Associations have complete control over the selection of 
parliamentary candidates which, unde r the Party Constitution, is by secre t 
ballot with the alternative vote. 
Most of the Australian State Country Parties require central 
headquarters endorsement of candidates. The British Conservative and Labour 
Party headquarters use various tactics, subtle and not so subtle, to impose 
candidates on local associations and various 'rebels' periodicall y surface, 
usually to be defeated - a notable recent exception being Mr. Dick Taverne 
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who not only retained his seat at a by-election but also at the February 
1974 General Election, (but lost it in the October General Election) in 
addition his supporters won numerous seats at both the city and regional 
level. 
Labour and Conservative members of parliament can be subject 
to unpleasant pressures from their constituency parties. 1 A recent case 
involved Mr. E. Griffiths, Labour M.P. for Brightside, Sheffield. He 
jointly runs the Commons All-party Committee on Association Football with 
Mr. E. Money, Conservative M.P. for Ipswich. He recently visited Mr. Money 
and they were photographed together at a local football game. The Ipswich 
Labour Party sent a letter of protest to the Brightside Party, which was 
expected to move a vote of no confidence in Mr. Griffiths. It is perhaps 
difficult to grasp, in Canada, that party politics can be quite so personally 
petty. It is incidents such as these that illustrate not only the class 
divisiveness in British society but also the unhealthy autocratic ways of the 
two major parties who between them have set up an "Establishment" that is 
almost all-stifling. Mr. Griffiths was asked to resign by the constituency 
party management committee and was denied re-adoption for the October 1974 
1 . 2 e ectlon • His appeal against these actions, to the Labour Party National 
Executive, was unsuccessful - possibly because the Executive has, in recent 
years, itself become dominated by extremists. 
1 
"Left Threat to Sack Labour M.P." Sunday Telegraph, June 30,1974,p.4 
2 Malcolm Pithers. "M.P. Appeals Over Call to Resign". The Guardian 
September 7, 1974, p.l, c.5,6. 
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CHAPTER 7 
"NEW STATES" AND "REGIONALISM" 
It is important to draw the distinctions between the New States 
movements and Secessionism in Australia and between Home Rule and Inde-
pendence or Self Government, in Great Britain. 
There is no provision in the Australian Constitution for seces-
sion. However, this did not deter a majority of voters in Western Austra-
lia from approving a referendum to secede in 1933. The Government of 
Western Australia presented a petition to the "United Kingdom Parliament 
praying for amendment of the Constitution Act by detaching State from the 
Comllonwealth"l. At that time the 1931 Statute of Westminster had not been 
adopted by the Federal Parliament in Canberra. A joint committee of the 
House of Lords and the House of Commons was appointed to consider whether 
the Western Australia petition should be received. There was considerable 
concern in Britain that this would be regarded as a serious interference in 
the internal affairs of a self-governing Dominion and that even its discussion 
by Parliament could have had grave repercussions both in Australia and in 
other parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The joint committee 
ruled that the petition should not be received and the matter died down. 
Although the question of secession is probably fairly academic 
1 H.R. Anderson. "The Constitutional Framework", in The Government 
9f the Australian States, ed. by S.R. Davis (London: Longmans, 1960), p.52. 
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it theoretically could be effected through the normal constitutional amend-
ing procedure. However, to secure approval would require the consent of the 
~lectors in at least four out of the six states. To achieve this would 
imply that the problem causing the demand for secession was readily reco-
gnised. If it was that widely accepted then either other solutions would 
be found or else there would be a real danger of the entire federation 
breaking up. 
The Scottish National Party, in its statement of Aim and Policy 
adopted 7-8 December 1946, clearly spells out its goal of and route to self-
government. It is predicated "on the election to the British Parliament of 
a majority of Scottish National members from Scotland, a Scottish Consti-
1 tuent Assembly shall be summoned". Britain has experienced unilateral decla-
rations of independence before, in the case of Rhodesia. However, since 
there is no written constitution the recognition of self-government for 
Scotland, or Wales, or some form of federation, would require only the 
passing of an appropriate Act through the British Parliament. 
In the same way as the Country Party does not support Secessio-
nism neither does the Liberal Party support break-away self-government move-
ments in Britain. In both countries the pressures towards greater regional 
recogriitionare localised. In Britain it is confined to Scotland, Wales 
and the perennial problem of Northern Ireland. In Australia it is mainly 
confined to New South Wales and Queensland, though there has been some minor 
1 H.J. Hanham. Scottish Nationalism. (London: Faber and Faber, 1969), 
p. 2l3. 
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activity in the western part of Victoria and the south-east corner of South 
Australia. The possible entry of New Zealand was certainly very much in mind 
at the time of the original constitutional convention though it is unlikely 
at present. Theoretically, areas such as Fiji, Papua and New Guinea could 
apply for "admission" and, at some future date, the Northern Territories 
could become a new state or states. However, we are concerned here only 
with the major New State movements and their relationship to the Country 
Party. 
If the area is defined closely enough there is strong support for 
the New State concept and for the Nationalists in Scotland and Wales. In 
Scotland it is estimated that rather more than sixty percent of the popula-
1 tion favour some form of Home Rule , not necessarily all going as far as 
self-government. In the 1967 referendum held in the northern part of New 
South Wales (including the Newcastle District) although the New State suppo r -
ters lost there was a 67 percent vote in favour of a new state in the rural area 
outside Newcastle, the coalfields and the Hunter Valley areas and a 75 percect 
. . h 2 vote agalnst In t ose same areas • 
The reasons why the British Liberals and the Country Party support 
regional concepts are very different. "Believing in government of, by, and 
for the primary producer and real ising that in the Commonwealth he is 
1 Hanham, p.12. 
2Don Aitkin, "Political Review" The Australian Quart e rly, 40(1) 
(March 1968), p.98 
117. 
hopelessly outnumbered by the urban voter, the (Country) party leaders 
advocate 'new states' in the hope that the new states will be controlled 
1 by the country minded voter". The attraction to the Country Party leader-
ship lies mainly in the additional Senate seats, since each new state would 
be entitled to the same number of seats as the present states. With the 
usual close balance in the Senate between the Liberals and the Australian 
Labor Party a solid block of Country Party Senators, who could be re-elected 
even on a double dissolution, would give the Country Party almost a permanent 
veto. 
The British Liberal Party support for devolution is fundamental to 
their basic philosophy of individual freedom. Even though it has cost them 
sorely the Liberals have been firm supporters of this concept ever since 
they first espoused Home Rule for Ireland in 1886. That policy cost them 
the support of the Liberal Unionists under Joseph Chamberlain and was a 
major cause of enmity between the Liberals and Conservatives. Although 
this policy benefitted the Liberal Party electorally in the non-English 
parts of the United Kingdom, it cost them support in the more numerous seats 
in England. Since the Country Party is an openly sectional party that does 
not expect ever to get support in urban areas they lose nothing by their 
espousal of New States since these areas are basically antagonistic to the 
metropolitan areas anyway. In the concept of ideological pressure groups 
within political parties it can be argued that in the case of the Country 
lLouise Overacker. The Australian Party System (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1952), p.226 
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Party it is so little concerned with general ideas that it is only the New 
States movements that can be described as exercising any pressure within 
1 the Party • 
Inevitably, the espousal of regional movements invoke s some res-
ponse from the other parties. In Britain, the Conservatives wi th their 
historic Unionist associations make no effort to cater to thes e views. The 
Labour Party in the past paid lip service to the concept of devolution. 
Recent nationalist electoral successes have spurred the Labour party to 
promise the introduction of regional Assemblies for Scotland and Wales. In 
Australia it has been part of the Liberal Party platform to create New 
States, since the late 1950's2, but this again seems to be mainly wi ndow-
dressing. The Australian Labor Party approach to the question is somewhat 
Machiavellian. The A.L.P. is strongly unitarian and considers that addi-
tional new states would fragment and weaken the power of the State Govern-
ments in general, resulting in a corresponding increase in the power of the 
central government. 
Leach3 summarised eight reasons for the concept of New States. 
These are given below with observations on the ir validity. 
Ijames Jupp. Australian Party Politics (Melbourne: Helbourne 
University Press, 1964), p.197. 
2Ibid ., p.166 
3Richard M. Leach. "The New State Movement in Australia", 
Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, III (1965), pp.20-31. 
(1) Comparison with the creation of new states in the 
United States and of new provinces in Canada. By com-
parison Australia was already divided up into separate 
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colonies on its formation. This, however, is more an acci-
dent or fact of geography and history and not a rationale 
for the creation of New States. 
(2) The United States achieved its position of wealth and 
power by creating new states, therefore to achieve same 
ends Australia must do the same. The c~eation of new states 
in the U.S. is a very minor factor in its growth of wealth -
massive immigration and enormous natural resources were of 
far greater significance. The economy of the Dakotas or of 
Saskatchewan indicate that the creation of new states or pro-
vinces in a federal system does not automatically create 
growth. 
(3) The formation of a large number of new states would cause 
such immense problems in regulating interstate trade 
(section 92 of the Constitution makes extremely difficult 
for the Commonwealth Government to regulate interstate 
trade) and particularly in the orderly marketing of agricultu-
ral products that basic amendments to the Constitution would 
soon follow. This presupposes a need .for major amendments 
to the Constitution which, if the demand really existed , 
could be done without creating a large number of ne,v states . 
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although this argument might appeal to the Australian Labor 
Party it appears to be an odd way to effect constitutional 
reform. 
(4) It would permit country dwellers to govern themselves 
instead of being dominated by urban residents. The argu-
ment is basically one of fairness but may be secondary to 
considerations of economic viability. Ellisl pointed out 
that the proposed State of New England (in northern part of 
N.S.W.) would have an area of 64,000 square miles and a popu-
lation, in 1956, of 700,000 people, ,.;rhich would make it 
fifth out of seven in terms of population. In terms of the 
value of production (in 1952/3) it would have exceeded Tas-
mania, Western Australia and South Australia. The proposed 
State of Northern Queensland would have an area of 272,000 
square miles and a population, in 1956, of 235,000 (about 
two-thirds that of Tasmania) with an annual production close 
to that of Tasmania. 
(5) New States are essential for Australia's security in order 
to promote the growth of population and development. This 
again is not necessarily true, reference the example of Princ e 
Edward Island with a basically static population and economy. 
In Britain there have been strong moves in recent years to 
larger local government units involving, for instance, the 
disappearance of Rutland and the incorporation of parts of 
Yorkshire into Lancashire. 
lUlrich Ellis "New States" The Australian Encyclopaedia, 
1963, 6, pp.295-300. 
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(6) New States would -develop the interior • This presupposes 
that they would have both the will and the resources to 
do so. Granted, the growth and magnitude of the state 
capital cities is a cause for concern but if there was any 
real intent to remedy that situation it could be done, and pro-
bably more effectively, in ways other than the creation of 
new states. 
(7) The creation of new states would create a better balance 
in the physical size of the Australian States. Tasmania 
has an area of 26,200 square miles and Western Australia of 
975,900 square miles. However, creating new states all of 
Tasmania size would result in something like one hundred 
states which, apart from questions of economic viability , 
would imply some very artificial boundaries and even more 
enormous differences in population since presumably each of 
the present State capitals would still all be in one state. 
(8) The final argument advanced by Leach is that if large groups 
of people want a new State they should be allowed to have it. 
Although in theory most democratic it is politically unrea l. 
Some might argue that if Quebec were ever to secede from 
Canada then the western part of the island of Montrea l might 
wish to secede from Quebec or be recognised as a separate 
State within a _federal Quebec, a solution which however much 
it might be desired by the local population is unlike ly to be 
recognised. 
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The British Liberal Party policy is clearly stated in its 1974 
General Election Manifesto, published on 13 February 1974. "In the long 
term we would establish a federal system of government for the United 
Kingdom with powers in domestic matters transferred to Parliaments in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and provincial assemblies in England. 
The Westminster Parliament would then become a Federal Parliament with a 
reformed Second Chamber in which the majority of members would be elected 
. 1 b· III on a reglona aS1S •••• To Canadians and Australians this would seem a 
straightforward proposal, in fact their own national structure of parlia-
ment - apart from the appointed Canadian Senate. It is certainly not so 
regarded in England where the idea of the English being the 'senior partner' 
in the United Kingdom, with a far flung Empire, is still good for an emotio-
nal response in the Conservative Party. In General Elections since 1935 
the Conservative Party have never held a majority of Welsh Seats and have 
only had a majority of Scottish seats in 1935 and 1955. Labour ha s continuously 
held a majority of Welsh seats since 1935, also in Scotland with the exceptions 
noted and have only held a majority of English seats in 194 5 and 1966. The 
one Liberal seat would have represented the balance of power in Scotland ..i..n 
1951. If one crudely regards the present British electoral sys tem as a 
gamble for power with high stakes 'winner-take-all' approach then obviously 
neither the Conservative nor the Labour Party is likely to be attr2 r ted to 
federalism. This question is discussed in more detail in the concluding 
chapter. 
lKeesings Contemporary Archives, 1974, pp.26376/7 . 
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Constitutionally the creation of New States is covered in 
chapter VI, articles 121-124, of the Australian Constitution. Article 
123 deals with altering the boundaries of a State and gives this power 
to the Federal Parliament subject to the consent of both houses of the 
Parliament of the State concerned and to the approval of a majority of 
electors of the State voting upon the question. Article 124 states that 
"A new State may be formed by separation of territory from a State, but 
1 
only with the consent of the Parliament thereof ••. " Anderson states that 
"the better opinion seems to be that article 123 has nothing to do with 
the creation of new States at all and is limited to other adjustments of 
boundaries". As will be seen in the outline of the new States movements 
that follows this has not been the interpretation in New South Wales where 
a referendum was held in 1967. If the opinion quoted by Anderson is correct 
a referendum is unnecessary if the new State is formed out of an area totally 
within the boundaries of an existing state. 
The history of the New States Movements is older than the history 
of Australia as a federation. At the time of the Constitutional Conven-
tion in 1897-98, there was considerable agitation in Queensland to organise 
self-government for Central and Northern Queensland and thus to have 
Queensland admitted as three separate Colonies. It is for this reason 
that Queensland had the right to elect Senators on the basis of electoral 
districts rather than on a single state-wide electorate as in the other 
states. 
1 Anderson, p.53. 
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On three occasions since Federation, State l egislature s have 
carried resolutions affirming the desirability of New States in Queensland 
and New South Wales. Secessionist tendencies in northern (New England) and 
southern (Riverina) N.S.W. were greatly strengthened during the tenure in 1925-27 
and 1930-32 of J.T. Lang as Premier of N.S.W. In February 1931 Earle Page 
called openly for the secession of the north if Lang persisted with his 
"repudiationist" policies. It was a strangely radical step for a constitu-
1 
tional and conservative party (the Country Party) to approve • 
The New England New State Movement has had diverse support. 
After the First World War it attracted many returning soldiers. In the 
early 1950's some members of the New England New State Movement wer e a lso 
active in the National Catholic Rural Movement, which in turn included active 
2 Country Party members. The N.C.R.M. was founded in 1940 with B.A. Santamar i a 
as its first secretary and took a decidedly spiritual approach to the 
benefits of small farming. Its aims were somewhat idealistic and impractical 
which may be why it had bedfellows in the New State Movement. The Scottish 
National Party, in its earlier years, flirted with the Social Credit theories 
3 
of Major Douglas 
Over the years a number of Royal Commissions have been appointed 
1 Jupp, p .15I. 
2Robert Murray, The Split: Australian Labor in the Fif ties 
2nd ed. (Melbourne: Cheshire Publishing, 1972), p.l09. 
3 Hanham, pp.145 and 174. 
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to report on various aspects of New Statism. The 1923 commission in 
N.S.W. reported (in 1925) that New States in N.S.W. were neither viable nor 
desirable. A Federal Royal Commission, that had been appointed in 1929 
to review the workings of the Constitution, recommended an alte r nat ive 
method for creating new states. It proposed that on receipt of a pe tition 
signed by at least twenty percent of the electors of an area not less in 
extent than Tasmania, the Commonwealth should set up a boundaries commis-
sion, call a Convention to draft a State Constitution and hold a referen-
dum in the State concerned. If 60 percent of the elect?rs in the area of the 
proposed New State and 40 percent of the people in the existing State as a 
whole approved then the Commonwealth Parliament should have the power to decide 
finally whether the New State should be establishedl • Nothing further was 
heard of this proposal, a common fate for the recommendations of Royal 
Commissions throughout the British Commonwealth! 
In Queensland most of the new state activity was between 1850 
and 1922. The northern Queensland movement was reactivated in 1948. However, 
in N.S.W. activity in the northern part of the State still persists. In 
1954 "The Constituent Assembly of New England" was elected by the Inverell 
Convention. Its purpose was to clarify the legal steps to statehood, to devise 
a system of centralised administration for the New Sta te, to encourage the 
investment of capital in the New State and to investigate the possibility 
of electing a permanent representative assembly of New England. Little 
lElliS, pp.295-300 
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came of all of this since politics with a complete absence of power is 
pretty much of an inconsequential game. However, after the defeat of 
the 1967 referendum, the New State Movement announced in January 1968 
that it would contest a number of northern seats at the State elections, 
1 
all the seats concerned being held by Country Party members. Although 
this caused much annoyance to the Country Party it has had no effect on 
the number of seats held since the Country Party candidates picked up the 
second and third preference votes of the New State Movement candidates. 
A similar situation faced the Liberal Party in Scotlan~ and Wales in the 
1974 elections, and in the absence of any system of transferable votes 
acted to the detriment of the Liberals. 
Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National Party both first contes-
ted General Elections in 1929. The percentage of the vote obtained in 
each subsequent General Election is shown in table 16 together with that 
for the Liberal Party broken down by region. 
lAO kO lt ln, p.97 
) (Feb 
(Oct) 
Wales 
General Plaid 
Election Cymru 
1929 <0.1 
1931 0.2 
1935 0.3 
1945 1.2 
1950 1.2 
1951 0.7 
1955 3.1 
1959 5.2 
1964 4.8 
1966 4.3 
1970 11.5 
1974 10.0 
1974 10.8 
Table 16 
Percentage Vote - Liberal, Plaid Cymru 
and Scottish National Parties 
Scotland Liberal Party 
Scottish 
National Wales Scotland England 
Party 
0.1 33.5 18.1 23.6 
1.0 21. 5 13.4 9.4 
1.3 18.0 6.7 6.3 
1.2 14.9 5.0 9.4 
0.4 12.6 6.6 9.4 
0.3 7.6 2.7 2.3 
0.5 7.3 1.9 2.6 
0.8 5.3 4.1 6.3 
2.4 7.3 7.6 12.1 
5.0 6.3 6.8 9.0 
11.4 6.8 5.5 7.9 
21.8 15.9 7.3 21. 3 
30.4 15.5 8.3 20.2 
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U.K. 
23.6 
10.4 
6.8 
9.0 
9.1 
2.6 
2.7 
5.9 
11. 2 
8.5 
7.5 
19.3 
18.4 
Sources: 
1918-1970 (2nd ed; 
F.W.S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Statistics, 
Chichester; Political Reference Publications, 1970). 
The Times. March 4, 1974 and October 14, 1974. 
The Scottish National Party shows a steady doubling of support, 
or better, at each election since 1955 rising from 0.5 percent of the vote 
in 1955 to 21.8 percent in 1974. The large increase in actual votes from 
1970 to February 1974 is mirrored by the modest increase in Liberal votes 
in Scotland in the same period, compared to England and Wa les. The impact 
of the S.N.P. on the Liberal fortunes has been much more pronounced than 
for Plaid Cymru in Wales. The two principal reasons for this are probably 
that the Liberals have normally been relatively stronger in Wales than in 
Scotland and that Plaid Cymru places more emphasis on the cultural aspects 
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of its policy whereas the S.N.P. concentrates on the alleged economic 
deprivation of 1 Scotland , which is more effective as a vote-getter. 
There are considerable differences between the potential for 
nationalism in Wales and Scotland. Wales has been part of the United King-
dom for a very long time compared wi th Sco tland. Scotland still retains its own 
national church, education system, legal system, banking system and system 
of local government. Both nationalist parties were founded in the aftermath 
of economic depression following the First World War, Plaid Cymru in 1925 and 
the S.N.P. in 1928. In some quarters comparisons have been made between 
these parties and the French Poujadist movement. However, the Poujadist move-
ment had above average support from artisans, small businessmen, small 
. 
farmers and others in the self-employed category. Both Plaid Cymru and the 
S.N:P. are basically 'Nationalist' in their appeal but with radical anti-
capitalist overtones. The support for Plaid Cymru is at present mainly 
from farmers and middle class people, especially ministers of nonconformist 
2 
churches, lawyers and teachers Most of its candidates were professional 
people, in the 1959 and 1966 General Elections nearly half the Plaid Cymru 
3 
candidates were schoolteachers • The Poujadist members of the French 
. National Assembly in 1956 were mainly drawn from commercial occupations. 
The S.N.P. is relatively stronger among manual workers, in fact it has 
lW.p. Grant and R.J.C. Preece. "Welsh and Scottish Nationalism" 
Parliamentary Affairs. XXI(3) (Summer, 1968), 258 
2 Grant and Preece, p.258 
3Ibid ., p.259 
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greater support among skilled manual workers than either Labour or Conser-
. 1 
vatlve . 
In both Wales and Scotland the Nationalist Parties attract a 
relatively larger proportion of voters under 45 than do the Liberals. One 
reason for this could be that the Liberals are identified with the 'system' 
against which both the young and the Nationalists are struggling. 
A further factor in Scotland is the steady emigration from 
2 Scotland during the twentieth century, averaging 5.4% per decade The 
English joke that this is because Scotland is a good place to be from, but 
Scottish emigrants were the backbone of much Colonial administration and 
enriched many parts of the world with their doctors, teachers, l awyers and 
engineers. Both Wales and Scotland have a dependence on heavy declining 
industry and poor farming. In Scotland the average weekly income is approxi-
mately 15 percent lower than in England and the unemployment rate is usually 
3 double England's On the other hand there has been developments in nuclear 
power research at Dounreay, an aluminum smelter at Invergordon, a small 
auto industry and development area tax incentives. Unfortunately, the 
perennial economic woes of the United Kingdom lend credence to the nationaLi ,' 
claim that they could not be worse off on their own. 
lHanham, p. 189 
2Ibid ., p.17 
3Ibid., p.30 
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Tables 17 and 18 shows the percentage swings from 1970 to 
February 1974 broken down by dominant party, excluding seats won in 
February 1974 by the SNP and Plaid Cymru. 
Table 17 
Percentage Swings in Scottish Seats 
Liberal Candidate in 1970 and No Liberal Candi-
February 1974 date in 1970 
Swing From Liberal Labour Conservative 
Seats Seats Seats 
-
Conservative -3.0 -1.5 -2.4 -3.9 
Labour -2.2 -4.0 -4.0 -3.9 
Liberal +2.6 +-1.7 +2.2 +-5.0 
S.N.P. +-2.7 +-3.9 +4.2 +-3.0 
(N) (2) (2) (9) (3) 
Table 18 
Percentage Swings in Welsh Seats 
Liberal Candidate in 1970 and No Liberal Candi-
February 1974 date in 1970 
Swing From Liberal Labour Conservative 
Seats Seats Seats 
Conservative -1. 3 0.0 -1.8 - 2.2 
Labour -0.6 -1. 9 -3.2 -4.9 
Liberal +-4.4 +2.3 +-6.1 +8.1 
Plaid Cymru -2.5 -0.4 -1.1 -0.9 
(N) (2) (8) (5) I (7) 
'---- -. _-
Tables 19 and 20 show the percentage swings in the seats won 
by the S.N.P. and Plaid Cymru in February 1974. 
Table 19 
Percentage Swings in Seats Won by S.N.P. in February 1974 
Seats Held by Seats Held·by 
Swing From Conservatives in 1970 Labour in 1970 
-- -
Conservatives -4.8 -2.2 
Labour -6.7 -8.3 
Liberal -1. :3 -1.0 
. 
Table 20 
Percentage Swings in Seats Won by Plaid Cymru in February 1974 
(Both seats won from Labour) 
Swing from 
Conservatives 
Labour 
Liberal 
% 
-0.4 
-3.1 
-0.8 
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These tables are very revealing. There is a completely diffe-
rent pattern in the relative voting between the Liberals and the Scottish 
National Party and Plaid Cymru. In all types of seats contested by the Libe-
rals and Plaid Cymru, with only one type of exception, the Liberals subs tan-
tially increased their vote and Plaid Cymru declined. The exception was the 
two seats actually won by Plaid Cymru where there was a slight decline in the 
Liberal vote. In both cases Plaid Cymru ran second to Labour in the 1970 
election and there was obviously a feeling among some Conservatives and 
Liberals and a greater number of Labour supporters that here was an opportunity 
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to elect a third party member. However, these figures confirm what is 
also apparent from table 16 that the Plaid Cymru claim to third place, 
relative to the Liberals, weakened considerably in February 1974. 
In Scotland, the situation is very different. The Liberals 
slightly improved their overall position but were dramatically overtaken 
by the Scottish National Party who laid clear claim to third place. 
What then does the future hold? As Albinski l observes, with the 
Country Party well represented in the Queensland and N.S.W. Governments 
"spokesmanship and sympathetic state policy for the two regions is reaso-
nably insured" and New State sentiment is unlikely to go to militant extre-
mes that would seek to impose a secessionist solution. At the Federal level 
no amount of high-flown window-dressing, as typified by the following quo ta-
tion, is likely to achieve any concrete changes. The Country Party "believes 
in the need for a policy of New States, whereby natural regions forming 
potential farmers' republics on the Jeffersonian pattern, such as the New 
England region of N.S.W. and North Queensland, would be carved out of the 
existing States to form new communities which would be ruled by farmers 
and would increase the power of the Country Party in the Federal Parliament,,2 
In order to make potential new states economically viable there would need 
to be a significant growth of secondary industries in country towns and there 
is no indication of this occurring. 
1 Henry S. A1binski. Canadian and Australian Politics in Compa-
rative Perspective. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p.139 
2J •D. B. Miller, Australian Government and Politics (2nd ed.; 
London: Gerald Ducbvorth & Co., 1961), p.7S 
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The future of the Liberal Party in Wales and Scotland is more 
difficult to forecast. Much will depend on the attitude of the Nationalist 
Parties. If they foresaw a better chance, than in the past, of achieving 
a federation because of the new strength of the Liberals then a really con-) 
certed electoral effort could produce sufficient Parliamentary strength to 
force either the Labour or Conservative Parties to make significant conces-
sions. Perhaps the horrors of Northern Ireland might convince the English 
voters that a freely negotiated federation is better than Northern Ireland 
multiplied by three. With the present polarisation of.British politics 
it is difficult to be hopeful that such a reasonable common-sense solution 
would find majority support. 
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CHAPTER 8 
INFLUENCE OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 
Political parties exist in order to determine who shall have 
the legislative and executive power in the physical region in which they 
operate. The electoral system is made up of laws concerning the qualifi-
cations required by a citizen before he can exercise his vote; the delinea-
tion of the boundaries of the voting districts; the system used to deter-
mine which candidates achieve recognition as representatives of the voter; 
and the whole range of election laws covering such matters as the secret 
ballot, frequency of elections, financial restrictions on electioneering 
costs, rules for nominating candidates and the like. In considering the 
electoral systems of Australia and Britain there are many points of simi-
larity in the election laws and in voter qualifications. Two of the main 
differences are the existence of compulsory voting in Australian federal 
elections and various property requirements in voting for the upper houses 
of some states. The more significant differences are the extent of "gerry-
mandering" electoral district boundaries, prevalent in some Austrdl ian 
States, and the actual voting system - simple plurality in Bri t ain, and 
single transferable vote in single member constituencies for the House of Re-
presentatives and proportional representation for the Senate in Australia. 
What is the significance of this difference in voting system? 
After studying the 1964 general election results in Britain, Berrington 
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concluded that "if the Liberals 'were to obtain 30 percent of the total 
poll .... and the increase were spread over the whole country and drawn 
in equal proportions from the two main parties, they would still return 
3 ' ,,1 no more than 0 M.P. s • This conclusion has been substantiat ed in large 
part by the results of the two 1974 General Elections where the Liberals 
polled close on 20 percent of the total vote and elected less than 15 M.P.'s. 
Under-representation of this magnitude tends to induce a contempt for parlia-
mentary electoral processes, particularly in a class-divided society under 
strong economic pressure. The Australian picture is very different. 
Butler, who has been responsible alone and with others for many studies of 
British election results, commented that "Australia has, to English eyes, 
an electoral system that offers a rich lode of analytic possibilities. So 
far much of the wealth remains unquarried and general commentaries on the 
Australian political situation are the poorer for it,,2. Following the 1969 
election the Country Party had 8.6 percent of the national vote, which gave 
it 16 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives. It fought only 
26 seats (one-fifth of the total) and won 20 of them, in these contests it 
polled 44.8 percent of the vote, only 2.6 percent more than the ALP rece~-" ed 
. h 3 In t ese seats • We have here the most startling comparison between the t wo 
lH.B. Berrington. "The General Election of 1964". Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society (Series A), 128 (1965), p.66 
2David Butler. "Aspects of Australian Elections". The Australian 
Journal of Politics and History. XIV(l) April, 1968, p.23. 
3 Henry S. Albinski, Canadian and Australian Politics in Compara-
tive Perspective. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p.2l0. 
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minor parties under study, major over-representation for the Country Party 
and even more major under-representation for the British Liberal Party. 
One reason for this difference lies in the different attitudes 
towards a minor party, by at any rate one of the major parties, in the two 
countries. In Australia in the 1920's the National Party leaders had reco-
gnised that the Country Party had established its right to exist in the 
1 party system. The British Liberal Party and its voting supporters do not 
appear to have that right, at least not in the same way as Labour and Conser-
vative supporters, who relatively elect in the order of ten time s as many 
M.P. 's with their votes as do the Liberals with the same number of votes. 
This problem of Liberal under-representation is compounded by the 
potentially even higher level of support indicated by the opinion polls. 
After the Orpington by-election victory in 1962, the National Opinion Poll 
showed Liberal support at 38 percent compared to 33 percent for Labour and only 
29 percent for the Conservative2 • In the Autumn of 1968, the Opinion 
Research Centre found that 52 percent of a sample replied 'Yes' to the ques-
tion, "If you thought that Liberals stood a chance of forming a Government: 
would you ever consider voting for them,,3. Unfortunately f or the Liberal 
Party nowhere near that percentage of voters considered that they ha d a chance 
lB.D. Graham. The Forma tion of the Austra lian Count ry Parties 
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1966), p.295. 
2 Pe ter G.J. Pulzer. Political Representation and Elections: Parti e s 
and Voting in Great Britain. (New York: Praeger, 1967), p.98. 
3David Butler and Donald Stokes. Political Change in Britain 
(London: Macmillan, 1969), p.320. 
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of forming the Government and therefore did not actually vote Liberal. 
However, it is indications of potential Liberal support of this magnitude 
that may well deter Labour and Conservative leaders from supporting any 
change in the electoral system, which could then prove potentially disas-
trous to themselves. Rae suggested that "electoral laws may create majo-
1 
rities where none are created by the voters". This is certainly true 
in Britain where only in 1931 and 1935 has the government party obtained 
more than 50 percent of the popular vote and in both cases the result was 
a landslide. Landslide results can be obtained even wbere the victorious party 
gets less than 50 percent of the national vote, as in the case of Labour in 
1945. (!Landslide'is defined here as a seat majority of over 150). 
Voting intention figures need to be viewed with some caution 
since "studies carried out in the United States suggested that the relative 
stability in the net figures for 'voting intention' masked much larger gross 
movements. For example the information that Labour's public opinion poll lead 
had increased from 3 percent to 6 percent did not indicate whether there had 
been a single transfer of 1.5 percent of the electorate from Conservative 
to Labour, or whether there had been a large movement from Labour to Conser-
vative counterbalanced by an even larger movement in the opposite direction, 
or, as seemed more likely, a complex series of switches from 'Conservative' 
to 'Don't Know', 'Liberal' to 'Don't hl10W', etc. Conventional public opinion 
polls also gave little indication about the motives which had influenced the 
svlitches,,2. 
lDouglas W. Rae. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws 
2nd. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p.75. 
2David Butler and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, The British General 
Election of 1970 (London: Macmillan, St.Martin's Press, 1971), p.19l. 
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Bonham in his study of- the middle class vote in the early fifties, 
found that the 'floating vote' was difficult to define and was not a cons is-
tent grouping of the same people from one election to the next who all move 
in the same direction. In the three elections immediately after the Second 
World War as many as ten million people alternated between voting and non-
voting for the main parties. He found that less than half the electorate were 
either regularly Conservative or regularly Labour in the 1945, 1950 and 1951 
1 . 1 e ectlons • These comments illustrate that the potential for major party 
Liberal support does indeed exist, whether it can be harnessed is the real 
question and to what extent the present British electoral system prevents it 
will be examined in depth. In order to assess these points the electoral sys-
terns at present used in Australia and Britain are revie\\1ed together with their 
results, particularly in recent years, as they affect the Country Party and 
the British Liberal Party. From this base the two systems will be evaluated 
against commonly accepted criteria of voting systems. Finally an attempt will 
be made to estimate the possible effect on Liberal Party electoral fortunes 
if the British system should be changed and also on the Country Party if the 
Australian system should be changed to the present British system. 
The British electoral system is simple. The entire United Kingdom 
is divided into single member constituencies. In the vast majority of consti-
tuencies the size of the electorate is within ± 20 percent of the national 
average and there is no serious criticism from any party of deliberate gerry-
mandering of boundaries or of over or under representation on any rural/urban 
lJohn Bonham. The Middle Class Vote (London: Faber & Faber, 1954), 
p. 176. 
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basis. As mentioned earlier, for a variety of historical reasons Northern 
Ireland is deliberately under-represented and Scotland and Wales over-repre-
sented, but the overall effect is very slight. In any general election or 
by-election tte successful candidate is the one who receives the most votes. 
In a straight fight, with only two candidates, the one with the most votes 
must also have an absolute maj ority, i. e. at least 50 percent of the total 
vote + 1. In a three-cornered contest, common where a minor party also runs 
a candidate, the winning candidate could win with 34 percent of the total 
vote, with the other two candidates each getting 33 percent. Theoretically 
this situation could become even more noticeable the greater the number of 
candidates. Again, in theory, one party could win every single seat by a 
small majority thus having slightly over 50 percent of the vote and leave 
all other parties unrepresented. In practice, because of the unevenness of 
p~rty support throughout the country, there tends to be a balancing out. 
This balancing is far from perfect and the greater the spread in total popular 
vote between the two major parties the even greater the spread in the number 
of seats won, the so-called 'cube' law1 . 
The actual percentage vote and the percentage of seats actually 
obtained in the House of Commons is shown on figure 5 for every British general 
Election from 1918 to October 1974. During this period the Conservative Party 
had every reason to be satisfied with the system since on only two occasions, 
1945 and 1966, were they under-represented. The Labour Party has less reason 
to be satisfied, but even they have been over-represented on eight occasions 
(1923, 1929, 1945, 1950, 1964, 1966, 1970 and 1974). In only one of these 
elections, 1970, did they subsequently fail to form the Government. If one 
lThe 'cube' law states that if the parties votes are in the propor-
tions of A:B, their seats will be in the proportions of A3:B3. 
-10 
~o 
+0 
)0 
I "/ ) 
10 I 
I 
I 
10 
~o 
10 
;0 
, 
'0 , , 
10 
Sources: As for table 16. 
1\ 
I'" 
I " / '\ 
I 
1 
I 
, I 
\ I 
V 
" , \ 
I \ 
I \ 
\ 
\ , 
, 
\ 
\ 
\ 
I\. / \ 
Pf~ C~N" (~) '10"1'£ 
PeA._ c.CI\4"1' (04) SE.A-rs 
C.OM SEP..VA"" \IE PAm'! 
-
LISE-ARt. PARTi 
OCT. 
~ 
OC T . 
- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - --.... - ........ -- ... ---' 
D~~ ________ ~~ ________ ~ ________ ~~~~~~~ ________ ~~ __ _ 
/'170 
141. 
major party is over-represented in 87.5 percent of the elections and the 
other major party in 50.0 percent then some one or more parties must be 
under-represented. The sufferers have been the minor parties and particu-
larly the Liberal Party who have never been over-represented in the period 
under study. If ~ 20 percent margin in constituency electorate size is con-
sidered an acceptable variance when the vagaries of vote distr ibution are 
taken into account, then the maximum index of under-representation (see 
chapter 4, p.16) that should be considered as acceptable is 1.4. The greatest 
under-representation experienced by the Conservative P~rty in 1945 was under 
1.2. The only times the Labour Party index of under-representation had exceeded 
1.4 is in 1918 (2.5), 1931 (3.6) and 1935 (1.5). The only times the Liberal 
Party has been under-represented by less than 1. 4 were in 1923 and 1931. During 
the past fifteen years the Liberal Party index of under-representation has never 
been under 4.5. Although this is a source of great concern to the Liberal 
Party I would suggest that it goes much further and should be a source of 
concern to anyone who professes a belief in democracy. Under-representation 
of this magnitude over a period of years should not be considered as acceptable 
by anyone and if it is so considered by the major parties then this would appear 
to be a prime illustration of their contempt for democratic processes which 
might adversely affect their own pursuit of power. 
The Australian electoral system is considerably different. All 
the lower houses, both at the Federal and States level, are elected using 
the Single Transferable Vote (STV) with the exception of Tasmania. The Tas-
manian Lower House and the Federal Senate are elected on a full proport i onal 
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representation system. The other upper houses, with the exception of New 
South Wales which has an indirectly elected Legislative Council, are elected 
using STV. Where STV is used there are single member constituencies and for a 
vote to be valid (or formal) the voter must mark an order of preference 
covering the full list of candidates. For example, if a seat was contested by 
the Liberals, Labor and Communists a staunch Liberal would have to show his 
second choice between Labor and Communist and so on for the other candidates. 
This can produce some strange results. In the 1961 General Election the 
Menzies Government finally retained office with a majo~ity of one on the floor 
of the House because the last contest to be decided went to a Right-wing Liberal 
who gained an unexpectedly large and just sufficient proportion of Communist 
1 preferences An extreme case of the distribution of preferences arose in 
the 1966 Federal election for a Victoria seat. The incumbent ALP member 
received 47 percent of the first preferences against 29 percent for the Liberal , 
but the Liberal eventually won the seat on the preferences 2 The ALP is 
opposed to both STV and PRo Basically this is because it is the most highly 
disciplined of the Australian parties and suffers from the way in which the 
present electoral system permits the less well disciplined non-Labor part ies 
a 'second chance' to put together an anti-Labor vote. The system also gives 
Party rebels more leverage and such is the bitterness when the ALP split s that 
very few 'rebels' exercise their preferences in favour of the ALP. In the 
1969 Queensland election 80 percent of Democratic Lab.or Party preferences 
lCrisp, p.173 
2Albinski, p.27l 
1 
went to the Liberals/Country Party and only 20 percent to the ALP 
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D.L.P. 
preferences may well have cost the ALP the 1961 and 1969 Federal House of 
. l' 2 Representatlves e ectlons . 
It is certainly the case that a large percentage of the changes 
produced by counting preferences has operated against the ALP. In the 
period 1937-1961 the percentages of changes on preferences that cost the ALP 
3 the seat where they led on first preferences are : 
Federal 
New South Wales 
Victoria 
South Australia 
Hestern Australia 
71. 7 percent 
62.9 
93.2 
33.3 
84.2 
A particular issue may have a big influence on the disposition 
of preferences. In the 1969 election Australian involvment in the Vietnam 
war was a major issue and the DLP strongly supported this involvment as a moans 
to stopping the spread of communism. This was in diametric opposition to the 
ALP and was a major reason for DLP preferences going so solidly to the 
Liberal/Country Party government candidates4 . In this election the total 
lJames Kelly. "Vote Weighting and Quota Gerrymanders in Queens-
land, 1931-1971". The Australian Quarterly. 43(2) (June 1971), p.43. 
2Albinski, p.27l. 
3 Joan Rydon. "Compulsory and Preferential - The Distinctive 
Features of Australian Voting Methods". Journal of Commonwealth Political 
Studies. VI(3) (November 1968), p.195. 
4Malcolm Mackerras "Another Second Preference Government" 
The Australian Quarterly. (41(4) (December 1969), p.30 
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anti-Labor vote, based on counting all preferences, was less than the ALP 
vote but the Liberal/Country Party government still retained power ,-·:' t h a 
66 to 59 seat margin l • The main reason for this is that the ALP holds rela-
tively more seats with large majorities and the Liberal/Country Party more 
seats with slim majorities. It is for this reason that, now that they are 
in power, the ALP is seeking to abolish preferential voting in order to 
prevent the resurrection of the DLP and weaken the Country Party, as planned 
whilst in opposition2 This may turn out to be short-sighted since in the 
long run, the ALP might fare better with a more equita~le system of propor-
tional representation. 
It is also not at all certain that STV favours the Country Party 
to any great extent. 3 As Joan Rydon showed in her analysis of election results 
between 1937 and 1961 triangular contests (table 21) are not that common 
anyway. 
Table 21 
Changes on Preferences in Seats Contested by the Country Party 
1937-1961 
Seats contested by 
Country Party 
New South Wales 219 
Victoria 221 
lJestern Australia 143 
Total 583 
_._._- ----- --- ------- -~-,.-- .,- . , .------.-
Triangular 
Total rc 
Pr 
37 
75 
22 
134 
--------- '---
Contests 
hanged on 
eferences 
lMalcolm Mackerras "Another Second Preference Government" 
The Australian Quarterly 41 (4) (December 1969), p.28 
2Ibid., p.3l 
3Rydon, p.196. 
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Only 23 percent of the total seats contested were triangular 
contests and in only just over one fifth of these seats, or less than five 
percent of the total number, was the result changed as a result of counting 
the preferences. Admittedly the ALP fared worst on these changes, but over 
half the cases reported were in Victoria where, at different times t he 
Country Party was granted immunity by the Liberals and at other times by 
the ALP. When this immunity was withdrawn and triangular contests became 
more common after 1950 the Country Party fared worst, not the ALP, and lost 
1 
much of its strength in the state . 
Strictly speaking it is only in Victoria that a genuine three party 
system is common. Tasmania and South Australia have been predominantly two 
party and in the other states the normal line up is a Liberal/Country 
Party coalition opposed to the ALP. The percentage of votes and correspon-
ding percentage of seats in the House of Representatives during the period 
1919 to 1974 is shown for the Liberal, Country and Australian Labor 
Parties in figure 6. This clearly shows that the only party in this 
period to be consistently over-represented in terms of seats is the Country 
Party. The index of over-representation for the Country Party in each 
general election for the lower Federal house is shown in table 22. 
1 Rydon, p.197 
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Table 22 
Index of Over-Representation for the Country Party 
1919-1974 
(Federal House of Repres entatives) 
--
General Election Year Index of Over-Representation 
1919 1. 67 
1922 1.46 
1925 1. 67 
1928 1. 52 
1929 1.39 
1931 1.91 
. 
1934 1. 54 
1937 1.42 
1940 1.38 
1943 1. 21 
1946 1. 24 
1949 1. 41 
1951 1. 51 
1954 1. 59 
1955 1. 90 
1958 1.72 
1961 1. 65 
1963 1.80 
1966 1. 63 
1969 1.58 
1972 1. 70 
1974 1. 54 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
The percent vote and pe rcent s eats for each of the t hree main 
parties is shown, for the pe riod 1919 to 1974 on fi gure 6. The variations 
in the percentage vote from election to el ection are magnified great l y in 
terms of perc entage of s eats actually won. A comparison between figures 5 
and 6 shows no significant difference in t erms of the distortion of percent 
seats to percent votes. The single transferable vote, as used i n Australia, 
has certainly not achieved 'proportional' repr esentation. 
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In the twenty-two general ele ctions since 1919 the ALP has 
received the largest vote for a particular party no fewer than e ighteen times. 
It has won a majority of seats on only five occasions. The ALP has been under-
represented in terms of seats to votes, fourteen times with a maximum index 
of under-representation of 1.58 (in 1931) and an average index of under 
representation of 1.09. The National Party / U.A.P./Liberal Party has been 
under-represented only six times, including the 1972 and 1974 elections, 
but on average has been over-represented with an index of 1.04. The Country 
Party has been consistently over-represented, with an average index of over-
representation of 1.57. In the light of these figures it is dif ficult indeed 
to accept Crisp's conclusion that "on the whole however, preferentia l voting 
in single-member electorates for the House of Representatives ha s given 
substantial satisfaction"l. 
Obviously the Country Party has good reason to be sat i sfied though, 
as will be discussed later, their electoral success is by no means wholly 
attributable to STV. The Liberal Party may have been satisfied until very 
recently but there is very little reason for the ALP to be satis fied. As 
Lipson observes STV is appropriate to a tri-party system wherein two of the 
parties were normally expected to coalesce against the third 2 . It is very 
doubtful whether STV alone is the best system from the point of view of the 
1 . Crlsp, p.122 
2L• Lipson 
Commonwealth: Causes, 
VII (1959), pp.12-31. 
"Party Systems in the United Kingdom and t he Older 
Resemblances, and Variations". Political Studies 
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British Liberal Party, since the idea of any permanent arrangement with 
only one major party is anathema. However, in Australia we have yet to see 
a party or a group of candidates bargaining their preferences ba ck and forth 
from one party to another or using them selectively, to favour particular 
d 'd l' , 1 can 1 ates or po lCles • If this was done in Britain with STV the effects 
are unpredictable but could be significant. Obviously a party's influence 
would be much greater if it could deliv er preference votes in either direc-
tion, particularly in marginal seats. 
The same pattern of consistent Country Party'over representation, 
and varying degrees of both under and over representation for the Liberals 
and ALP, are also apparent in various State elections 2. However, in no case 
does the extent of either under or over representation, for the Liberals, 
Country Party and ALP, approach the degree of under representation of the 
British Liberal Party (see table 4). If the Democratic Labor Party is 
included in the comparison, the picture changes, since in spite of a maximum 
DLP vote of over nine percent in 1958 the DLP has never been able, in spite 
of STV, to elect a single member to the House of Representatives. As with 
the British Liberal Party the DLP vote is relatively evenly spread across the 
country and consequently their supporters are effectively disenfranchised 
except in the sense of being able to use their preferences negatively against 
the ALP. 
1 Rydon, p.194 
2 Malcolm Mackerras "The New South Wales Election, February 1971. 
The Australian Quarterly. 43(2) (June 1971), pp.3l-34. Also Kelly, p~4l. 
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The results of the February 1974 British General Election and 
the May 1974 double dissolution elections in Australia illustrate some 
changes in electoral trends in both countries. 
In Britain the Liberal vote in February 1974 was the largest it 
had achieved in England since 1929, in Wales since 1935, in Scotland since 
1964 and in the country as a whole since 1929. The Liberal Party fielded 
517 candidates, four more than in 1929 and the largest number in the whole 
period under review since 1918. The pa ltry return in terms of seats of 
fourteen was the largest number won at a general election since 1935, when 
twenty-one seats were won with a third of the 1974 percentage vote. As is 
shown in table 23, there was a marked increase in the number of sea t s '-- :;('_~:~ 2; 
the Liberal ran second. 
Table 23 
Second Place Finishes by Liberal Party Candidates (U.K.) 
General Liberal Liberal Total 
Election Second Second Second 
Year behind behind Place 
Conservative Labour 
f-----______ 
- -- ----
--
1966 22 7 29 
1970 20 7 27 
1974 (February) 125 19 144 
1974 (October) 91 4 95 
_ ___ _ ______________ 1 ________________ _____ _______ ____ 
.. ~ -.-- --------
In view of the number of forfeited deposits in other genera l elec-
tions since 1945 it must have been particularly gratifying for t he Liberals 
to lose fewer deposits than Labour in February 1974. 
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The October 1974 results were a definite setback but far from a 
disaster. In the seats where the Liberal ran second behind the Conserva-
tive, the Conservative majority was reduced, compared to February. in 51 
cases (in 23 of these cases the Conservative majority was over 10,000; 
in 16, between five and ten thousand; and in the remaining twelve under 
five thousand). 
In a party with fairly evenly spread support the failure to con-
test seats does not give a true indication of total electoral support. Table 
24 shows the average Liberal percentage vote per candidate. 
Table 24 
Average Liberal Percentage Vote per Candidate,1950-1974 (U . K.) 
General Election Year Average Liberal % Vote per 
Candidate 
1950 1l.8 
1951 14.7 
1955 15.1 
1959 16.9 
1964 18.5 
1966 16.1 
1970 l3.5 
1974 (February) 23.3 
1974 (Octoberl 19.1 
The importance of maintaining a steady constituency base was under-
lined by Berrington who found 1 thc~t the Liberals polled 20.8 pe r cent of the 
vote in seats they contested in both 1964 and 1959, compared to 16.1 percent 
1 . Berrlngton, p.34 
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in seats contested in 1964 but not 1959. This difference of 4.7 percent 
was considerably larger than the increase of 1.6 percent in the average 
Liberal vote per candidate. Getting established in a constituency normally 
takes time. In 1970 the Liberals entered candidates in 85 constituencies 
where they had no candidate in 1966 and took second place in only one of 
them. Maintaining the same candidate appears to have little effect as is 
shown in tables 25(a) and 25(b), which confirms other studies in Britain 
showing the relative unimportance of the candidate as an individual. The 
analysis was restricted to constituencies where there had been no change 
or only minor changes in boundaries between 1970 and February 1974, with 
three-cornered contests. 
Table 25 (a) 
Seats Contested 1970 and February 1974 by Same Liberal Candidates 
Won by Number Liberal Second in % Swing from % Swing from 
of seats 1970 1974 Cons. to Lib. Lab. to Lib. 
-
Liberal 2 0 0 Lf.2 5.2 
Labour 6 0 0 3.8 2.3 
Conservative 14 3 8 3.3 3.3 
Table 25(b) 
Seats Contested 1970 and February 1974 by Different Liberal Candidates 
-- - - ----- - -----,-----
Won by Number Liberal Second in % Swing from % Swing from 
of seats 1970 1974 Cons '. to Lib. Lab. to Lib. 
Liberal 3 0 0 4.6 3.7 
Labour 32 0 2 3~6 2.0 
Conservative 81 6 45 3.6 3.1 
_J 
' --
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The 1970 general election results were a low point for the Liberal 
Party in twenty years. Table 26 shows the results for seats contested by 
the Liberals in February 1974 but not in 1966 or 1970. Table 27 shows the 
results for seats contested by the Liberals in 1966 and February 1974 but not 
in 1970. All of the analyses of the 1974 election results are confined to 
seats where there was no change, or only minor changes, in boundaries from 
1966 or 1970. This was true of a total of 249 constituencies that were con-
tested in February 1974 by Conservative, Labour and Liberal candidates. The 
percentage swings in tables 26 and 27 were calculated from 1966 to 1974. 
Table 26 
Results in Seats Contested by Liberal in February 1974 
but not in 1966 or 1970 
Won by Number Liberal % Swing from % Swing 
of Seats Second in Cons. to Lib. Lab. to 
Labour 33 2 3.5 5.9 
Conservative 13 2 3.6 8.3 
I 
Table 27 
Results in Seats Contested by Liberal in 1966 
and February 1974 but not in 1970 
Won by Number Liberal % Swing from % Swing 
of Seats Second in Cons. to Lib. Lab. to 
Labour 6 0 1.4 3.4 
conservat,ive 11 3 1.1 6.0 
from 
Lib. 
from 
Lib. 
--
There is naturally a larger swing from both Conservative and Labour 
to Liberal when the starting point is zero, as in table 26. Where there was 
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no Liberal candidate in 1966 the Libera l support was completely hidden. 
The significance lies in the markedly higher swing from Labour t o Liberal 
than from Conservative to Liberal regar dless of when the Liberal last con-
tested the seat. The overall average swing, in the 83 constituencie s con-
sidered in tables 26 and 27, was 2.2 percent from Conservative to Liberal 
and 6.5 percent from Labour to Liberal, or three times as many votes from 
Labour as from the Conservatives to the Liberals. This is markedly diffe-
rent from earlier elections. Berrington found l that in the 1964 election the 
Liberal vote was drawn equally from Labour and Conservatives in most regions 
except south-east and south-west England where 28 percent came f rom the Con-
servatives and 62 percent from Labour. Butler and Stokes considered2 that 
in both 1964 and 1966 the Liberal vote seemed to have little preferential 
impact on either Labour or Cons ervative. It is also very noticeable that 
the Labour swing to the Liberals was more pronounced in seats won by the 
Conservatives. This had also been observed in earlier elections and Berrington 
found 3 that in 1964 the Liberal vote was drawn to a disproportionate extent 
from the minority party and to a greater extent the safer the s eat. However, 
in the February 1974 election this no longe r was true of the Conservative 
swing which was not significantly higher in Labour won seats. 
Liberal improvement was not completely uniform, as average figures 
lB· 41 errlngton, p. 
2 Butler and Stokes, pp.335-336 
3B · 42 errlngton, p. 
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might indicate. In three constituencies contested by the Liberals in 
1966 and February 1974 (Bosworth, Bolton West and Stretford) there was 
actually a small swing (averaging 1.3 percent) from Liberal to Conserva-
tive. The impact of the Liberal Party is thus not uniform and this makes 
the prediction of their future fortunes doubly difficult. 
Although the Liberals, in the February 1974 election, took 
relatively more votes from Labour supporters they are more of a threat 
to the Conservatives. This is shown by the very much larger number of 
seats where they ran second to the Conservatives (125) compared with Labour 
(19) (see table 23). It is also shown by the type of seat in which they 
did well compared to 'safe' Conservative and 'safe' Labour seats. 'Safe' 
is here defined as more than 60 percent of the constituency vote for Con-
servative, 65 percent for Labour and 'strong' Liberal as more than 30 per-
cent. this gives approximately equal number of seats for each party, under 
these classifications. 1 1966 Census data by constituency, has been used 
ona percentage basis from the following categories: (tables 28 (a) , (b) 
and (c). 
Non-manual 
Professional and Managerial 
Owner Occupiers 
Council Tenants 
With full plumbing 
11966 Census: General and Parliamentary Tables, H.M.S.O. Novem-
ber 1969, in David Butler and Michael Pinto - Duschinsky. The British 
General Election of 1970 (London: Macmillan, 1971), pp.358-379. 
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With cars 
Born in the New Commonwealth, i.e. excluding Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand 
Young voters, the proportion who, in April 1966, were 
between 15 and 19 and who in 1974 would be between 23 
and 27 
Retired, defined as the proportion of the male population 
over 15 who were recorded as retired in the 1966 census. 
Table 2S(a) shows the average percentages for all 630 constituen-
cies and for 'safe' Labour and Conserva tive and 'strong' Liberal seats in 
1974. 
Table 2S( a ) 
Average Percentages by Census Category (U.K.) 
(fJ 
-i-l r-i "0 
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U.K. 630 32.6 15.3 44.0 27.7 73.1 43.6 1.7 10.2 10.S 
Safe Labour 42 19.5 7.1 26.1 40.4 62.0 30.5 1.9 10.9 10.5 
Safe Conservative 42 47.9 25.5 53.3 15.1 S1.7 52.7 2.0 9.3 12.6 
Strong Liberal 39 40.3 20.S 51.S 19.1 79.6 52.6 1.2 9.6 12.4 
In every single category except one, Labour and Conser vatives 
are opposite sides of the national average with the averages in the strong 
Liberal seats also opposite to Labour, between Labour and Conserva tive and 
closer to the Conservative averages than to Labour. The one exception is 
among new immigrants where Liberals do best where, relatively, the propor-
tion of new immigrants is lowest and lower than Labour, Conserva tive or the 
I 
I 
J 
---
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national average. This could be due to a number of factors. Immigrants 
are concentrated in inner City areas where Liberals do poorly and there-
fore do not show up as strongly Liberal constituencies. New Corrrnonwealth 
immigrants are much less likely to have any historical, family or cultural 
links with British Liberalism. It is of passing interest that t he racial 'mix' 
does not seem to be at all decisive in determining whether a constituency is 
likely to be 'safe' for either Labour or Conservatives. 
However, averages can be misleading and tables 28(b) and 28(c) 
. 
show the maximum and minimum percentage s in each census category. 
Table 28 (b) 
Maximum Percentages by Census Category (U.K.) 
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Safe Conservative 87.6 41lGl 39.4 96.5 73.6 9.5 1 11 •1 29.8 Strong Liberal 87.6 32.3 72.6 31. 0 89.5 66.8 2.8 11.5 26. {, 
Table 28 (c) 
Minimum Percentages by' Census Category (U.K.) 
Safe Labour 12.0 5.2 1.6 11.4 35.2 12.1 0.1 8.7 6.5 
Safe Conservative 27.9 12.5 8.2 1.6 64.2 31. 7 0.2 6.3 4.7 
Strong Liberal 1 23 . 7 8.6 30.2 5.8 62.4 29.6 0.1 8.1 8.5 
The maximum and minimum figures underline that the Liberals are 
not strong in areas with large proportions of new immigrants. However, 
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Liberal strength is very similar to Conservative in constituencies with 
comparable percentages of non-manual workers but, if anything, their strength 
is concentrated more in areas with significant numbers of owner occupiers, 
the hallmark of the middle class and, to a growing extent, the skilled manual. 
Perhaps surprising is that there is not a great difference between the parties 
because of the proportion of young voters, if anything in favour of Labour, 
but probably because this census grouping is relatively evenly distributed. 
Both Liberals and Conservatives do relatively better than Labour in constituen-
cies vlith higher than average numbers of retired people. Many of the retired 
have small private pensions or investment income and may feel that Labour 
is unsympathetic to their interests in these fields. 
A voter 'Constituency Class Index' can be constructed by adding, 
for any given constituency, the percentages of non-manual, professional and 
managerial and owner occupiers together and subtracting the percentage of 
council tenants. For example Bromley (Orpington) had 60.3 percent non-manual, 
32.3 percent professional and managerial, 61.4 percent owner occupiers and 
15.5 percent council tenants to give a Constituency Class Index of 60.3 T 
32.3 + 61.4 - 15.5 = 138.5. 
Table 29 shows the average, maximum and minimum Constituency 
Class Index (CTI) for all the English seats that can be classified as Strong 
Liberal, Safe Labour or Safe Conservative in the February 1974 Election. 
The analysis was restricted to the English seats to eliminate the effect of 
the Scottish Nationalist and Plaid Cymru votes. The analysis wa s done for 
seats with little or no change in electoral boundaries since 1966. 
Table 29 
Constituency Class Index for Safe Labour, Safe Conservative 
and Strong Liberal Const i tuencies, 1974 
Labour Liberal 
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Conservative 
Max. Ave. Min. Max. Ave. Min. Max. Ave. Min. 
Inner London Boroughs 42.9 - 7.8 -34.1 - - - 1 28.4 116.5 108.1 
English Boroughs 51.8 10.6 -17.2 152.9 102.7 42.1 151.0 115.6 62.4 
English Countries 57.5 25.2 - 5.0 145.9 89.8 44.0 1 69.6 108.1 51.4 
Combined 57.5 12.3 -34.1 152.9 93.8 42.1 169.6 111. 6 51.4 
eN) = 42 39 42 
. 
For comparative purposes the average CTI for all constituencies 
is 64.2 and for the 123 constituencies analysed in table 29 is 71.8. The 
average CTr in table 29 clearly shows the class basis of party strength. The 
figures for Labour and Conservative are not surprising, but tho s e for Liberal 
are unexpected. The CTI's for the strong Liberal constituencies are only 
marginally less than for the safe Conservative seats which indicates that 
the two parties are basically competing for many of the same sea ts. It must 
be remembered though that there are over five hundred other sea t s at stake 
and they are mostly in the more central part of the crI spectrum. 
There is some overlap between the maximum Labour CTI' s and the 
minima for the Conservatives and Liberals, though this is not v ery signifi-
cant. Only six out of tbe 42 Labour seats exceed the minimum Liber a l Cli 
of 42.1 and only two of the strong Liberal constituencies are below the 
maximum Labour CTr of 57.5. Relative to the Conservatives only four of the 
Labour seats have a CTI below the Conservative minimum of 51.4 and only two 
1 
, 
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of the safe Conservative seats h"ave a CTI below the maximum Labour figure. 
Only three of the 39 Liberal constituencies have a CTI below tha t of the 
minimum for a strong Conservative seat. 
The other matter of interest, and of concern, is the very wide 
spread from the minimum Constituency Class Index of minus 34.1 for Bermondsey, 
where the Conservative candidate polled 23.1 percent of the vote in a straight 
fight with Labour, to a CTI of 169.6 for Surrey East where the Conservative 
won in 1974 with a 62.0 percent vote in a three-cornered fight against both 
Liberal and Labour candidates who almos t equally shared the remaining votes. 
This spread is almost plus and minus 100 points either side of the national 
average and is a graphic commentary on the two nations concept of a class 
divided society. 
Another fact that illustrates Labour weakness in Liber al held seats 
is that out of the fourteen Liberal seats won in February 1974, the Labo ur can-
didates lost their deposits in exactly half of them. This included a 
crushing defeat in Cormvall (North) where the Labour candidate poll ed a mere 
3.9 percent of the vote in a three cornered fight won by the Liberals with 
57.9 percent of the vote. If the Liberals are to achieve their goal of a 
less class-divided society they still have a very considerable way to go 
in terms of making significant inroads into areas of traditional Labour 
strength. 
The 1974 Federal elections in Australia were primarily of inte-
rest because of the virtual disappearance of the Democratic Labor Party 
from the Federal scene. In the aftermath of the double dissolution they lost 
their five Senate seats. The results for the House of Representatives are 
shown in table 30. 
Table 30 
Percentage Vote, House of Representatives (1974)1 
(Figures in brackets represent percent change from 
previous general election in 1972 
Liberal Country Australia A.L.P. D.L.P. Party Party Party 
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In- Turn-Other for-
mal out 
National 49.3(-0.3) 34.9(+ 2.9) 10.7(+1.3) 1.4(-3.9) 2.3(-0.1} 1.2(- 0.1) 1.9 95.0 
NSW 52.7(+0.8) 33.2(+ 3.3) 10.6(+0.8) 0 (-3.5) 2.8(-0.5) 0.4(- 1.2) 1.6 94.6 
Victoria 47.8(+0.5) 36.4(+ 2.8) 7.4 ( 0 ) 5.1(-3.3) 2.4(+0.3) 0.5(- 0.7) 2.0 95.7 
Queensland 44.0(-3.2) 30.4(+ 4.9) 23.5(+3.9) 0 ( 0 ) 1. 7 ( 0 ) 0.1(- 5.9) 1.3 94.8 
S.Australia 48.6(-2.0) 36.5(- 4.8) 4.1(+1.9) 0 (-3.7) 2.0(+1.0) 8.6(+ 7.4) 2.7 96.2 
W.Australia 46.3(+0.2) 41.3(+ 2.0) 10.7(+2.4) 0 .(-4.5) 1.2(+0.1) 0.3(- 0.4) 2.5 94.4 
Tasmania 55.1(-3.8) 44.3(+ 9.5) 0 ( 0 ) 0 (-4.8) 0.1(-0.4) 0.3(- 0.7) 1.7 96.5 
A.C.T. 55.5(+3.4) 35.5(+12.7) 3.5(+3.5) 0 (-3.6) 4.4(+4.4) 0.9(-20.6) 1.3 93.0 
The DLP only ran candidates of its own in Victoria. The main benefi-
ciaries from the absence of DLP candidates clearly appear to be the Liberals 
and the Country Party. The large increase in the 'Other' column represents 
the votes for the Liberal Movement in South Australia. Even with compulsory 
voting the total vote still falls five percent short of a complete turnout. 
The percentage informal vote, which covers both deliberate and accidental 
spoilt ballots, indicates that the complexities of marking an STV ballot are 
not that great, though the Australian voter now has many years experience 
with this system. The percentage of informal votes was much higher in the 
Senate elections, ranging from 6 percent in Queensland to over 12 percent 
in NSW. Some of this is deliberate, where the voter may not think very much 
of any of the candidates, some is also no doubt due to the diff iculty, for 
some voters, of remembering the names of his party's candidates. Candidates 
lAustralia, Australian Information Service, Canberra, Bulletin 
6 June 1974. 
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names are listed alphabetically and there has been a number of studies on the 
so-called 'donkey vote' where an elector numbers his choices 1 to 10 from the 
top of the ballot to the bottom. If this is a source of concern it would not 
appear to be that difficult to determine the order on the ballot paper by lot 
after nominations had closed. 
After its return to power the ALP government, at the first joint 
sitting in Australian history, pushed through an electoral reform bill by 
1 96 to 91 votes. This bill, and its intent and possible effects, will be 
discussed more fully in the final chapter. However, it is interesting to 
note that where a major party feels it is in its own interests to effect an 
electoral reform, which may well be justified, it will go to extreme lengths 
to effect it. A minor party, which may well have an even stronger case for 
reform, is by its very nature powerless, which only serves to substantiate a 
view that politics is concerned with power, and the exercise of power, not 
justice. This, in a way, is the ultimate irony since democratic politicians 
express great concern about respect for the rule of law. The two views are 
only reconcilable if one adopts the cynic's attitude that there is no rela-
tionship between law and justice. There is obviously, therefor e , some rela-
tionship between an electoral system and its appropriateness. ' Iackenzie 
has outlined 2 the basic criteria of voting systems and these are outlined 
below: 
1 The Montreal Star, August 6, 1974, p.A-5 
2W•J . M• Mackenzie. Free Elections. (New York: Rinehart, 1958), 
pp.69-71. 
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(a) Do they produce a good quality of member! 
(b) How close is the relationship between the member and the 
constituency that elected him? 
(c) Does the system produce a collectively effective assembly? 
Is it possible for the assembly elected to do the business 
required of it? Does the voting system tend to strengthen 
or weaken the party system? Does it promote party discipline 
among the electorate and in the assembly? How does it affect 
the number of parties and the possibility of lasting coali-
tions between them? 
(d) How accurately does it reflect opinion? 
(e) The attitude of electors in voting. Does it 'educate' them 
in the practice of 'democracy'? Should the voter be forced 
to take a narrow but effective decision by limiting his 
freedom of choice to a small number of pre-determined options ? 
(f) Public confidence. Does the system inspire public confidence 
in its fairness and effectiveness? 
(g) How are vacancies or by-elections filled? Can be from a 
'reserve' list (often found in municipal elections) or by 
further elections, which are an indication of current opinion 
in the constituency. 
(h) Political possibility. Existing systems may be us ed to 
defend existing regimes. 
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How then do the present systems in Australia and Britain compare 
and particularly how do they compare in relation to the Country Party and 
the British Liberal Party? 
(a) Quality of member is difficult if not impossible, to assess 
objectively. Quality of leaders in both countries and in all 
parties has often been high. The quality of members is more 
related to their power within the legislative chamber rather than 
to the electoral system alone, for example the powers and pres-
tige of United States Senators. If the "quality of Country Party 
back-benchers has not appeared high this may be more a reflec-
tion of their limited objectives than an assessment of their per-
sonal qualities. Rigid party discipline, caucus or Whip power, 
inhibits independent thinking in any party. 
(b) Both lower houses are based on single member constituencies 
in both countries. The population of the electorates in both 
countries is comparable but the geographic size of some Australian 
electorates is immense. Australian Senators are elected on a 
state-wide basis so that they are relatively l ess close to the 
electorate. With the present day mass media it i s doubtful 
whether this factor is of any great significance. 
(c) Judging the effectiveness of legislatures is also well nigh 
impossible. Is their merit in being able to pass bad legis-
lation quickly? There is no evidence of government instability 
in either Britain or Australia at either the Federal or State 
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level to match that of Italy or France under the Third 
and Fourth Republics. There is no evidence that preferential 
voting increases either the number of parties or the number 
of candidates 1 In the period 1937 1961, the . to average 
number of candidates per seat in Federal elections was 2.90 
compared to 2.95 in Britain in the period 1964 to 1974. Part 
of the reason for this is the relatively large number of uncon-
tested seats in Australia, something virtually unknown in 
Britain. In State elections the average number of candida t e s 
per seat has been even lower, less than 2.0 in South Australia 
during the same period. Party discipline is high in both Austra-
lia and Britain. However, there have been major splits in the 
ALP and in the major Australian conservative party, this may be 
due more to the Australian character than to the voting system. 
Although there have been periods of coalition instability, as 
was discussed in chapter 3 coalitions have been commonplace 
among the anti-Labor parties at both the Federal level and most 
of the States. 
Cd) In terms of relfecting opinion both systems produce inequities. 
1 
A major over-representation of the Country Party is matched by 
an even greater und er-representation of the DLP in Australia 
and of the British Liberal Party. This reflects the inadequa-
cies of both systems in terms of equity of representation, which 
Rydon, p.194. 
might be considered by some to be the very essence of a 
democratic system. 
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(e) The Australian system is probably more effective in 
educating the voter who must indicate his preferences. The 
use of 'how-to-vote' cards, common in Australia, is in many 
respects an insult to the voter's intelligence. However, 
the voter is under no obligation to follow their instructions. 
The British system is simplistic and has virtually become a 
choice between two parties and in practice between the two 
leaders. Both major parties make cornrnop reference to 'don't 
waste your vote' by voting for a minor party and particularly 
by voting for the Liberal candidate. If 'one man-one vote' has 
any real meaning then no person's vote should ever be 'wasted'. 
The exhortations of 'don't waste your vote' are a plain admis-
sion of the inequity of the system and should be a cause of shame 
to those who utte r them. A recognition of this shame on the 
part of those concerned has not been discernible to-date. 
(f) Public confidence is closely allied to (e) above. This confi-
dence is more likely to be eroded the greater the distortions 
in representation. It may not affect the staunch supporter 
of the major parties but is likely to increasingly disenchant 
the minor party and independent voters. If this is coupled 
with major social diVisions and serious economic problems it 
may well not be an overstatement to view an inequitable electoral 
system as another significant threat to democratic institutions 
themselves. 
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(g) In both Britain and Australia lower house vacancies are 
filled from by-elections which are simple to arrange in single 
member constituencies. As was seen in chapter 3 Australian 
Senate vacancies are filled by some fairly questionable prac-
tices, though admittedly multi-member electorates are more 
difficult to handle. 
(h) Political possibility is a very real factor in both countries. 
The ALP have made changes which may not make the end result 
any more equitable in absolute terms bu~ hopefully, for the 
ALP, will be less advantageous for some of their opponents and 
produce different inequities. In Britain, it certainly appears 
true that the existing Conservative/Labour regimes are main-
taining the existing system for their own benefit, since the 
degree of Liberal under-representation has reached a point as 
to be almost ludicrous with the Liberals, in the last several 
elections requiring eight to ten votes to elect their M.P. 's 
compared to the single value votes of both Labour and Conser-
vative. As Enid Lakeman commentedl "it is hard to see why 
people who think it right to take pains to make votes equal 
as between people living in different places are unwilling to 
do anything to make votes equal as between people v .. ho vote for 
different parties". She points out that all Conservative voters 
lEnid Lakeman. "A Case for Electoral Reform". Cont emporary Review 
217 (1255) (August 1970), p. 58 
168. 
in South Shields have had their vote "unemployed" right 
back to the very creation of their constituency by the first 
Reform Act of 1832 and that the same is also true of all 
Labour supporters in the "stockbroker belt" round London 
since their party 1 was founded • 
Where then do matters stand and what could be done? The British 
Liberal Party stated its policy on electoral reform in its February 1974 
Election Manifesto 2 , "Liberals would introduce proportional representation 
by the single transferable vote for all elections. The present electoral 
system buttresses the discredited 'two-party system' of confrontation. Elec-
toral reform, while giving fairer representation to ,different sectors, will 
make cooperation between them easier. The success of proportional represen-
t~tiort in Northern Ireland in uniting a divided community through a power-
sharing Executive is strong testimony for its introduction in Britain as a 
whole to heal the rifts of our society". The reference to Northern Ireland 
might appear unfortunate. However, it was the very success of proportional 
representation in giving the Catholic minority a proportional r6le in execu-
tive power that produced the extremist reaction. It would appear more logical 
to condemn the extremist reaction than to condemn the electoral system if the 
concern is with the recognition of the democratic rights of minorities. 
lEnid Lakeman. "A Case for Electoral Reform". Contemporary Review 
217 (1255) (August 1970), pp. 58-59. 
2Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1974, pp.26376/7. 
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The Liberal enthusiasm for STV is hard to understand. Butler 
estimatedl the consequences of STV and true PR for the Liberal Party and 
his estimat es have been consolidated into table 31. 
Table 31 
The Consequences for the British Liberal Party of STV and PR 
1923-1959 
Year Actual Result Und er STV Under PR 
1923 159 217 182 
1924 40 74 108 _ 
1929 59 137 143 
1931 37a 42 62 
1935 21 24 41 
1945 12 22 58 
1950 9 16 57 
1951 6 11 16 
1955 6 11 17 
1959 6 10 37 
a Includes National Liberals. 
2 For the 1966 election Pulzer quotes two results for STV of 33 and 
39 seats compared to the twelve seats actually won by the Liberals and 54 
under true PRo Immediately after the 1974 election 'The Times' stated3 
"it has been calculated that, with six million votes, the list system \,,7ould 
have given the Liberal about 125 seats, and the single transferable vote would 
lD.E. Butler. The El ectoral System in Britain Since 1918 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp.19l and 194. 
2peter G.J. Pulzer. Political Representat i on and Ele ctions 
(New York: Praeger, 1967), p.56. 
3The Times. March 4, 1974 
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have given them 33 seats". 'The Times' then went on to say that the millni-
mum the Liberals would now accept would be "single transferable vote in multi-
member constituencies in cities and boroughs, and the alternative vote in 
rural constituencies" (per unanimous recommendation of the 1916 Speaker's 
Conference). In the light of the above figures the Liberals, if given the 
chance, should certainly not settle for less. In fact, in my view the 
Liberals would be best advised to press for a system similar to that opera-
ting in West Germany. 
The West German system was developed after the Second World War 
with the twin goals of encouraging equitable representation and discoura-
ging small extremist parties. These goals could almost be said to be uni-
versally applicable. The system has been slightly amended since its incep-
t~on in 1949 but is basically a mixture of single member constituency and 
'list' system. Half the seats are in single-member constituencies won on 
the simple 'first-past-the-post' system as used at present in Britain, 
Canada and the United States. The other half of the seats are awarded under 
the d'Hondt procedure for the total number of seats by application to party 
'lists'. This has quite an impact on electoral strategy since if a party 
succeeds in electing a disproportionate number of its candidates in the 
single constituency contests it may end up entitled to no list seats and 
this did in fact happen in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1966 to the Social 
1 Democrats • 
lDavid P. Conradt. "Electoral Law Politics in West Germany". 
Political Studies. XVIII(3) (September 1970), p.342. 
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In order to secure 'list representation' a party must achieve 
five percent of the national vote and win at least three single-consti-
tuency seats directly. Obviously the larger parties benefit because of 
the 'wasted' votes for those parties that receive less than 5 percent of 
the total and/or fail to win three seats. It is of interest to see how 
the two major parties have fared under this system (table 32). 
Table 32 
Two Party (CDU/CSU and SPD) Share of Vote 
_______ an_d __ B_u_ndestag Seats 1949-1969 
Vote (%) Seats (%) 
1949 60.2 67.1 
1953 74.0 81.1 
1957 82.0 88.3 
1961 81. 5 86.6 
1965 86.9 90.1 
1969 88.8 94.0 
Obviously if minor parties were declining under this system 
their decline was not prevented. Rae calculated that, in overall terms, 
the West German system acted like a P.R. formula and gave an average vote-
2 
seat deviation of only 1.37 percent. However, it exerted a stronger defrac-
tionalisation effect on legislative parties than a straight plurality formula 
and, on average, excluded 
1 Conradt, p.356 
3 4.5 parties from the Bundestag. 
2 Douglas W. Rae. The Political Consequence s of Electoral Laws 
(2nd ed.; New Haven: Yales University Press, 1971), p.112 
3Ibid ., p.1l2. 
. 1 
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This is the most important point since the most commonly 
expressed criticism of PR, in Britain, is that it would lead to a multi-
plicity of parties and obviously, from West German experience, this need 
not be so. 
It is not the intention to review here all the possible voting 
systems that might be used in Australia or Britain but it is of value to 
compare how the West German system compares, in broad terms, with Mackenzie's 
voting criteria. 
(a) A more truly representative system might be less of a deter-
rent to minor party candidature and thus the system might 
actually raise the quality of members. However, this effect 
would probably be marginal. 
(b) The only difference would be that the single member consti-
tuencies would be twice the size, unless the legislature was 
doubled in numbers which would be technically feasible in 
Australia but not in Britain. There would obviously be some 
dilution but not insuperably, many American Sena t ors represent 
constituencies of millions. 
(c) The legislature should be more effective if more representative 
particularly in times of crisis. The average duration of one 
party majority governments in Britain, Canada and New Zealand 
. 1 
lS 4.3 years compared to four years in West Germany. Coali-
tion government is not necessarily bad government. 
lJean Blondel. An Introduction to Comparative Government. 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969), p.344. 
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(d) The West German system is a greatly improved reflection 
of opinion than either the present Australian or British 
systems. 
(e) The elector would be required to take more interest in the 
election at the local level (constituency) and national level 
(list). Democracy needs both an informed and an active 
electorate. 
(f) More equitable representation should automatically lead to 
greater public confidence in the Syst(~l~ but traditional 
outlooks do not change overnight. 
(g) By-elections are possible for vacancies in the constituen-
cies and the next name can automatically be used from the 
list for other vacancies. 
(h) Political possibility is the most doubtful point, perhaps 
less so in Australia than in Britain. Australia does have 
a tradition of partial P.R. whereas Britain has virtually none, 
coupled with the mystique that the British system is the 
oldest and truest. 
What would be the effect of introducing STV or the West German 
system in Britain? STV would have a marginal effect and would be more effec-
tive in multi-member constituencies. An analysis has been made of its pro-
bable effect in the eight major cities, outside London, in Britain, based on 
the February 1974 election results. The criterion for a 'major' city was 
five or more seats. The results are shown in table 33. A comparison of the 
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multi-member constituency seat percentages shows a much closer match with 
the percentage vote for all parties, including the Scottish Nationalists. 
The problem is that all parties gain (except Labour) at the expense of Labour. 
The Scottish Nationalists stand to gain 3 seats, the Conservatives 6 and the 
Liberals 8. It is scarcely surprising, even if somewhat amoral, that the 
Labour Party shows no enthusiasm for STV whatsoever. 
Table 33 
Percentage Vote, 1974 (%) 
Seats with Multi-Member Constituency (Actual Seats Feb~uary 1974) 
Cons. Lib. Lab. SNP Others Total 
Birmingham 39.5 10.7 48.4 0 1.5 
5(3) 1(0) 6(9) 0 0 12(12) 
Bristol 35.8 20.9 42.1 0 1.2 
2(2) 1(0) 2 (3) 0 0 5 ( 5) 
Edinburgh 40.0 15.5 31.8 12.6 0.1 
2(4) 1 (0) 2(2) 1(0) 0 6 ( 6) 
Glasgow 28.8 2.0 49.1 19.4 0.6 
4(2) 0(0) 7 (11) 2(0) 0 13 (13) 
Leeds 33.8 25.4 40.5 0 0.2 
2 (3) 2(0) 3 (4) 0 0 7 ( 7) 
Liverpool 33.2 17.9 48.3 0 0.6 
3(1) 1(0) 4 (7) 0 0 8 ( 8) 
Manchester 32.6 18.5 48.5 0 0.4 
3(1) 1(0) 4 (7) 0 0 8( 8) 
Sheffield 29.9 15.3 54.3 0 0.5 
2 (1) 1 (0) 3(5) 0 0 6( 6) 
TOTALS 34.2 14.7 46.1 4.4 0.7 
23 (17) 8(0) 31 (48) 3 (0) 0(0) 65(65) 
% Actual Seats 26.2 0 73.8 0 0 
% M.M.C. Seats 35.4 12.3 47.7 4.6 0 
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The other advantage of this approach is that redistribution is 
simplified. The city boundaries can be left unchanged and the number of 
seats varied with population changes, as is done periodically in Canada 
with the provinces. This should encourage more of a sense of civic community 
which should be beneficial. Under the present system Labour can win Glasgow 
Central with 9,400 votes since the total electorate is only 25,426 and the 
Liberals can lose in Pudsey with 18,011 votes because the electorate totals 
65,780. The transfer of one Conservative seat from Glasgow to Leeds and 
one Labour seat from Glasgow to Sheffield would even out the constituency 
size without affecting the total seat distribution. 
Introduction of the West German system in Britain would have a 
major effect in Britain and would have resulted in 125 Liberals in the House 
of Commons after the February 1974 election. This is obviously not a pros-
pect viewed with any great favour by Labour or Conservative party managers. 
In Australia a change from STV to the present British system 
would have relatively little effect. It would finally kill the already 
virtually dead DLP. If this is the only reason for its introduction by the 
ALP then it is a classic example of overkill. As long as the Liberals and 
Country Party have electoral pacts the change in the voting system itself 
will have little impact on the two conservative parties. A redistribution 
of boundaries may well reduce the number of Country Party seats but, unless 
one accepts the view that a rural vote in itself is worth more than an urban 
vote, this is long overdue. 
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A change to the West German system for the Australian House of 
Representatives would have a major effect on the relative position of the 
Country Party. If it was assumed that the total number of seats was dou-
bled with the same number of single constituency seats the Country Party 
might well win its present seats on a single constituency basis. However, 
as it is at present over-represented by a factor approaching two it would 
obtain few or even none of the list seats. It would have a seat total very 
much in line with its vote, for the first time in its history. They will 
have to hope that the ALP will overlook this possibility whilst engaged in 
overkilling the DLP. 
It is clear, therefore, that the differences in the present 
electoral systems in Australia and Britain are not significant in accoun-
ting for the differences in electoral success between the Country Party and 
the British Liberal Party. The key to the Country Party's success has been 
the concentration of its voting power in approximately one fifth of the total 
number of constituencies. If British Liberal Party support was similarly 
concentrated it would have well over one hundred seats even with a simple 
plurality system. A thinly spread vote can be just as disastrous to a party's 
electoral fortunes in Australia as evidenced by the lack of success of the 
DLP in elections to the House of Representatives. 
The single transferable vote does have an influence on the bargai-
ning power of a minor party but the only system that will give a minor party 
with evenly distributed support, a fair share of seats,is some system of 
proportional representation. The British Liberal Party would be better advised 
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to pursue some type of multi-member constituency system in urban areas, 
combined with a 'list' system for the country as a whole, if it desires 
equitable representation. 
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CHAPTER 9 
RELATIONS WITH OTHER PARTIES 
In their relations with the other parties in their respective 
countries there is obviously a very significant difference between the 
Liberal Party and the Country Party. Throughout the entire period under 
review the Liberal Party, with the exception of Lloyd George's coalition 
and Churchill's wartime coalition from 1940 to 1945, has been well away 
from being the actual government or even in serious contention since 1929. The 
Country Party on the other hand has spent many years as asignificant part of 
the Federal government and a number of the State governments. 
The Liberals obviously have grave reason to be suspicious of the 
Conservatives in any type of coalition embrace •••• "there are no conceivable 
circumstances in which the Liberal Party could enter into a coalition, 
alliance, partnership, understanding, or other collusive arrangement •..• 
with the Conservative Party. Liberals are not separated from Conservatives 
merely by a difference in the way of doing things ..... They are separated 
in their fundamental aims, in thought, in idea, in principle; and there is 
1 
neither any event, nor any formula that can ever bridge this gulf". This 
was written immediately after the 1923 election but it still reflects the 
views of many Liberals and was a factor in March, 1974 immediately after 
lTrevor Wilson. "The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914-1935" 
pp. 286-287, quoting Liberal Magazine, December 1923. 
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the 1974 election when Heath was exploring with Thorpe the possibility of 
continuing as Prime Minister with some form of Liberal support. 
Clement Davies had been a National Liberal for a number of years 
until leaving the group in November 19391 and even as late as May 1950 he 
had, as then leader of the Liberal Party, to make a public statement that 
there was I~O intention of compromising the independence of the Liberal 
2 Party" This statement was made necessary after Lord Wool ton, Chairman 
of the Conservative Party, had told Conservatives that he did not know "of 
any practical issues on which Liberals and Conservatives are not agreed,,3. 
If the Liberals ever achieved a comparable position, in terms of relative 
strength to the Conservatives, as the Country Party had relative to the 
National Party in 1923, in Australia, then the Conservatives could find 
themselves faced with equally tough terms. 
Relations with Labour have, historically, been more amicable, 
in fact Labour owes a great deal of its early success in displacing the 
Liberals as a major party to the Liberal Party itself. Gratitude is never 
particularly noticeable in politics but if Liberal strength should continue 
to grow Labour might find itself under some compulsion to be suitably grate-
ful. As a radical party there is a natural tendency, outside areas such as 
nationalisation, for there to be more empathy between the Liberals and 
1 Roy Douglas, p.244 
2Ibid ., p.261, quoting "The Times", 3 May 1950. 
3Ibid ., p.261. 
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corresponding minds in the Labour party. In 1965, there were fairly 
strong indications that Grimond was leading towards some sort of accom-
modation with Labourl • Fortunately for the Liberal Party he was rebuffed. 
The Liberal Party would be most unwise to make any long term accommodation 
with either Labour or Conservatives without, at very least, a major modi-
fication in the electoral system, otherwise as the weaker partner they 
could very easily be out-manoevred. 
Over the past half-century there have been many moves from 
the upper levels of the Liberal Party to both Labour and Conservatives, 
in the latter case usually by the National Liberal route. An example is 
the case of one prominent pre-war Liberal, Sir Richard Acland, who left 
2 the Liberals in 1942 to become the leader of Common Wealth. Later, Acland 
joined the Labour Party and became M.P. for Gravesend for several years 
before retiring from politics at a comparatively early age. 
In Australia the Liberal Party "makes no secret of the fact that 
it looks forward to the day when there will be only one non-Labor party and 
that it is working to this end,,3. In many respects the Country Party invites 
1 Roy Douglas, p.28l 
2 Common Health was a dissident radical group, unhappy with the 
wartime electora l truce and distru s tful of the Chambe rlain Conservatives. 
It attracted a diverse group of former Lib erals, former memb ers o f th e 
British Battalion of the Spanish Civil War International Brigade , Soc ialists , 
Communists and soon disintegrated after the war. 
3A· k· lt ln, p.335. 
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this attitude since its concentration on matters of rural interest has left 
the initiative, little as it has been, on other policy matters, to the 
Liberalsl . 
Australian Conservatives have always taken a pragmatic approach 
to party organisation and policy, organisation in particular being regarded 
merely as a tool to win elections and achieve power.2 The Australian National 
Federation was never anymore than a loose federation of stat e Nationalist 
Party organisations. After the Scullin Labor Government came to power in 
1929 its concern was how to get them out and the Australian National Party was 
prepared to cooperate in any form, including its own disappearance , to achieve 
this. From such fundamental philosophy the United Australia Movement ~vas 
3 
created. The UAP itself was l ed by a former Labor Premie r of Tasmania 
and its task was made considerably easier by a three way split in Scullin's 
government in 1931. The UAP lost ground in 1934 and had to fall back on coa-
lition with the Country Party under Page. Australian politics has thrown up 
some real characters and none more so than Page, a brilliant, eccentric man 
h 1 d d 1 d L h ' P' M" 4 w 0 a so serve as me ica a viser to yons, 1S own r1me ln1ster. 
Menzies and Page clashe d from the start and supposedly this dated 
back to 1920 when Henzies' father lost his seat in the Victoria n Legis l a t i v e 
1 . 
Coleman, p.26 
2John R. Williams. "The Organisa tion of the Australian National 
Party". The Australian Quarterly. 41(2), June 1969, p.4l 
3Ibid ., p.43 
4Ge orge Fairbanks. "Menzies Becomes Prime Minister , 1939". 
The Australian Qua rterly. 40(2), June 1968, p.20. 
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Assembly to a Country Party candidatel • On the death of Lyons in office 
Page tried once again to play the role of kingmaker in his coalition part-
ner's affairs. This time he tried to block Menzies from becoming leader 
of the UAP by starting a campaign in support of Bruce for Prime Minister -
Bruce at the time was on a visit to Australia from his normal duties as 
High Commissioner in London. Hughes, who was 76 years old, almost won over 
2 Menzies but Menzies finally won the UAP leadership by 23 votes to 19 • 
Page promptly resigned and launched a bitter attack on Menzies which shocked 
even his own colleagues and "Fadden and three other Country Party members 
3 temporarily left the Party . 
After the outbreak of war in September 1939, the Country Party 
directed Page to offer to re-establish the coalition but Menzies, not 
unnaturally, flatly refused to have Page and the tables were turned. Page 
was persuaded to resign as Country Party leader and was succeeded by Cameron. 
In August 1941 Menzies was overthrown by a revolt in his own party and Fadden 
became Prime Minister for a few weeks until Labor came to power with the 
collapse of the UAP. 
This brief summary clearly illustrates the sorts of pressures 
and manoeuvres between the Country Party and its allies which inevitably 
produce recriminations and tensions. The Country Party held together in 
lCeorge Fairbanks. "Menzies Becomes Prime Minister, 1939". 
The Australian Quarterly. 40(2), June 1968, p.19 
2Ibid .,p.26. 
3Ibid ., p.28. 
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opposition much better than their ertswhile partners and it took all of 
Menzies great skill to put together a new Liberal Party from the ruins of the 
UAP1. A big factor in rallying conservatives of all hues together was 
the referendum in August 1944 when the ALP attempted to pass a constitu-
tional amendment to give the Commonwealth Government power to regulate 
employment, marketing, and the production and distribution of goods. 
At the State level there are varying degrees of competition and 
tension between the Country Party and the Liberals. Only in Victoria does 
the Country Party hold its options completely open with a willingness to come 
to an accommodation with the ALP as well as the Liberals. Aitkin discusses 2 
the attempts of the New South Wales Liberals to bring about a merger between 
the Country and Liberal parties in the postwar years and particularly in 
the period 1944 to 1947. The situation in N.S.W. underlines the dangers to 
the Country Party of being one-sidedly anti-Labor and having achieved many of 
its immediate economic goals. However, to-date the Liberals have needed 
the Country Party as an ally and have made virtually no attempt to challenge 
the Country Party in its strongholds at election time. 
The situation in Queensland is very different since being the 
junior partner in a composite government headed by a Country Party Premier 
lJohn R. Williams. "The Emergence of the Liberal Party of 
Australia". The Austr alian Quarterly. XXXIX(l) March 1967, pp.7-27. 
2Don Aitkin. "The 
South Hales, 1944 to 1964". 
XI(2), 1965, pp.150-162. 
Country Party and Non-Labor Unity in New 
The Australian Journal of Politics and History. 
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is a continual source of irritation to Liberal membersl • In the days of 
the lengthy Labor rule it was jointly agreed that the Country Party should 
contest the easy seats and that the richer and more highly organised Liberal 
Party in Queensland should contest the more difficult ones 2• Originally 
the Country Party in Queensland opposed, though not unaminously, the intro-
duction of preferential voting and perhaps not unnaturally feels that the 
Liberals motive for triangular contests is in order to secure the Premiership 
for themselves. It must equally naturally be most irksome to the Liberals 
to poll more votes than the Country Party and obtain fewer seats. At the 
federal level in Queensland the Liberals had an agreement not to contest 
Country Party held seats, but in Labor held seats the parties jointly nomi-
nated Liberal - Country Party candidates who, if elected, would then be free 
to choose with which party they sat in parliament. This produced an unex-
pected result, in the 1958 federal election, when a Country Party branch 
official was elected in Herbert and chose to join the Liberals3 • 
In Victoria, Holt admitted in 1967 that "there may be some pro-
blems on the State scene in Victoria"4 in referring to relations with the 
Country Party. In 1958 the Liberals would not agree to a combined team 
for the Senate, which meant that in 1958 all the non-Labor Senate candidates 
from Victoria were Liberals and in retaliation the Country Party contested 
1 Overacker, p.276 
2Ibid ., p.276. 
3Rawson, Australia Votes, p.27. 
40veracker, p.276 quoting the "Australian", 24 November 1967. 
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seats in the House of Representatives held by Libera1s1 On the other 
hand, relations in the federal parliament between McEwen, who was from 
Victoria, and Menzies were generally good. 
The situation in South Australia has become more complicated 
in the past decade. A separate Country Party was formed in 1963 and won 
its first seat in the 1973 House of Assembly election by corning to an 
"understanding" with the ALP2 There has also been a r ecent split in the 
Liberal and Country League with an active campaign in 1973 by the breaka~ay 
Liberal Movement. The Democratic Labor Party did not contest any seats 
and declared the Liberal Movement, ALP and Communist Party to all be 
unacceptable a"s second preference a1ternatives3• In terms of inter-party 
relations the situation can only be described as fluid. 
The 1969 Federal election showed a sharp loss of Liberal seats 
to the benefit of the ALP. The Country Party held its own, a pre-election 
redistribution cut back its strength by one seat. The Country Party was 
thus relatively stronger relative to its Liberal ally which put McEwen 
in a strong bargaining position. He asked for, and got, an additional 
Country Party member in the Cabinet, to make a total of four and a total 
of seven out of 26 ministers 4 • This setback caused problems for Gorton 
with his own Liberal party, Fairbairn refused to serve under him and he 
had to transfer McMahon from the Treasury to External 
1 Rawson, p.54. 
2 Dean Jaensch. "The South Australia State Elections 1973". 
The Australian Quarterly. 45(4) (December 1973), p.83. 
3Ibid ., p.84 
4 Anon. "Mr. Gorton's Growing Troubles". Round Table 238(1970) 
p. 206 
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Affairs. The 1972 election brought an end to the twenty-three year long 
rule of the Liberal/Country Party government and Ironmonger considered 
that this was mainly because the coalition had become stagnant in terms 
of economic innovations compared with the United States, Britain and Wes-
1 tern Europe • 
Finally, a word about the Democratic Labor Party - the 'other' 
third party in Australia. It started originally as the Anti-Communist 
Labor Party in Victoria in 1955 and officially became the DLP in June 1957 
with branches in all states except Queensland. In 1962, a Queensland 
breakaway Labor Party with similar views affiliated with it. The DLP fede-
ral vote is relatively evenly distributed and it has never elected a member 
to the House of Representatives though, in 1968, it did have four Federal 
S~nators. It has no prospect of winning office and has used its preferen-
ces to try to keep the ALP out. Normally, it can deliver about 80 percent 
of its vote as second preferences to the Liberals/Country Party. The 1974 
federal elections were a major setback and resulted in the defeat of all the 
DLP candidates for both the House of Representatives and the Senate. 
2 The DLP is basically a Catholic Centre Party though in the 
1967 Victoria Senate campaign two out of its three candidate s were Protes-
tants. It attracts young married voters, new immigrants with a deep fear 
of communism and white collar workers. Contrary to popular belief it is 
not sectarian. 
1 D.S. Ironmonger. "Australia's New Government. Round Table 
250(1973), pp.225-23l. 
2 Robert R. Alford. Party and Society (Chicago: Rand McNally 
& Co., 1963), p.200. 
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It was remarkably successful in its attempts to keep the 
ALP out-of-power federally and probably cost the ALP victory in two, 
maybe even three, federal elections. As a result they are a prime target 
of the ALP, now in office, who are seeking a basic alteration to the elec-
toral system in order to deprive the DLP and its supporters of any future 
influence. The workings of 'democracy' are oft mysterious. 
The recent merger between the Country Party and the DLP in 
Western Australia may be a portent for the future. The ALP when in 
power, has an uncanny knack for digging its own grave, partly by extreme 
policies and partly by galvanising all its opponents to effectively unite 
against them. Australian politics has never been dull and with a relati-
vely even balance between Labor and non-Labor the relations between four 
parties are a continuing matter of interest. The emergence of the Austra-
lia Party in the past three federal elections poses a similar threat to 
the Liberal Party in particular, and to a lesser extent to the Country 
Party, as did the emergence of the DLP in the mid-fifties to the ALP. 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE PARTIES FUTURE 
The present (1974) is a time of flux for both the Country 
Party and the British Liberal Party. The Liberal Party received its 
largest voter support, in February 1974, in nearly fifty years. Jupp, 
writing in 1964, commented that the Country Party "has declined, not 
because of bad organisation or leadership or internal dissension. The 
classes and groups which brought it into existence are simply no longer as 
1 
aggrieved nor as numerous as they were half a century ago". However, 
after the success of the Country Party and its Liberal partners in the 1966 
elections Overacker saw the greatest danger to the Country Party in the 
Liberals obtaining a clear majority and being able to dispense with depen-
2 dence on the Country Party for support • 
The relative power of the Country Party has declined, at the 
Federal level, over the past fifty years. In the Bruce-Page Ministry the 
Country Party held five out of the eleven portfolios, in the Menzies Minis-
try they held less than a quarter of the portfolios. The biggest threat to 
the Country Party is the decline in the size of its support base, which is 
proceeding rapidly. The 1954 Census showed 13.3 percent of the work force 
1 Jupp, p.16l 
2 Overacker, p.3l7 
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engaged in primary production, by 1966 this had fallen by nearly a third 
1 to 9.4 percent. The metropolitan and other urban areas are steadily 
rising in population whilst there is even a slight decline in rural popu-
1 . 2 atlon • Any redistribution of Federal seats based on present population 
patterns is bound to have an adverse effect on the Country Party. However 
unpalatable this may be to the Country Party it is basically inevitable and 
justified. It will certainly reduce the extent of over-representation of 
the Country Party but is unlikely to completely eliminate their relatively 
favourable position. This position depends on the concentration of Country 
Party strength in approximately one-fifth of the total number of seats. The 
future of the Country Party therefore depends on its ability to hold onto 
its support in these areas. 
This of course is true for any party. However, for a minor party 
it is more crucial to hold on to its relatively much fewer supporters who 
may become disheartened at perpetual minor party status. The Country Party 
has shared power, at the Federal level, for two-thirds of its existence and, 
in four of the states, for one-third of its existence which is not the normal 
state of affairs for a minor party. The very success of the Country Party 
in the past and the fact that it has achieved many of its goals, in such 
areas as marketing and the provision of rural transport facilities, may be 
IMalcolm MacKerras. "Another Second Preference Government". 
The Australian Quarterly. 41(4) (December 1969), p.32 
2J • B• Condliffe. The Development of Australia. (New York : 
Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp.59, 60 . 
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1 
a factor against it now. However, Coleman argues that "the particular 
interests it represents are so real, so definite a part of the country, 
that there is no point in looking forward to its disappearance,,2. Alford 
considers that a third party in Australia may not be more significant than 
a pressure group in the United States and that it is the combination of 
disciplined major parties coupled with the alternative vote or pro portional 
3 
representation that forces the pressure to take the form of a new party • 
There are a number of factors favouring the Country Party at 
present. Being in opposition federally, with the Liberals, against an 
active ALP government means that they are less likely to be subject to 
pressure from the Liberals who need their support if they are to regain 
power. The Liberals have relatively little to offer in the way of new 
policies and ten years ago appeared to be running out of initiative4 
Under McEwen the Country Party attempted to broaden its base. He spoke 
of the need for balanced development and took a strong interest in 
5 
secondary manufacturing and mineral development. This tended to produce 
6 
a rural backlash and threaten basic primary producer support For some 
7 
time the Country Party has been losing strength in the Country towns 
1 Rawson, pp.57, 58. 
2 Coleman, p.26. 
3 Alford, p.307. 
4 Jupp, p.179. 
SA' k' lt ln, p.335. 
6 Overacker, p.3l0. 
7 Jupp, p.160. 
and has been threatened by active rural wings of both the ALP and the 
Liberals l • 
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The rationale for a purely country party thus becomes more and more 
questionable and in any situation where the major parties are evenly balanced 
the minor parties run the risk of having some of their election 'planks' sto-
len. The British Liberal Party is faced with a similar problem, for example 
Labour's current espousal of elected Assemblies for 2 Scotland and Wales • 
It is difficult for a minor party's supporters to accept that they may be 
achieving their own goals if one of their major party opponents adopts cer-
tain of their goals. It is, however, in its basic challenge to the two-party 
system that the British Liberal Party is posing a fundamental issue to the 
British electorate. Jeremy Thorpe repeatedly hamme rs a t this issue so clearly 
expressed in the Liberal Election Manifesto (1974) in these words "this 
country cannot be ruled from the extremes of right and left which set the 
people against each other - it must be run by a Government whose neutrality 
is unquestioned, whose policies are fair-minded and whose politics is not 
governed by vested interests. Politics has become sterile; the old two-
party system has finally proved its inadequacy. Old political theories of 
unbridled free enterprise and undiluted socialism have been shown to be irre-
levant •••• Politics has gone away from the people and this in a democracy 
is the most dangerous development of recent years". 
lAO k " lt ln, p.336. 
2The Guardian, September 6, 1974, p.lO 
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Some writers have tried to paint this as a virtue. Bonham com-
ments that the two party system in Britain has "helped to concentrate atten-
tion on the distribution of wealth between classes. British politics are 
almost wholly innocent of those issues which cross the social lines in 
other lands - for example race, nationality, religion, town and country inte-
rests, regional interest, or the conflict between authoritarian and parlia-
1 
mentary methods". A notable recent convert to the evils of the pre sent 
two party system and the merits of proportional representation for Britain 
is Professor Finer2. He considers that th~ Labour and Conservative Parties 
"have become increasingly the prisoners of their own clienteles". He notes 
that the average distribution of trade unionists votes over the past ten years 
has been 60 percent to Labour and 40 percent to other parties. Yet the trade 
u~ion leadership is 100 percent Labour, or to the Left of the Labour Party. 
He ·leans towards the West German electoral system and method of financing 
parties. 
Recent polls in Britain show increasing concern about extremism. 
A team from Essex University conducted a survey of 2,462 voters afte r the 
February 1974 election. They found that three out of eight voters regard 
either Labour or Conservative as "extreme". More than half thought that 
Labour divide s the nation and forty percent called the Tories "bloody-minded,,3. 
1 John Bonham. The Middle Class Vote. (London: Faber & Faber, 
1954), pp.194, 195. 
2S . E . Finer. "In Defence of Deadlock". The Guardian. Se ptem-
ber 7, 1974, p.ll. 
3 Bernard Nossiter. "Coalition Idea Gains Favor in Britain". 
The Montreal Star. September 17, 1974, p.A-ll, c.2. 
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The Liberals are not alone in their concern with the shortco-
mings of the British two-party system. Ian Harvey, a former Conservative 
M.P. and Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office ) 
advocated, six years ago, a new radical movement made up from the right of 
Labour, the centre and left of the Conservatives and the general mass of 
Liberals l • Christopher Mayhew, a former Labour Navy Minister, in his state-
ment of resignation from the Labour Party to join the Liberals,wrote that 
the Labour Party "has become too vulnerable to the extreme left and too 
dependent on the unions •••• at the present time I particularly support their 
(the Liberal Party) campaign for a political realignment. We need a revolt 
of the centre against extremes •..• we must break away from the old Tory-
Labour confrontation which sets one half of the country against the other. 
Just as sectarian political parties like those in Northern Ireland increase 
sectarian divisions, class parties increase class divisions,,2. 
One of the most disturbing features of the current British 
socio-political scene is the mushrooming of extreme right organisations led by 
ex-military officers. Enoch Powell and his transfer from Wolverhampton to 
Northern Ireland is a relatively normal political move. The National Front 
is a fairly natural evolution from the Mosleyite movements. However, it is 
groups such as Great Britain 75, the National Association of Ratepayers 
lIan Harvey. "Next Entry into Westminster". The Political Quar-
terly. 39(3) (July-September 1968), p.307. 
2The Times, July 10, 1974, p.l, c.3 
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Action Groups and the Union Committee for Action under the leadership 
of Colonel Stirling, General Sir Walter Walker and Major Greenwood that 
are a new phenomenon. The British prefer their generals to stick to sol-
diering. Cromwell may have been efficient but life vIas more fun under 
Good King Charles. The Duke of Wellington was a military hero and a much 
hated political leader. The rationale for the existence of these movements 
is the fear of politically motivated strikes. The strike is basically a 
weapon of force not reason and its excessive use, and especially abuse) gene-
rates a reaction which may be even more undesirable, and the polarisation 
of views is accelerated. 
One consequence of this has been a renewed interest in the idea 
of some form of coalition government. Professor Finer expressed the advan-
tages as follows, "of this Parliament, something can be said. No major 
interest has been able to capture it .... Suppose this situation were to 
continue for a decade or more - then the consequences seem more likely t o 
be benign than otherwise ••.• Capital and labour would have to carryon their 
1 
conflict - or their collusion - on the industrial plane to which it belongs" • 
Even among trade unionists there is a concern with current trends. In an 
August 1974 Gallup Poll 52 percent of the trade union members polled felt that 
in the present situation the trade unions should hold back wage claims 
and 54 percent of trade union members polled were against political involve-
ment by the trade unions2 • This comes at a time when totalI,abour Party 
IF' lner, p. 11, c. 6, 7. 
2"Union Members Want Pay Policl1 • The Sunday Telegraph. 
September 1, 1974, p.4, c.l,2. 
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membership has fallen by nearly 100,000 in the past year and individual 
membership of constituency parties by over five percent · in the same 
. d l perlo • 
This poses a very real challenge to the Liberal Party. It is a 
basic long-term goal of the Liberals to replace Labour as the Radical oppo-
. . h C . 2 sltlon to t e onservatlves. To-date the Liberals have done best in seats 
held by the Conservatives. In the period 1950-1959, 203 Conservative, 
110 Labour and 3 Liberal seats were unchanged. Lees considered that the 
best hope for the Liberals might well be in these 'safe' seats where the 
opposing major party effort is low3 As a result of the February 1974 
election there are now forty-nine seats where the Liberals ran second and 
where a swing of 7~ percent from the winning party to the Liberal candidate 
would result in a Liberal win. HOvlever, of these forty-nine seats 47 are 
4 Conservative held and only two Labour. Liberal success here would thus 
seriously weaken the Conservatives whilst leaving Labour relatively untouched. 
Mr. Heath and Mr. Wilson are well aware of this and thus the Conservatives 
are relatively conciliatory to the Liberals and Labour relatively contemptuous. 
1 The Sunday Telegraph. September 1, 1974, p.l, c.l. 
2D•E• Butler and A. King. The British General Election of 1964 
(London: Macmillan, 1965), p.98. 
3 J.D. Lees. "Aspects of Third-Party Campaigning in the 1964 
General Election". Parliamentary Affairs. 19(1), 1966, p.88. 
4The Economist. September 7, 1974, p.30, c.l, 2. 
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The challenge to the Liberals now is to make comparable inroads and pose 
equivalent threat into Labour held seats as they have in Conservative 
seats. If they can do this then the Liberal Party will be both a more 
viable and a more credible third party. 
In conclusion, therefore, it is clear that the primary reason 
for the success of the Country Party, compared to the lack of success of 
the British Liberal Party, lies in the concentration of their voting 
strength into approximately one-fifth of the total seats. Compared to 
this the voting system differences are of relatively minor importance. The 
British Liberal Party is unlikely to obtain electora l 'justice' from the 
use of the single transferable vote alone and would be better advised to 
press for some combination of proportional representation that included a 
'list' component. A Federal system with its larger number of senior level 
governments does make it easier for a minor party to maintain a presence 
but again only if its strength is concentrated in certain regions, as in 
Australia. Leadership, organisation and policy are the lifeblood of any 
political party and both the Country Party and the British Liberal Party 
are in relatively good shape in these areas. The Country Party may well be 
in for a slow decline due to the combination of a shrinking rural population, 
relative to total population, and the end in sight of their favoured 
electoral position. The British Liberal Party, on the other hand, may well 
be on the threshold of again achieving major party status. The October 
1974 general election results disappointed expectations but still gave the 
party nearly one-fifth of the votes. If the Liberal Party does achieve 
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major party status again it will be because of the severity of Britain's 
social and economic problems and its responsibilities, in terms of seeking 
solutions to these problems, will be awesome. 
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APPENDIX 
THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE AND PROPORTIONAL 
REPRESENTATION SYSTEMS 
The Single Transferable Vote (STV) system used in Australia 
is not a system of proportional representation. STV is applied, for 
elections to the House of Representatives, in single-member constituencies 
and was primarily introduced, and mainly used, as a means of avoiding 
splitting the anti-labor vote. 
STV can only be used as a means towards proportional represen-
tat ion in multi-member constituencies. The best example of this is the 
Hare system as used in elections to the Dail in the Republic of Ireland. -
1 The average number of seats in a district is quite small, 3.7 , and the 
Irish experience has not shown any proliferation of parties or tendencies 
towards unstable government. This is also basically the system used in 
Australian Senate Elections. Five Senators are normally elected from each 
State every three years. The quota for election is the total number of 
votes cast divided by the number of seats to be filled plus one, i.e. in 
this case by six, plus one. 
As candidates reach the quota they are declared elected and 
their second preference votes distributed among the remaining candidates. 
1 Rae, pp.36-38 
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In order to determine who wins the final seat the candidate with the 
lowest total number of votes is eliminated and his preferences counted 
and so on, until the last successful candidate reaches the quota. For 
example if 60,000 votes are cast for the five seats, the quota would be 
60,000 divided by six plus one, i.e. 10,000 plus one = 10,001. When five 
successful candidates for the five seats have each reached the quota of 
10,001 there are only 9,995 votes left for the sixth, and unsuccessful, 
candidate. 
There are a number of variants on this basic system - d'Hondt highest 
average formula, Lague highest average formula, the imperiali largest 
remainder formula - all of which are used in Europe with the d'Hondt system 
the most common (Austria, Belgium, Finland, West Germany, Norway (until 
1~53, Lague after 1953) and Switzerland). 
The size of the district has a big impact on the degree of close-
ness attained between proportion of seats and proportion of votes. The 
greater the number of seats in a district the closer it is possible to pro-
portion seats won to votes cast. In some small countries, such as Israel 
and the Netherlands, the entire country is a single electoral district and 
the relationship between seats and votes is close. 
Various devices can be used to e ither make it easier or more 
difficult for small parties to obtain seats. The imperiali formula used 
in Italy lowers the quota required to obtain a seat and thus makes it easier 
for small parties to secure a seat. The West German system requires a party 
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to win at least three seats by simple plurality plus obtaining at least 
five percent of the total national vote in order to secure representation 
from its list candidates. This has had the effect of steadily reducing 
the number of small, and often extremist, parties. 
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